Systems fragility: the sociology of chaos by Hodges, Lori R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
Systems fragility: the sociology of chaos
Hodges, Lori R.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








Thesis Advisor:  Robert Josefek 
Second Reader: Wayne Porter 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
SYSTEMS FRAGILITY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHAOS 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Lori R. Hodges 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER   
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
  AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis seeks to examine the concept of community fragility in emergency management from a systems 
perspective. Two questions are studied. First, can community fragility be qualitatively measured? Second, does this 
concept hold value for the emergency management field? Using literature that addresses fragility in four areas of 
complex systems—ecosystems, social systems, socio-technical systems, and complex adaptive systems—we create a 
theoretical framework focused on the emergency management field. This theoretical framework is then assessed 
through a multi-case analysis, examining three diverse large-scale events that have occurred in the United States in 
the past decade. Assessing each fragility factor from the theoretical framework for each case study reveals that the 
framework is sound. These findings allow for the development of a causal prediction model illustrating how 
community fragility factors can be used in the emergency management field to not only improve overall outcomes 










14. SUBJECT TERMS  
complexity, systems theory, systems, fragility, emergency management, socio-technical, social capital, 
resilience, vulnerability 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
171 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
SYSTEMS FRAGILITY: THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHAOS 
 
 
Lori R. Hodges 
Director of Emergency Management, Larimer County Government, Fort Collins, CO 
B.A., Metropolitan State University, 2005 
M.A., University of Colorado at Denver, 2006 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
























Chair, Department of National Security  
 iii 




This thesis seeks to examine the concept of community fragility in emergency 
management from a systems perspective. Two questions are studied. First, can 
community fragility be qualitatively measured? Second, does this concept hold value for 
the emergency management field? Using literature that addresses fragility in four areas  
of complex systems—ecosystems, social systems, socio-technical systems, and complex 
adaptive systems—we create a theoretical framework focused on the emergency 
management field. This theoretical framework is then assessed through a multi-case 
analysis, examining three diverse large-scale events that have occurred in the United 
States in the past decade. Assessing each fragility factor from the theoretical framework 
for each case study reveals that the framework is sound. These findings allow for the 
development of a causal prediction model illustrating how community fragility factors 
can be used in the emergency management field to not only improve overall outcomes 
after disaster, but to also build less fragile systems and communities in preparation for 
future disasters.  
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Over the last decade, the United States alone has averaged at least one large-scale crisis 
or extreme event per year. In this environment of complex disasters, we see differences in 
how communities respond and recover. In some of these disasters, the community bands 
together and recovers faster and to be stronger than before. In other cases, the disaster 
cripples the community, leaving it for years to come in ruins, socially, politically, and 
economically.  
This thesis takes a new approach to the study of community response and 
recovery. It examines the concept of community fragility in emergency management 
from a systems perspective based on research in fields outside emergency management. 
The assertion is that 1) there is a gap in the current emergency management literature and 
policies with regard to community fragility and what causes systems to fail, and 2) there 
should be a way to qualitatively measure fragility as an emergency management concept. 
Therefore, two questions are studied. The first is whether community fragility can be 
qualitatively measured, and the second is whether this concept has value in the 
emergency management field.  
This research uses a multi-method approach to answer these questions. Using 
literature that addresses fragility in four areas of complex systems—ecosystems, social 
systems, socio-technical systems, and complex adaptive systems—we create a theoretical 
framework focused on the emergency management field.  
Using multi-case analysis, this framework is refined to include factors affecting 
community fragility within the emergency management field. The findings of the case 
studies allowed for the development of a  community  fragility  causal  prediction  model 
illustrating how community fragility factors can be used in the emergency management 
field to not only improve overall outcomes after disaster but to also build stronger 
systems and communities in preparation for future disasters.  
Three themes were developed from an examination of the research: 
connectedness, stability, and sustainability. Recent trends have shown an increase in 
 xvii 
focus upon resilient communities, but as shown in this research, resiliency is merely one 
factor of the whole. Along with resiliency, there are factors that affect the sustainability 
of a community. Additionally, the connections between community members, public 
officials, and emergency management practitioners play a role as well as the overall 
stability of the community before the disaster strikes. This could explain why plans and 
procedures so often fail despite the best efforts of everyone involved—they were looking 
through a lens that was too small.  
Each one of the case studies chosen for this research illustrated key concepts that 
are critical to emergency management when looking into the future. The first is the 
understanding that our disaster landscape is not the same as it was when the discipline of 
crisis management emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, crisis managers looked 
at a specific problem or a potential disturbance within a system. The aim was the same— 
to stop a cascading event from occurring. Managers assumed, however, that the 
triggering event would be stable and recognizable. With the increase in complexity in the 
twenty-first century, along with our highly interdependent global network, we have 
entered into a new era where we face greater instability and less recognizable problems. 
This research illustrates this new environment by outlining various factors of fragility 
from a systems perspective. The research does not end at risk and vulnerability 
assessments. Instead, it recognizes the importance of these factors along with the 
importance of social structure of a community, the leaders who shape policy, the 
interdependencies of our critical infrastructure, the structure of emergency management 
systems, and the people who put it all together. 
The concept of fragility alone is significant to the field of homeland security and 
emergency management. While studied in several other disciplines and fields, our hope is 
that this important idea will gain momentum in the area of disaster management. Doing 
so will cause a change in focus. Instead of looking merely at how to reduce a threat, the 
inclusion of fragility allows emergency managers to turn around and see the connections 




and execute as expected, only to see the event unravel and fail. The focus on fragility 
brings to light areas previously hidden that explain these failures and provide a roadmap 
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“The fragile wants tranquility, the antifragile grows from disorder.” 
–Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
 
Late in the evening on May 4, 2007, a series of 22 tornadoes formed in Kansas. 
One of these storms created an EF51 tornado that killed 11 people and destroyed the 
declining farm town of Greensburg, Kansas.2 After the initial shock of the event passed, 
the community members saw the destruction as an opportunity to re-create their 
community and to strengthen it against future storms in the process. Using renewable 
energy options for rebuilding efforts within three years, Greensburg has been transformed 
into a “green” community. It is now a model community not only for renewable energy 
but also for community recovery after disaster.3  
Sadly, many other communities do not share the same fate. In 1993, nearby 
Chesterfield, Missouri, was inundated by flood waters in a multi-state flood event 
affecting the entire 32.5 mile town and a population of 50,000 people. Unlike 
Greensburg, however, Chesterfield did not recover fully. One study reported that 
Chesterfield lost 200 businesses in the flood and over two-thirds of those businesses 
never recovered.4  
What makes one community falter after disaster while another thrives and grows 
stronger in the process? Is there a formula for success that communities can follow to 
ensure a recovery that not only gets them back on track but increases the odds of a better 
1 Enhanced Fujita Scale. EF5 is the highest level rating for a tornado. 
2 Leslie Lemon, and Mike Umscheid, The Greensburg, Kansas Tornadic Storm: A Storm of Extremes 
(Norman, OK: Cooperative Institute for Mesoscale Meteorological Studies, University of Oklahoma, 
2008), https://ams.confex.com/ams/pdfpapers/141811.pdf, 2.4.  
3 Shanti Pless, Daniel Wallach, and Lynn Billman, “From Tragedy to Triumph: Rebuilding 
Greensburg, Kansas, to Be a 100% Renewable Energy City” (presented at the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, ACEEE Summer Study Conference, Pacific Grove, CA, 2010), NREL/CP-550-48300, 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/11/f5/48300.pdf, 4.  
4 Clara Beitin, The Great Flood of 1993: The Important Role of State and Local Governments, Pace 
University, accessed January 20, 2015, http://landuse.law.pace.edu/landuse/documents/StudentArticle/
Reg7/MidwestFlood.doc 
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outcome in the future? More importantly, is there a way to determine the point at which a 
community’s ability to withstand shocks and disturbances from disasters ends and system 
failures begin to occur?  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
Over the last decade, the United States alone has averaged at least one mega-crisis 
per year.5 A mega-crisis is a distinguishing factor between the disaster that remains 
within the community’s capacity to respond and recover, and that which exceeds that 
capacity.6 In a book called Mega-Crises: Understanding the Prospects, Nature, 
Characteristics and the Effects of Cataclysmic Events, it states, “Mega-crises are not just 
‘more of the same;’ they present a new class of adversity with many ‘unknowns.’ They 
defy boundaries, limits, neat demarcations, patterned connections and linear 
consequences.”7 These types of events challenge all of our basic assumptions about 
response and recovery from large-scale events. They also challenge our assumptions 
about the methods used by political leaders, emergency responders, and community 
members. With these challenges come solutions that often diverge or conflict as complex 
problems do not have simple answers.8  
This increase in mega-disasters or mega-crises is partially responsible for a new 
degree of complexity we are seeing in emergency management. We have more people 
living in areas susceptible to wildfires, flooding, tornadoes, and coastal disasters than 
ever before in our history.9 And though the causes of climate change are yet to be fully 
explained, our nation has experienced dramatic weather and climate changes over the last 
5 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Disaster Declarations,” 2014, http://www.fema.gov/
disasters  
6 Marc Landy, Climate Adaptation and Federal Megadisaster Policy: Lessons from Katrina, 
Resources for the Future Issue Brief 10–02 February 2010, http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-IB-10-
02.pdf, 2. 
7 Ira Helsloot, ed., Mega-Crises: Understanding the Prospects, Nature, Characteristics, and the 
Effects of Cataclysmic Events (Springfield, IL: Charles C .Thomas Publishing, 2012), 5. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  
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decade, compounding the dangers people face from large-scale disasters. Jeffrey Kluger, 
TIME Magazine, reports,  
Wildfires in such regions as Indonesia, the western U.S. and even inland 
Alaska have been increasing as timberlands and forest floors grow more 
parched. The blazes create a feedback loop of their own, pouring more 
carbon into the atmosphere and reducing the number of trees, which inhale 
CO2 and release oxygen.10 
With climate change, the destruction from extreme events such as hurricanes, 
floods, and wildfires is more pronounced, leading to increased overall costs of recovery. 
According to Erwann Michel-Kerjan and Fredderic Morlaye with the International 
Association for the Study of Insurance, “There have been as many as four times more 
Category 4 and 5 hurricanes during the period 1996–2005 than during the period 1900–
1925.”11 Additionally, two studies in 2005 found that the number of Category 4 and 5 
hurricanes worldwide have doubled in the last 35 years, and the wind speed of all 
hurricanes has increased almost 50 percent.12 In 2005 and 2006, the insured losses from 
Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Wilma were estimated at $85 billion, another historical 
record.13 Disasters in 2011 set a new record of $366 billion for economic losses, with 
29,782 deaths associated with over 302 major disasters.14  
Routine crises and emergency situations can be managed with normal structures 
in place, but once the event passes into the realm of the mega-crisis or extreme event, 
many of those tried and tested structures cease to support the community. Gustav 
Koehler, Guenther Kress, and Randi Miller, at California State University, wrote,  
Managing complex, chaotic, and high level crises requires different sets of 
knowledge, skills, and preparation that involve decision making, central 
10 Jeffrey Kluger, “Earth at the Tipping Point: Global Warming Heats Up,” TIME, March 26, 2006, 
accessed December 27, 2014, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1176980,00.html, 37. 
11 Erwann Michel-Kerjan, and Frederic Morlaye, “Extreme Events, Global Warming, and Insurance-
Linked Securities: How to Trigger the ‘Tipping Point,’” The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues 
and Practice 33, no. 1 (2008): 76.  
12 Kluger, “Earth at the Tipping Point,” 34. 
13 Michel-Kerjan, and Morlaye, “Extreme Events, Global Warming,” 154.  
14 Roxana Ciurean, Dagmar Schroter, and Thomas Glade, “Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability 
Assessments for Ntural Disasters Reduction,” in Approaches to Disaster Management: Examining the 
Implications of Hazards, Emergencies and Disasters, ed. John Tiefenbacher (Rijeka: Intech, 2013), 3. 
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and yet flexible organizational structures, and a leadership capacity to stay 
on top of the crisis that is unfolding with dynamic changes.15  
They go on to state that during times of instability, it is essential to recognize that 
stability can only be regained by introducing a bit of instability into these environments 
with communities and networks that are dynamic and fluid.16 By looking at these events 
differently, it may be possible to better understand and anticipate how and when systems 
fail as these events progress from the routine into the complex.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
From an emergency management perspective, how can the fragility of a 
community be measured and what are its implications?  
2. Secondary Question 
If community fragility can be qualitatively measured, is that measurement 
a useful tool in emergency management? For example, would a larger 
network of local emergency management partners increase or decrease the 
fragility of a community with regard to response and recovery from large-
scale emergencies and disasters, and does the governmental structure and 
trust in elected or key officials make a community more or less fragile to 
future disasters?  
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this environment of mega-crises and complex disasters, we see differences in 
how communities respond and recover. In some of these disasters, the community bands 
together and recovers faster and becomes stronger than before, such as the community of 
Greensburg, Kansas did.17 In other cases, the disaster cripples the community, leaving it 
in ruins for years to come, socially, politically, and economically.18 The idea of 
15 Gus Koehler, Guenther Kress, and Randi Miller, What Disaster Response Management Can Learn 
from Chaos Theory (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing, 1995), http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/05/
over_2.html, 13.   
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Patrick Quinn, “After Devastating Tornado, Town Is Reborn ‘Green,’” USA Today, Green Living 
Magazine, April 25, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/greenhouse/2013/04/13/greensburg-
kansas/2078901/ 
18 Kim Ann Zimmermann, “Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage and Aftermath,” Live Science, August 
20, 2012, http://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane-katrina-facts.html 
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community fragility is explored as an emergency management concept to identify those 
community structures and emergency systems that strengthen a community overall.  
There is very little research on fragility as an emergency management concept. 
Most studies involve fragile ecological systems or fragile nation states, each of which 
have similarities to emergency management but are not specific to this field.19 
Additionally, words such as “resilience” and “vulnerability” are common terms to 
describe hazards and the ability to recover from an event but are inadequate to describe a 
system failure, or “tipping point,” where a community may no longer be able to fully 
recover. Therefore, this research seeks to examine how we measure these failures, the 
points of fracture, and determine whether this measurement can assist communities 
before disaster occurs.  
This research will not include an analysis of social networking (Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.), loose social groups, or unaffiliated volunteers. Instead, the focus will 
remain on primary emergency management systems, such as political systems, 
emergency systems, and the strength of community organization. Network analysis will 
be used to determine the strengths and weaknesses of these connections or links between 
members of a community and to analyze the impact of those partnerships on the overall 
ability of the community to not only recover but to become less fragile for future events. 
Additionally, key emergency management standards and practices will be analyzed to 
determine if points of fragility in these systems can be measured, allowing for change to 
occur prior to a disaster affecting a community. Therefore, while the topic centers on 
fragility at a community level, this paper will use systems and networks theory to 
synthesize data and analyze the results.  
The assertion of this thesis is that 1) there is a gap in the current emergency 
management literature and policies with regard to community fragility and what causes 
systems to fail, and 2) there should be a way to qualitatively measure fragility as an 
emergency management concept. This topic has the potential to show a weakness in our 
19 Paul Schuler, “International Policy toward Fragile States and the Fate of the Nation State: An 
Interview with IR/PS Professor Miles Kahler,” Journal of International Policy Solutions (Spring 2007): 7, 
,http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/012/6362.pdf  
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concept of emergency management at the community level, specifically with regard to 
those areas in which we attempt to create solutions but instead increase fragility of the 
system in the future. Dirk Helbing, a physicist and professor at the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology in Zurich, explains this weakness in his paper on emerging systemic risks. 
He states,  
It is shown that linear, experience-based, or intuitive approaches often fail 
to provide a suitable picture of the functioning of social and economic 
systems. This leads to the illusion of control and a dangerous logic of 
failure, which can lead to paradoxical system behaviours, unwanted side 
effects, and sudden regime shifts.20  
Therefore, while concentrating on quick and full recovery from disasters, it is equally 
important to determine ways in which we can strengthen the system for the next disaster.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research will help determine if the fragility of a community can be 
qualitatively measured and whether that measurement can lead to stronger emergency 
management and community networks in the future. For over 30 years, the emergency 
management community has been working to control and manage large-scale incident 
response. Over the same amount of time, social scientists have been studying complex 
systems and networks requiring flexibility and adaptability in order to survive.21 These 
two schools of thought converge with the study of fragility in emergency management. 
No longer will the focus remain on being resilient, or “bouncing back” to normal after a 
disaster, but instead on building systems and structures that allow a community to gain 
strength and decrease their fragility before the next disaster. Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
states, “Almost all people answer that the opposite of ‘fragile’ is ‘robust,’ ‘resilient,’ 
‘solid,’ or something of the sort. But the resilient, robust (and company) are items that 
neither break nor improve.”22 The concept of fragility makes communities not only look 
20 Dirk Helbing, Systemic Risks in Society and Economics (Zurich, Switzerland: International Risk 
Governance Council, 2010), 1.   
21 John Harrald, “Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response,” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604, no. 1 (2013): 256.  
22 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House 
Trade Paperbacks, 2014), 32. 
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at resiliency and sustainability, but it also leads to a forward-looking philosophy of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
“A changing, uncertain world in transformation demands action to build 




Many theories exist regarding the proper structure and function of emergency 
management and community systems in disasters. Although the literature covers a wide 
variety of such theories, this review primarily focuses on their application to the theory of 
community fragility. Because this term is not a common or well-established term in 
emergency management, Part I of the literature review begins with a section on key 
research terms definitions, including terms such as resiliency, vulnerability, and risk, 
which have all been used to some degree to determine degrees of fragility.  
Due to the complex nature of emergency management, research into diverse 
complex systems was utilized to determine what characteristics may constitute fragility. 
Several complex systems, including ecosystems, social systems, socio-technical systems, 
and complex adaptive systems, were studied as the baseline for this research. To make 
the connection between the literature and emergency management and begin the 
conceptual development, a conceptual analysis was added to each section, providing 
research and data on the applicability of findings in each complex system to the field of 
emergency management. Part II of the literature review presents prior studies related to 
fragility by first presenting existing literature and then applying that literature to 
emergency management. This structure is repeated throughout the literature review in 
each complex system studied.  
B. PART I: KEY RESEARCH TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
The terms risk and vulnerability are often used in emergency management to 
describe the state of a community before a disaster, but they are also often misused and 
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confused. Many emergency management analysts agree that vulnerability is based upon a 
hazard, specifically the frequency and severity if that hazard was to occur.23 Therefore, a 
vulnerability analysis is used to determine how vulnerable a community is to a specific 
hazard occurring and whether that hazard will cause minimal or maximum harm (see 
Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Thesis Definition of Vulnerability 
In contrast, the dictionary definition of risk is, “exposure to the chance of injury 
or loss.”24 According to the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UNISDR) report, there are two essential elements in the formulation of risk: 1) a 
potential hazard, and 2) the degree of susceptibility, or the vulnerability to the hazard (see 
Figure 2).25  
 
 
Figure 2.  Thesis Definition of Risk 
Dirk Helbing describes systemic risks as those that do not just have independent 
failures but interdependent, or “cascading,” failures in a system with multiple 
interconnections. He states, “Systemic risks result from connections between risks 
(networked risks).”26 In such cases, a localized initial failure could have disastrous 
23 Joern Birkmann, “Risk and Vulnerability Indicators at Different Scales: Applicability, Usefulness 
and Policy Implications,” Environmental Hazards 7 (2007): 21. 
24 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Risk,” accessed December 27, 2014, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
risk?s=t 
25 Ciurean, Schroter, and Glade, “Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability,” 5. 
26 Dirk Helbing, “Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond,” Nature 497, no. 7447 (May 
2013): 51, doi:10.1038/nature12047.      
Vulnerability: Susceptibility to damage or harm 
Risk: The degree of susceptibility (vulnerability) and exposure to a hazard and the 
capacity to respond 
 
 10 
                                                 
effects and cause infinite damage (see Figure 3). For example, a tree limb may strike a 
power line at a vulnerable part of the larger electric system. This could cause a 
overloading in the system and transformer failures affecting a much larger area. If not 
caught and corrected soon enough, the simple tree limb could cause a large-scale power 
blackout affecting millions of people.  
 
Figure 3.  Conceptual Framework to Identify Risk27  
Even higher risks are incurred by networks of networks or those that combine 
different kinds of systems. Emergency management is an example of a network of 
networks, causing an increase in risk as the disaster becomes more complex.28 Using 
Figure 3 as an example, emergency management is a system involving hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability, and adaptive capacity. These four areas intersect multiple social and 
technical systems within emergency management that interrelate to solve complex 
problems. This “network of networks” can create increased risk overall. However, by 
identifying areas where 1) hazards may be mitigated, 2) exposure may be limited, 3) 
vulnerability may be reduced, and/or capacity can be improved, the overall risk can be 
decreased.29  
27 Ciurean, Schroter, and Glade, “Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability.”  
28 Naim Kapucu, and Vener Garayev, “Designing, Managing, and Sustaining Functionally 
Collaborative Emergency Management Networks,” The American Review of Public Administration, 43 
(2012): 312. doi:10.1177/0275074012444719. 
29 Ciurean, Schroter, and Glade, “Conceptual Frameworks of Vulnerability,” 9. 
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The word “resilience” is used by many as a catch-all phrase for a community’s 
capacity to recover. The root of the word comes from the Latin word “resilio,” which 
literally means to “jump back.”30 The dictionary definition is quite similar, stating that 
resilience is the “power or ability to return to the original form or position, or the ability 
to recover readily.”31 In physics, the term refers to the speed at which a material or 
system returns to equilibrium after displacement.32 These definitions all outline a concept 
of being able to absorb a shock (disaster) and return to original form (see Figure 4).33  
By its nature, resilience is a reactive concept.34 It focuses on the community after 
a disaster, not before. This does not mean that the term is not a positive concept. The 
ability to withstand shocks and quickly return to a sense of normal following a disaster is 
incredibly important for a community. Yet, the concept of resiliency alone does not 




Figure 4.  Thesis Definition of Resilience 
1. Community  
In the Handbook of Disaster Research, it defines emergency management as, “the 
discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning, and management to 
30 Gian Paolo Cimellaro, Andrei M. Reinhorn, and Michel Bruneau, “Framework for Analytical 
Quantification of Disaster Resilience,” Engineering Structures 32, no. 11 (2010): 3639–3649.  
31 Dictionary.com, s.v. “Resiliency,” accessed December 27, 2014, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/resiliency?s=t  
32 Fran Norris et al., “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities and Strategy for 
Disaster Readiness,” American Journal of Community Psychology 41 (2007): 129.  
33 National Research Council of the National Academies, Applications of Social Network Analysis for 
Building Community Disaster Resilience: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press, 2009), 23.  
34 Siambabala Bernard Manyena, “The Concept of Resilience Revisited,” Disasters 30, no. 4 (2006): 
438, doi:10.1111/j.0361-3666.2006.00331.x.  
Resilience: The ability of a system to return to its original form or position, or the 
ability to recover quickly.  
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deal with extreme events that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive 
damage to property, and disrupt community life.”35 In order for emergency managers to 
work within these parameters, they cannot work alone, in one department or jurisdiction. 
Emergency managers must depend upon the various communities who may be able to 
offer support and assistance in accomplishing disaster related goals.  
When most people think of the word “community,” they see a vision of people 
working together in a specific geographic area, sharing common interests or needs. In 
addition, the term has also been used to describe almost any collection of individuals, 
whether they are governmental, non-governmental, political, professional, social, ethnic, 
or religious. For example, in one municipality, there may be a church, a university, an 
apartment complex, a subdivision, a political headquarters, and a real estate association. 
Each of these alone could be considered a community.36  
Another view of community involves the notion of competing interests where 
various groups negotiate with each other over power and influence, leading to a 
disproportionate distribution of risk. Therefore, community can be characterized by both 
consensus as well as conflict. Current research indicates that this is a factor in whether a 
community is able to recover from disaster.37  
Therefore, the idea of community goes beyond any one geographic limit or social, 
political, or religious construct. It is also more than the sum of its parts or its individual 
members. In the book, The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, Scott Peck 
uses the analogy of a gem to better define the complexities of community. Much like a 
gem, in order to understand the community, one must understand all of its facets, each of 
which is one mere part in the whole.38   
35 William A. Anderson, Patrick J. Kennedy, and Everett Ressler, “From Research to Praxis: The 
Relevance of Disaster Research for Emergency Management,” in Handbook of Disaster Research, ed. 
Havidan Rodriguez, Enrico L. Quarantelli, and Russell Dynes (New York: Springer, 2007), 468.  
36 Morgan Scott Peck, The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Touchstone, 1998), 1.  
37 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, “From Research to Praxis,” 468. 
38 Peck, The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace, 1. 
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In order to use the term “community” for the purposes of this research, it must be 
restricted to the confines of emergency management (see Figure 5). Researchers at the 
Disaster Research Center have categorized all governmental and non-governmental 
organizations into four basic categories: 1) established, 2) expanding, 3) extending, and 
4) emergent organizations.39 According to the same researchers, established and 
expanding organizations already have disaster-related tasks on a daily basis and merely 
expand their responsibilities depending upon the size of the disaster. These may include 
governmental structures such as emergency management organizations, fire departments, 
law enforcement, emergency medical services, and hospitals. They may also include non-
governmental organizations, such as the American Red Cross or the Salvation Army. 
Extending groups do not have a day-to-day disaster mission, but they have been involved 
in disaster-related planning and preparedness activities, which may include construction 
companies or debris removal companies that are integral to an effective disaster response 
and recovery. It also includes homeowners associations, faith-based groups, and 
community organizations that work together on a regular basis. Finally, emergent groups 
are those that have no prior formal structure but come together for a disaster-related 
purpose. This group includes unaffiliated volunteers who flock to a disaster scene and 
provide a variety of services to the affected area.40  
 
 
Figure 5.  Thesis Definition of Community 
Established, expanding, and extending groups can all be considered communities 
within the emergency management realm. Each has a defined group of people that share a 
common goal or purpose and each is well established prior to a disaster. Due to the nature 
of emergent groups, however, they are not typically considered a community pre-disaster. 
39 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, From Research to Praxis,” 472. 
40 Ibid. 
Community: Unified groups of individuals with a common purpose before, during 
and after emergencies and disasters 
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Therefore, for purposes of this research, community will be defined as those unified 
groups of individuals with a common purpose before, during, and after emergencies and 
disasters. This may include governmental and non-governmental partners as well as 
community organizations, such as faith-based groups, homeowners associations and 
geographic communities with no formal authority or government structure.   
2. Fragility 
The term community fragility is the main focus of this paper. This term is much 
less used in the emergency management field, but it accurately portrays the notion of 
decreasing community risk both before and after disaster by looking at individual points 
of weakness that may lead to systemic failures (see Figure 6). The dictionary defines 
fragile as “easily broken, shattered or destroyed.”41 When discussing fragile states from 
an international perspective, the term fragility is used to describe a point of failure or the 
risk of failure for a community within a nation state.42 In architectural terms, based on 
earthquake fragility, the term is used much in the same way to describe a point of failure 
or the probability of failure to a building.43  
 
 
Figure 6.  Thesis Definition of Fragility  
 
41 Dictionary.com, s.v., “Fragility,” accessed December 27, 2014, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/fragility?s=t  
42 Patrick Guillaumont and Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney, “State Fragility and Economic 
Vulnerability: What Is Measured and Why?” Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid, accessed 
December 27, 2014, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/erd-2009-background-paper-state-fragility-and-
economic-vulnerability-what-measured-and-why-patrick_en, 12–14.  
43 Bruce R. Ellingwood, Ozan Cem Celik, and Kursat Kinali, “Fragility Assessment of Building 
Structural Systems in Mid-America,” Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics 36, no. 13 (2007): 
1936.  
Fragility: A quality that leads to weakness or failure within a system, sometimes 
resulting in cascading effects (the domino) that can lead to systemic failures and 
collapse 
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Two areas of emphasis are important in determining the degree and measurement 
of fragility for the emergency management field. The first is a point of weakness that may 
cause a failure. For example, in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space 
Shuttle Challenger Accident, the cause of the shuttle explosion was found to be “a failure 
in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor.” The report 
goes on to state that no other part of the shuttle system contributed to the failure.44 This 
incident involved one point of weakness that caused the shuttle system to become fragile 
and fail.  
The second area of emphasis involves more complexity, where the accumulation 
of small failures build up and result is systemic failures. This is often called a “tipping 
point” where individually, these areas of fragility would not cause extensive harm, but 
collectively they take the system to a point where it is unable to function and it fails.45 
Continuing with the example of a space shuttle, this collective series of failures can be 
adequately shown in the space shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003. In a report by Marcia S. 
Smith titled, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
concluded that a series of failures occurred that ultimately caused the shuttle disaster.46 A 
root cause analysis shows the cascading events that caused this tragedy: 1) The orbiter 
disintegrated, due to 2) a left wing structural failure, due to 3) the shuttle’s weakened 
state after extreme heat and velocity in re-entry, due to a hole that was created in the wing 
due to 4) a 1.7 pound piece of foam that struck it just after liftoff.47 On the surface, it 
seems that the 1.7 pound piece of foam that separated from the external tank caused this 
44 U.S. Government Printing Office, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle 
Challenger Accident (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), Chapters III and IV. 
45 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: 
Back Bay Books, 2002). 
46 Marcia Smith, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003), http://history.nasa.gov/
columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Documents/Congress/
CRS%20Summary%20of%20CAIB%20Report.pdf 
47 Ibid.  
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disaster.48 But upon further analysis, if that piece of foam had not hit the left wing 
causing a hole, then the superheated air would not have been able to disintegrate the left 
wing upon re-entry, ultimately leading to the destruction of the shuttle as a whole. 
Additionally, the Columbia Accident Investigation Report found that a “culture” of 
neglect and shortcuts led to ignored warnings about the problem with the foam in the first 
place. All of these factors played a role in the ultimate destruction of the shuttle and led 
to the loss of lives of the seven astronauts onboard the aircraft.49  
Since fragility is not well used in the emergency management field, both 
individual and systemic weaknesses and failures will be used to determine fragility. 
Therefore, for purposes of this research, fragility is defined as a quality that leads to 
weakness or failure within a system, sometimes resulting in cascading effects (the 
domino) that can lead to systemic failures and collapse.  
3. Community Fragility 
Community fragility is explored as a network, or system of systems. For example, 
a homeowners association may not be a formal government structure, but it ties a group 
of people together for a common purpose and can either increase or decrease fragility 
before, during, or after a disaster (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7.  Thesis Definition of Community Fragility 
Additionally, an emergency management system is not tied together through 
government but through a common understanding of the needs of the environment around 
them. Government structures also play a key role in the definition of community fragility. 
48 “Root Cause Analysis: The Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster,” ThinkReliability, 2014, 
http://www.thinkreliability.com/cm-columbia.aspx  
49 National Aerospace and Security Administration, Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 
Vol. 1, 2003, http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Documents/Congress/
House/SEPTEM~1/executive_summ.html  
Community Fragility: A quality that leads to weakness and possible failure within a 
“system of systems” which connects emergency management and an affected 
community  
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Loosely formed governments, such as special districts or tax-based entities providing a 
service, play a role as surely as do the more formal municipal, county, state, and federal 
institutions.  
Each of these groups, or social systems, will have a direct effect on the response 
and recovery from a disaster. If failures occur within the network of people or groups, or 
a series of failures occur, it will affect the whole. If the fragility of the community could 
be measured, however, failures may be recognized early enough to make the necessary 
changes to strengthen the system overall. Additionally, as we have seen in multiple recent 
disasters, cascading events from a disaster can be just as devastating as the original event. 
Through a study of community fragility, mitigation measures may be better established to 
decrease the dangers associated with disaster and in effect, decrease or eliminate the 
catastrophic cascading events that follow.  
C. PART II: STUDIES IN FRAGILITY AND THEIR APPLICATION TO 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
A vast amount of research is available in the emergency management field 
regarding community resiliency and vulnerability, specifically with regard to hazard 
assessments and recovery procedures. However, the topic of fragility is relatively new to 
emergency management and homeland security, and the further defined idea of 
community fragility is even less studied. Therefore, several areas of fragility were 
explored in this research to determine basic commonalities.  
A recent trend in the field of emergency management involves a “whole 
community” approach to disaster preparedness and response. According to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency,  
We must leverage all of the resources of our collective team in preparing 
for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating 
against all hazards; and collectively we must meet the needs of the entire 
community in each of these areas.50  
50 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Whole Community Engagement,” 2014, 
https://www.fema.gov/whole-community  
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This suggests that in order for emergency management to be effective, the field must 
expand and include various community components, including community organizations, 
non-profits, businesses, the private sector, and other key groups within the area served by 
the emergency management organization. Since community fragility is defined as a 
system of systems, it must be researched in a holistic fashion, which includes formal 
emergency management and governance structures as well as informal community 
structures and social norms. This has the potential to provide a broader picture of the 
complexities involved in managing these large-scale disasters and allow emergency 
managers the ability to solve problems otherwise unknown when studying each 
individual system on its own. 
The majority of the literature on fragility and/or community fragility is based 
upon research in complex social, technical, and biological networks. Accordingly, the 
remainder of this section is broken down into sub-sections in each of these areas. 
Additionally, each section provides first a review of the literature available on fragility, 
and the application of that literature to the conceptual development of fragility in 
emergency management.  
D. ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND FOOD WEB NETWORKS 
A large amount of research available regarding the topic of fragility exists in the 
study of ecological systems and food web networks.51 Food webs consist of networks of 
food chain relationships in ecosystems and provide a complex picture of species 
interaction, diversity, structure and function.52 Complex food web networks, such as 
rainforests and coral reefs, often appear more stable than less complex systems. In a 
complex systems group project published by the Santa Fe Institute, Institute of 
Theoretical Physics, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the authors argue that 
although stability does not typically correspond to complexity in mathematical models, 
51 Ricard V. Solé and Jose M. Montoya, “Complexity and Fragility in Ecological Networks,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 268, no. 1480 (October 2001): 2039, doi:10.1098/
rspb.2001.1767.  
52 Jennifer A. Dunne, Richard J. Williams, and Neo D. Martinez, “Food-Web Structure and Network 
Theory: The Role of Connectance and Size,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 99, no. 20 (October 1, 2002): 12917, doi:10.1073/pnas.192407699.  
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this is not necessarily true for the natural world. The authors state, “In nature we deal not 
with arbitrary complex systems, but rather with ones selected by a long and intricate 
process.”53 Due to these intricacies, ecological systems and the networks that connect 
them are studied as a first step in understanding fragility.  
1. Relevant Bodies of Literature on Ecological Systems and Food Web 
Networks 
An ecological community consists of a group of interacting or potentially 
interacting species that live in the same place. The community is bound together by the 
impacts and influences the species have on one another.54 This level of 
interconnectedness leads to varying degrees of stability, where a disturbance to one 
species has a direct effect on all other species. Food web networks illustrate this principle 
at a larger level, through a series of relationships and interactions between ecosystems.55  
The review of the literature begins with species connections and the effects of loss 
of strong and weak species within the system. The first factor concerns the connections of 
the key species, often called “keystone” species, to other areas of the system, as well as 
the effects on the system if that species were removed. Several studies, such as that of 
Solé and Montoya, have found that upon the removal of the most connected species from 
a food web, community stability will be greatly disturbed.56 For example, in Washington 
State, starfish have been known to be keystone species— the most connected within the 
community. Through their existence, they provide the ability for smaller species to thrive 
since they stave off mussels that would otherwise feed on the smaller species. Therefore, 
the very existence of the starfish keeps other species from extinction. Another example of 
the importance of the keystone species is equivalent to the role of a keystone in an arch. 
53 Samraat Pawar et al., Evolution of Food-Web Networks in Fluctuating Environments (Beijing, 
China: Santa Fe Institute, Institute of Theoretical Physics, and Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2005), 
http://www.unm.edu/~oskar/project%20report%20CSSS05%20final.pdf  
54 “Ecological Communities: Networks of Interacting Species,” Global Change, October 26, 2008, 
http://www.globalchange.umich.edu/globalchange1/current/lectures/ecol_com/ecol_com.html  
55 Dunne, Williams, and Martinez, “Food-Web Structure and Network Theory,” 12917–12922.  
56 Solé, and Montoya, “Complexity and Fragility in Ecological Networks,” 2039.  
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The keystone is under the least amount of pressure of any of the stones within an arch, 
but the arch would collapse without it.57  
A recent study suggests that weakly interacting species can also be keystone 
species, in the sense that their loss can have multiple consequences causing a trickle-
down effect (or domino effect), which will cause dramatic changes throughout the system 
as a whole.58 For example, the extinction of sea otters from the Pacific Coasts of North 
America led to the extinction of kelp forest communities. This was due to overgrazing of 
the kelp by a predator species no longer controlled by the sea otter population. Bo 
Ebenman and Tomas Johnson have studied whether these results were typical or whether 
the phenomenon was unique to one species. They found that this phenomenon is common 
amongst a variety of species and that analysis can be used to identify fragile community 
structures and keystone species. Hence, they found this can provide management 
priorities for the preservation of the species.59  
The relationship between connectedness and stability is also the subject of many 
studies, most of which concentrate on the overall change in stability of the species’ 
community when small disturbances are introduced. Interactions and diversity within the 
food web have been shown to strengthen the network as a whole.60 Therefore, in order to 
maintain a robust ecological network, with the ability to adapt and the flexibility for 
change, must have a diverse combination of keystone species as well as weak species to 
optimize species interaction and decrease the possibility of species collapse or extinction. 
2. Ecological Systems Literatures Applied to the Concept of Fragility in 
Emergency Management 
The literature on ecological networks, specifically food webs, is significant to the 
study of fragility in emergency management in several ways. We live in a highly 
57 “Keying in on Keystone Species,” Arizona State University School of Life Sciences, 2014, 
https://askabiologist.asu.edu/what-keystone  
58 Bo Ebenman, and Tomas Jonsson, “Using Community Viability Analysis to Identify Fragile 
Systems and Keystone Species,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 20, no. 10 (October 2005): 568, 
doi:10.1016/j.tree.2005.06.011.   
59 Ibid., 569.  
60 Pawar et al., Evolution of Food-Web Networks in Fluctuating Environments. 
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interconnected global environment, where the actions of one group have the ability to 
greatly affect another group or the global community as a whole.61 Furthermore, the 
emergency management field is also a loosely connected network of various systems and 
providers. For example, a bomb explosion in a crowded urban area will involve 
emergency services systems such as fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical 
services, as well as the healthcare system, intelligence community, and a series of non-
governmental and private sector partners—all working in concert to mitigate the disaster. 
A weakness in any one of these areas could lead to an individual system failure or a 
cascade of events that create a failure throughout the intricate network of systems.62 
Using the bomb example, a failure of the intelligence community to share vital 
information with local law enforcement may lead to a lack of surveillance, allowing the 
bomb to go off. Additionally, a systemic failure can be illustrated using the same 
example. The lack of surveillance may lead to the attacker gaining vital information and 
detonating a bomb in a crowded subway station, leading to a disruption in the 
transportation system. The explosion further affects the system by taking out the power 
transformer nearby, leading to a collapse of the energy transmission throughout the area, 
which further complicates the transportation system by disabling stoplights at key 
intersections. This cascade of events has the potential to go on until a full collapse of the 
system is seen with an increase in damage as an increase in the loss of lives.  
The first consideration in the literature for ecosystems is the importance of the 
keystone species and the connections between the keystone species to all other parts of 
the ecosystem. In emergency management, the keystone species is often the local 
emergency manager. He or she is the most connected individual within the system before, 
during, and after a disaster and her or his loss could have a dramatic effect on the system 
as a whole. Additionally, because of the emergency manager’s role as an integrator and 
61 Erica P. Dalziell, and SoniaT. McManus, “Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptive Capacity: 
Implications for System Performance” (presented at the International Forum for Engineering Decision 
Making, Stoos, Switzerland, 2004), http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/2809/
1/12593870_ResOrgs_IFED_dec04_EDSM.pdf  
62 William Waugh, and Gregory Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency 
Management,” in “Effective Emergency Management: Articles of Collaborative Public Management,” 
special issue, Public Administration Review (December 2006): 131–40.  
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coordinator between multiple groups and networks of people, he or she also shares the 
burden of keeping smaller groups from extinction. For example, Voluntary Organizations 
Active in Disaster (VOAD) would not have a means of effectively connecting into a 
disaster without a central coordination point such as an emergency operations center or 
the emergency manager. They would still function, possibly, but not effectively and their 
existence could actually cause harm if their activities were done in an uncoordinated 
manner. Additionally, without a key role in the disaster, the groups could very well break 
apart and cease to exist.  
Another key finding in the ecological literature found that a weak species could 
sometimes be considered a keystone if its removal had the potential to cause systemic 
failures. Similar to ecological networks, studies have been conducted to determine the 
thresholds for individual networks to fail when specific groups or individuals are 
removed. How many people can be removed before the system fails as a whole? 
Researchers have found that with individual networks, there is a progressive decline in 
functionality as individuals are removed until finally a failure occurs.  
From an emergency management perspective, such a phenomenon can be found 
in the interactions between individuals and groups during a disaster. For example, the 
American Red Cross is one of the primary support entities for post-disaster sheltering 
operations. As a non-governmental entity, it does not have the direct responsibility for 
sheltering people in jurisdictions. Instead, that responsibility lies with the governing 
authority, whether it be the municipal, county, or state government. For many 
jurisdictions, however, they rely heavily on the American Red Cross to support incident 
operations and would suffer without its support. Therefore, if the Red Cross was removed 
from the emergency management system, it would have the potential to cause a trickle-
down effect, much like in ecosystems, where multiple other individuals and groups would 
be affected. For example, in the 2013 Colorado Flood event, the American Red Cross 
was overwhelmed with requests for shelters and evacuation points. It exceeded its 
capacity to respond and had to call in national resources to help manage the event.63 If 
63 “Red Cross Responds to Colorado Flooding,” American Red Cross, September 13, 2013, 
http://www.redcross.org/news/press-release/Red-Cross-Responds-To-Colorado-Flooding  
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the Red Cross support had ceased during this event, it would have placed an enormous 
burden on the local jurisdictions to provide shelter to the thousands of displaced people in 
the 17 affected counties. This, in turn, would cause a strain on logistical support, human 
resources and on the overall prioritization of tasks for the incident. Therefore, while the 
American Red Cross is not considered the “keystone” in emergency management, its 
removal could have devastating effects.   
Finally, the literature on ecological systems suggests that connectedness and 
stability are both key factors in the survival of ecosystems. This area of research 
discusses how a species community would respond when small disturbances are 
introduced and suggest that greater interactions and diversity lead to a stronger network 
overall. This ties back in to the concept of “whole community” planning and emergency 
management. In the 9/11 Commission Report, one of the key findings of the panel was 
that organizations working in silos, without the ability to share information, had a direct 
effect on the inability to detect and apprehend the hijackers before the attacks on 
September 11, 2001. The report calls for “a unity of effort” in several key areas, bringing 
the intelligence community, Congress, and foreign operatives together to “transcend 
traditional governmental boundaries.”64 This notion of crossing boundaries and creating 
greater diversity in the homeland security arena has the potential to strengthen national 
efforts to combat terrorism. Additionally, as the literature suggests, with a more diverse 
network, small disturbances are easier to absorb and manage, decreasing the chance of 
failure in the emergency management system. See Figure 8 for an overview of the key 









64 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [executive summary], 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf, 21. 
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Figure 8.  Fragility Measurements for Ecological Systems  
and Food Web Networks 
E. SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
In the past, there has been an assumption that ecological and social systems 
should be treated independently, but further research confirms that both behave in a 
similar fashion. Each is a dynamic, nonlinear, complex, and evolving system interacting 
in a multitude of ways.65 Differences between individuals create differing outcomes 
based upon history, culture, complexity, and individual preferences.66 Individuals often 
must make decisions based upon uncertain information and future expectations. In an 
issues paper by Huma Haider, of the International Development Department at 
Birmingham University, she states, “The empowerment of local people and the 
perception and treatment of them as resourceful and capable can also contribute to 
confidence-building and feelings of worth.”67 This allows for a great deal of innovation 
and improvisation when the situation warrants. In emergency situations, where the stress 
is high and the ability to predict outcomes decreases, individuals must depend upon these 
traits of flexibility and adaptability in order to survive.  
In this section, social systems are explored in a few ways. The vast amount of 
research on fragility of social systems exists within the context of increasing or 
65 Carl Folke et al., “Resilience and Sustainable Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World 
of Transformations,” Ambio 31, no. 5 (August 2002): 437.   
66 Helbing, “Globally Networked Risks and How to Respond,” 57.  
67 Huma Haider, Community-Based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected and Fragile 
Contexts (Birmingham, England: University of Birmingham: Governance and Social Development 
Resource Centre, 2009), 9. 
Measuring Fragility in Ecological Systems and Food Web Networks 
• Removal of species—Removal of primary species (keystone) causes instability, 
removal of weaker species can also cause a trickle-down effect, which will cause 
changes throughout the system as a whole. 
• Fragile ecosystems—The least fragile systems have a combination of weak and 
strong species which creates a mix of cooperation and competition. 
• Diversity—Interactions and diversity strengthen the system as a whole. 
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decreasing social capital, which is further divided into three primary areas of social 
capital: trust, social norms, and networks. Additionally, this section analyzes social 
cohesion and social vulnerability as concepts of fragility in social systems.  
1. Relevant Bodies of Literature on Social Systems 
As related to researching the key factors that may make a community more or less 
fragile during and after disasters, multiple studies illustrate that social capital is a primary 
factor. Social capital primarily consists of social norms, trust, and networks. These areas 
can be more specifically defined as three types of connectedness: bonding (social norms), 
bridging (trust), and linking (networks).68 Bonding involves the social norms that are 
formed between families and communities sharing the same demographic characteristics 
and similar objectives. Bridging involves the capacity of groups of people from different 
ethnic or geographical backgrounds to make links with others that may have different 
views. This involves a degree of trust in order to form these relationships outside areas of 
comfort or influence. Finally, linking describes the ability of these various groups to 
communicate and work with external partners or systems. Linking involves the creation 
of networks between the community and formal systems, such as business or 
government, either to influence their policies or to utilize helpful resources.69  
a. Social Norms 
Existing research suggests that there is a connection between the type and 
quantity of support provided by social networks and the relationships between the people 
within each social network. Studies have found that community ties with friends and 
family are the primary way through which people get the resources they need to survive. 
These ties make up much of the social capital people use in daily life and help people to 
capture opportunities and reduce uncertainty.70 Several studies, such as one carried out 
68 Yuko Nakagawa, and Rajib Shaw, “Social Capital: A Missing Link in Disaster Recovery,” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 22, no. 1 (March 2004): 9. 5–34 
69 Jules Pretty, “Social Capital and the Collective Management of Resources,” Science (New York, 
N.Y.) 302, no. 5652 (2004): 1912, doi:10.1126/science.1090847.   
70 Barry Wellman, and Scot Wortley, “Different Strokes from Different Folks: Community Ties and 
Social Support,” American Journal of Sociology 96, no. 3 (November 1, 1990): 558. 
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by Hayden, have found that community ties are not only dependent upon the interactions 
of people with one another, but also on the personal characteristics of those involved and 
the overall cultural and belief systems that create social norms. Moreover, researchers 
have also shown that a tie between two people does not necessarily mean that a support 
structure exists.71 Instead, the individuals that make up the community are equally 
important to the structure of the social network that determines what happens within the 
community. For example, teams are created from both the individual strengths of the 
athletes as well as how they all work together.72 Research shows that a well-established 
personal community network depends upon a set of active community ties, including a 
diverse group of people, throughout a large area with loose connections.73  
Research regarding social norms also suggests that the size of the social network 
is important. Several studies show that larger networks tend to be more supportive,74 
similar to the high connectedness found in food web networks. Researchers, such as 
Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, have also found that the larger the network, the higher the 
percentage of people within the network that provide support. Therefore, not only do they 
have more support systems to choose from, but communities also have more members 
within each network to support.75 However, the downside of a larger network is that if 
people perceive inequalities in the amount of support, it may lead to the destruction of the 
ties that hold those groups together.76  
71 Nancy Hayden, Dynamic Social Network Analysis: Present Roots and Future Fruits (Washington, 
DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2009), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DTRA-SocialNetworkAnalysis.pdf, 12. 
72 Ibid., 6. 
73 Wellman, and Wortley, “Different Strokes from Different Folks,” 559. 
74 Stanley Wasserman, and Joseph Galaskiewicz, eds., Advances in Social Network Analysis: Research 
in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1994), 62.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid., 64. 
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b. Trust 
The topic of trust has been heavily researched at multiple levels, including 
personal trust, organizational trust, and societal trust.77 For example, Kurt T. Dirks and 
Donald L. Ferrin have studied trust and its role in fostering cooperation, high 
performance, and positive attitudes. Their study concluded that it is likely that trust 
would facilitate stronger cooperation because, with a high degree of trust, individuals 
believe that others are willing to cooperate.78 Other studies have attempted to better 
define what causes trust to exist in the first place. For example, is trust merely based upon 
the possible cost or benefit of an interaction, or is trust established through multiple 
interactions over time? Studies have adequately shown that both of these are indicators of 
trust. Therefore, the argument can be made that trust is established when a benefit can be 
clearly illustrated and is strengthened with multiple interactions over time.79  
Trust has also been shown in studies to increase the ability of partners to innovate 
and make decisions in a non-linear fashion, leading to a more dynamic response.80 The 
assumption is that this approach has been so successful because social capital is strongest 
at the local level, specifically with regard to trust. One research paper on building trust in 
economic exchange, confirms this assumption through an examination of various studies 
about the formation of trust. The author, Peter Ring, evaluates the definition of trust as, 
“a noncalculative reliance in the moral integrity, or goodwill, of others on whom 
economic actors depend for the realization of collective and individual goals when they 
deal with future, unpredictable issues.”81 At the local level, there is more of an 
opportunity to understand and rely upon the moral integrity or goodwill of others because 
the people have interacted more frequently.  
77 Thomas J. Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management: Fostering Trust to Enhance 
Collaboration in Complex Adaptive Emergency Response Systems” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2009), 11.  
78 Ibid., 5. 
79 D. Harrison McNight, Larry Cummings, and Norman Chervany, “Initial Trust Formation in New 
Organizational Relationships,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 473. 
80 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 5. 
81 Peter Smith Ring, “Fragile and Resilient Trust and Their Roles in Economic Exchange,” Business & 
Society 35, no. 2 (June 1996): 156, doi:10.1177/000765039603500202. 148–75. 
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c. Social Cohesion and Vulnerability 
Social cohesion is defined as the ability of a community to ensure the welfare of 
its members, which minimize inequalities and social division.82 This includes leadership, 
community organization, networks, and social capital. There is a vast amount of literature 
that suggests that a lack of social cohesion between groups contributes to a decrease in 
trust and the increase of fragility of formal institutions, and that social cohesion can 
contribute to stability.83  
The area most studied with regard to social cohesion and fragility involves the 
study of fragile nation states. State fragility has been associated with a variety of factors, 
including: low capacity due to a lack of financial, physical or human resources; poor 
governance and/or corruption; failure to deliver services that meet basic human needs; 
and low levels of social cohesion.84 A Canadian Team working for the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry found similar results in their study where they identified three specific areas 
where state fragility is measured. These include authority failure, service entitlement 
failure and legitimacy failure. Authority failures come from civil conflict or violence, 
service entitlement failures come from human development outcomes such as poverty 
rates and childhood mortality, and legitimacy failures are measured by the level of 
democracy or level of autocracy.85 The researchers found that there is little correlation 
between these three factors, meaning that failing countries rarely did not have to have 
two or more to fail. Therefore, by using the definition of fragility as the risk of failure of 
a nation state, any one of these factors is important individually.  
Some of the key factors of social vulnerability available in recent studies are 
similar to those found in fragile nation states. They include: access to resources 
(including information and technology); access to political power or representation; 
82 “State Fragility and Social Cohesion,” accessed December 27, 2014, http://www.academia.edu/
5313761/State_fragility_and_social_cohesion 
83 Ibid., 3.  
84 Bilal Barakat, Zuki Karpinska, and Julia Paulson, “Desk Study: Education and Fragility” (presented 
at INEE Working Group on Education and Fragility, April 2008), http://www.ineesite.org/uploads/files/
resources/doc_1_FINAL-Desk_Study_Education_and_Fragility_CERG2008.pdf, 2.  
85 Guillaumont, and Jeanneney, “State Fragility and Economic Vulnerability,” 10.  
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social capital; limited access and functional needs, and the accessibility of lifelines such 
as power, water, and road systems.86 
2. Social Systems Literatures Applied to the Concept of Fragility in 
Emergency Management 
Social systems are an integral part of any emergency management system. Every 
disaster is directly affected by the people involved, either through the affected 
community or the emergency responders that come to assist. An evaluation of the 
research on the fragility of social systems brought to light several key concepts for 
emergency management.  
The studies on social capital clearly illustrate that the development of social 
capital involves a participative community, where citizens are engaged and active in 
community activities.87 In an article for the International Journal of Mass Emergencies 
and Disasters, Yuko Nakagawa and Rajib Shaw state, “A high accumulation of such 
capital contributes significantly to social, political and even economic performance, for 
better or worse.”88 This allows people affected by disaster to go from being mere victims 
to survivors, and possibly the creators of a more robust community in the future. As 
Russell Dynes explains, “Even with losses to physical and human capital, social capital is 
less affected, can be quickly repaired, and provides an essential resource in 
accomplishing critical tasks.”89 
a. Social Norms 
Social norms are a powerful form of social capital that will either enable action or 
limit action by community members, emergency managers, and government officials. 
The research on social norms clearly shows that community ties are the primary way in 
86 Susan Cutter, Bryan Boruff, and W. Lynn Shirley, “Social Vulnerability to Environmental 
Hazards,” Social Science Quarterly 84, no. 2 (June 2003): 245. 
87 Jenny Onyx, and Paul Bullen, “Measuring Social Capital in Five Communities,” The Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science 36, no. 1 (March 2000): 25, doi:10.1177/0021886300361002.  
88 Nakagawa, and Shaw, “Social Capital,” 6. 
89 Russell Dynes, “Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies,” Homeland Security Affairs 
II, no. 2 (July 2006): 2.  
 30 
                                                 
which individuals get information. When lacking relevant information from a broad 
perspective, individuals will make decisions that may make sense at a smaller level but 
could conflict with broader community needs.90 In situations where information is 
available and collective action is needed, however, individuals will often act as a unit for 
the greater good of the whole. In a research paper analyzing Eric Posner’s law and social 
norms, Dan Kahan, from Yale Law School, states that studies consistently show that 
individuals in collective action settings, such as a disaster, will often adopt a cooperative 
attitude and will contribute to the collective good if they perceive that others may do the 
same.91 
One other factor included in whether social norms affect community fragility 
involves cultural and belief systems. This is largely why a disaster in the southern United 
States will have different characteristics that one in the Midwest or on the East Coast. 
One of the key tasks of any emergency manager is to learn the community structure and 
diversity to better be able to communicate and coordinate during and after disasters. In 
different locations, there will be varying levels of communication and differing channels 
used to convey important messages to ensure everyone gets the information that is 
needed. Russell Dynes believes this trend will only continue as recent census results 
illustrate a widening gap between diverse groups of the United States population, leading 
to a need for more avenues of communication for different social networks.92 
The structure of networks within social systems also illustrates that larger, more 
diverse networks are less fragile to shocks and disturbances overall. In emergency 
management, this can be illustrated through the large networks of non-profit and non-
governmental entities that assist after disasters. The larger and more diverse the network 
of providers of service, the better able members of the community are able to find the 
services they need. 
90 Louise K. Comfort, “Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events,” Public 
Administration Review 62 (2002): 101, doi:10.1111/1540-6210.62.s1.18.  
91 Dan Kahan, “Commentaries on Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms: Signaling or Reciprocating? 
A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms,” Litigation Essentials 36 (May 2002).  
92 Dynes, “Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies,” 9.  
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b. Trust 
Trust is a primary factor in whether a community will hold together during and 
after an emergency or fall apart into chaos. This was seen clearly during Hurricane 
Katrina, for example, where the natural disaster quickly turned into a social disaster, 
leading to an increase in crime and a decrease in compliance with social norms.93 
Measurements of trust, at both the local community level as well as more formal 
levels (trust in government) can be seen in civic involvement, volunteerism, cooperative 
agreement, and community activities.94 In an article by William Waugh and Gregory 
Streib, they state, “Emergency management capacity is built from the ground up. 
Neighborhood and community programs have to stand on their own because assistance 
may not arrive for hours or days.”95 
In Thomas J. Currao’s thesis on collaboration in complex adaptive systems, he 
notes, “The idea of not knowing each other diminishes the level of inter-organizational 
trust, which has a negative impact on emergency management operations and the ability 
to collaborate.”96 Inclusive processes have the potential to strengthen community trust 
and practices, thereby increasing the ability of the community to work together through 
response and recovery activities. Strong social capital is as a way to decrease community 
fragility outlined in several research studies.97  
c. Social Cohesion and Vulnerability 
Social inequalities often lead to social vulnerability. This involves the degree to 
which social factors influence the susceptibility of groups to injury or harm and the 
ability of those groups to adequately respond. Social vulnerability also involves “place 
93 Kristina M. Cordasco et al., “‘They Blew the Levee:’ Distrust of Authorities among Hurricane 
Katrina Evacuees,” Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 18, no. 2 (May 2007): 277, 
doi:10.1353/hpu.2007.0028  ,  
94 Daniel Aldrich, “Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,” Department of Political 
Science Faculty Publications, Paper 3, Purdue, May 2010, http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/pspubs/3  
95 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 133. 
96 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 75.  
97 Haider, Community-Based Approaches to Peacebuilding, 7. 
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inequalities,” which are those characteristics of communities based upon their location 
and environment, such as isolation in the case of mountain communities or the level of 
urbanization in cities.98 As illustrated previously, studies consistently show that an 
increase in social cohesion leads to a less fragile system and an increase in the ability of 
the community to respond and recover.99 This leads to a different way of looking at 
emergency management activities prior or a disaster. If both social cohesion and a 
decrease in social vulnerability will lead to stronger, less fragile emergency management 
systems, emergency managers can change their preparedness activities to heighten these 
areas. In recent years, the “whole community” approach to emergency management has 
attempted to narrow this gap by emphasizing all members of the community in 
preparedness, response, and recovery activities.100 Prior social science disaster research 
has also recognized the community nature of emergency management and 
recommendations have been made for the consideration of greater community work in 
studying and designing emergency management programs.101 See Figure 9 for an 
overview of the key factors involved in fragility in social systems.  
98 Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley, “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards,” 243.  
99 Guillaumont, and Jeanneney, “State Fragility and Economic Vulnerability.” 
100 Wendy Schafer et al., “Emergency Management Planning as Collaborative Community Work : 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,” Journal of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management 5, no. 1 (March 2008), http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jhsem.2008.5.1/
jhsem.2008.5.1.1396/jhsem.2008.5.1.1396.xml 
101 Ibid.  
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 Figure 9.  Fragility Measurements in Social Systems 
F. SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS / NETWORKS 
General systems theory has been in existence for centuries. Aristotle defined a 
system as “a whole composed by parts in a purposeful way.”102 He also classified 
systems through natural phenomena, such as solar systems, as well as through societies, 
buildings, and machines. The original notion of socio-technical systems was first 
introduced in the 1950s in a series of labor studies at the Tavistock Institute in London. 
The concept was developed to highlight the necessary interconnections between people 
and machines. Researchers found that people did not follow the rigid mechanistic view of 
work. Instead, they found that the social aspects were also important, specifically with 
regard to how teams interacted, cooperated and collaborated. The performance of a 
system was based upon the ways in which people worked with one another and the 
interactions of the system as a whole. This theory led to practices utilizing more 
102 Günter Ropohl, “Philosophy of Socio-Technical Systems,” Society for Philosophy and Technology 
4, no. 3 (1999), http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v4_n3html/ROPOHL 
Measuring Fragility in Social Systems 
• Empowering citizens—Contributes to confidence and feelings of worth, 
decreasing fragility in the community 
• Community ties—Connections with friends and family are the primary ways in 
which people get the resources they need to survive 
• Larger networks—More supportive and better able to find needed resources, less 
fragile to shocks and disturbances 
• Social cohesion—A lack of social cohesion leads to a decrease in trust and 
increase in community fragility 
• Social capital—High degree of social capital contributes significantly to social, 
political and even economic performance, including active participation in 
community activities, higher cooperation with formal emergency response 
systems, and higher level of trust 
• A high level of trust leads to better cooperation and coordination 
• Resilient systems—Better able to absorb shocks and are better able to reorganize 
and learn during dramatic events 
• Basic human needs—Ability to meet basic needs decreases stress and increases 
the ability to cope, decreasing the fragility of communities and systems 
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flexibility, diversity, innovation and an open mind in the design of work processes and 
procedures.103  
This idea, similar to Aristotle’s observations regarding complex system 
interactions, outlines the importance of analyzing social systems in the context of their 
interactions with other systems, or the networks connecting systems. Networks, as used 
in research literature, are defined as, “multi-organizational arrangements for solving 
problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations.”104 This 
definition is helpful in the study of emergency management, as each disaster offers 
varying levels of cohesion and cooperation. For example, the healthcare system relies 
heavily upon the emergency medical system which relies upon law enforcement and fire 
systems in emergency response operations. Each of these is connected through networks 
of partners working together. This multi-disciplinary approach outlines the key principles 
of socio-technical systems, which stress interaction amongst partners throughout a 
network of people and technical systems.   
1. Relevant Bodies of Literature on Socio-Technical Systems / Networks 
The Resilience Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research 
(MCEER) has identified four properties that can be used in all systems to measure their 
fragility. These include:  
• Robustness—the ability to withstand an event without significant 
disruption is service 
• Resourcefulness—the capacity to apply measures to address disruptions 
when they do occur 
• Redundancy—the ability to satisfy all system requirements with backup 
systems and processes, limiting disruption and downtime 
• Rapidity—the ability to restore systems in a timely manner105 
103 Ibid. 
104 Beryl A. Radin, and Joshua M. Chanin, Federal Government Reorganization: A Policy and 
Management Perspective, 1st ed. (Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2008). 
105 Naim Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Contexts: Networks in Emergency 
Management,” Connections: Journal of International Network for Social Network Analysis 26 (2005): 37.  
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Using these properties as an organizational tool, the remainder of this section focuses on 
these four areas in determining what literature exists regarding systems fragility.  
a. Robustness 
A key factor in the formation of networks that have the ability to either increase 
or decrease fragility involves the actual structure of the networks. Research by Gustav 
Koehler, Guenther Kress, and Randi Miller finds that the more diverse a group of people, 
or network, the better able they are to predict variances in outcomes and come up with 
viable solutions.106 In order to do this effectively, links must be formed between the 
various systems of support entities. Different ties within a network of people will provide 
different levels and types of support.107  
Many research studies suggest the importance of strong ties between each of these 
networks in order to ensure adequate information exchange and effective response during 
disaster. Much like the examples shown in the ecological system studies for individuals, 
however, it is equally important to look at the weak ties that bind groups together in 
determining how fragile they are to disturbance (see Figure 10). In studies conducted by 
Mark Granovetter, he found that when a network consists of merely strong ties, or groups 
that are closely connected, most individuals receive the same set of information from 
multiple sources. In contrast, when weak ties, or outlying groups, are part of the network, 
they provide new information previously unknown to the core group.108 Because 
different phases of a disaster require varying levels of information, equipment, and 
support, it makes sense that a network of both strong and weak ties would decrease 
fragility of the network overall. 
106 Koehler, Kress, and Miller, What Disaster Response Management Can Learn. 
107 Wasserman, and Galaskiewicz, Advances in Social Network Analysis, 54.  
108 Stephen P. Borgatti et al., “Network Analysis in the Social Sciences,” Science 323, no. 5916 
(February 13, 2009): 893, doi:10.1126/science.1165821, 8. 
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Figure 10.  Diagram of the Connections between Strong and Weak Ties  
within a Network109    
b. Resourcefulness or Capacity 
With regard to fragile nation states, several studies have shown adequate support 
involves a complex flow of resources between a wide range of partners and stakeholders. 
The Catastrophic Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP) describes the qualities of a 
catastrophic event from the viewpoint of the demand it places upon the emergency 
management system and the capacity of that system to respond.110 
Louise Comfort, Kilkon Ko, and Adam Zagorecki conducted a study attempting 
to simulate an increase in demand during disaster with a decrease in capacity to 
determine the point at which a system would fail, thus defining the fragility of the 
system. According to the authors, “Modeling the fragility of sociotechnical response 
systems is critical to enabling metropolitan regions to manage their exposure to risk more 
efficiently and effectively.”111 Public and private officials with the responsibility for the 
protection of community members are often unable to effectively monitor the 
109 Andrew Filey. “Project Management Software, Mind Mapping, Weak Ties and the Human Brain,” 
Wrike, July 28, 2008, https://www.wrike.com/blog/project-management-software-mind-mapping-weak-
ties-and-the-human-brain/  
110 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 258. 
111 Louise K. Comfort, Kilkon Ko, and Adam Zagorecki, Modeling Fragility in Rapidly Evolving 
Disaster Response Systems (Berkley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies, 2003), http://escholarship.org/
uc/item/1cz8w6gk  
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interdependent interactions between organizations. In addition, they are unable to 
effectively share information about emerging threats real-time due to the speed of 
information during an event.  
Therefore, the Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki created a theoretical model to observe 
the changing relationship between partners as the demand for resources grew and the 
capacity to respond to needs diminished. They also used network theory from the field of 
mathematics to formalize the interaction of the various players within any emergency 
management system. They were able to show that different phases of emergencies require 
different types of management skills. Additionally, their research illustrated that failure in 
one area of disaster response leads to the failure in other parts of the system, which leads 
to a decrease in performance and possible collapse, much like the domino effect seen in 
ecological food webs.112 However, the most interesting finding in research of Comfort, 
Ko, and Zagorecki was the realization that the increase in partners and interconnections 
during disaster response does not lead to a decrease in efficiency or fragility. Instead, 
networks with more connections also have more diversity and the ability to withstand and 
react to disturbances.113  
This leads to the difference between a connected community and an 
interdependent community. The interdependence of systems is not directly related to the 
number of connections between them. Instead, interdependency is measured by how one 
action or disturbance will affect another. Most communities do not have well-connected 
systems of partners. If interdependencies exist, however, then each is sensitive to 
disruptions or shocks that occur to any one of the disciplines, leading to unintended 
consequences, unpredictability, and cascading failures.114 The findings of this study 
parallel the ecological food web research and socio-technical research regarding strong 
and weak ties within networks. 
112 Ibid., 3.  
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 5. 
 38 
                                                 
c. Redundancy 
The interdependence of systems leads to research based upon the central and 
peripheral figures within a network that provide redundancy and stability. Some studies 
have indicated that the most effective structure of a network is one that is centralized in 
nature with one influential hub or lead agency.115 But if these studies are examined with 
fragility in mind, this leads to an incredibly fragile structure. For one, the network is 
based upon one central figure; therefore, if that figure is removed, similar to food web 
networks, a cascading effect would occur, causing failures across the network.  
Second, this leads to a very strong tie with one individual or agency, which could 
lead to a decrease in peripheral ties to outlying organizations that provide vital support to 
response and recovery operations. Therefore, to decrease the fragility of networks, there 
should be focus on both central and peripheral figures, allowing for greater diversity 
within the network.116 Tests have been conducted by Girvan and Newman to confirm this 
theory in food web networks as well as collaborative networks and both tests positively 
confirmed the benefits on such a structure.117 Even those researchers who suggest a 
strong central network, such as Harrald, have agreed that complex disasters require an 
open system of partners and organizations that have the ability to adapt readily to 
changing conditions and anticipate problems before they occur.118 
Several models have also been constructed regarding the development of a 
holistic approach to systems failures, including Turner’s man-made disaster model, 
Reason’s Swiss cheese model, and Perrow’s normal accident theory. All of these models 
are based upon the foundation that seemingly inconsequential failures within a system 
115 Sang O. Choi, “When Practice Matters More Than Government Plans: A Network Analysis of 
Local Emergency Management,” Administration & Society 37 (January 2006): 668. 
116 Michelle Girvan, and Mark Newman, “Community Structure in Social and Biological Networks,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99, no. 12 (June 2002): 
7822, doi:10.1073/pnas.122653799.  
117 Ibid., 7825. 
118 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 261. 
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interact and create a cascade of problems leading to full system failure.119 A study on 
crowd disasters recommends that, because of these interdependencies, and various 
moving parts, it is unlikely that any one person or group would have all of the knowledge 
necessary to avoid systemic failures.120 Therefore, all parts of the system should be given 
consideration, including people, processes, procedures, technology, and community 
culture (see Figure 11). In this research, by Rose Challenger and Chris Clegg, they state, 
“New systems design should involve multiple stakeholders with a complementary range 
of knowledge and expertise, including end-users, managers, human resource experts, 
designers and clients. End-user participation in, and ownership of, systems design and 
implementation is critical.”121 
 
Figure 11.  A Socio-Technical Systems Perspective122 
119 Rose Challenger, and Chris W. Clegg, “Crowd Disasters: A Socio-Technical Systems 
Perspective,” Contemporary Social Science 6, no. 3 (November 1, 2011): 344, doi:10.1080/
21582041.2011.619862. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 345.  
122 Ibid. 
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d. Rapidity 
Knowing how different organizations interact with one another will provide 
information that is necessary to determine how information will flow within the network 
as well as between networks, allowing for greater flexibility and efficiency in the 
decision-making process. In a research paper by Naim Kapucu, he found that in a closed 
system, the information will be relatively stable and should be readily available to anyone 
in the network. In an open network, on the other hand, the information may be less stable 
but will be more diverse, leading to a broader perspective of the problem.123 This broader 
perspective will allow faster restoration of the system after a disturbance has been 
identified. In their research on adaptive capacity, Udo Staber and Jorg Sydow found that 
if a network is a closed network of few partners, it is more fragile to shocks and 
disturbances, such as those that exist during large-scale and catastrophic disasters. An 
open network allows for independent activities that can adjust over time to meet the 
changing demands of the event and the flexibility to react in different ways.124 
2. Socio-Technical Systems Literatures Applied to the Concept of 
Fragility in Emergency Management 
The socio-technical infrastructure in most communities is highly fragile and 
susceptible to shocks and disturbances.125 When a disaster occurs, this already fragile 
system is easily overwhelmed and the systems that communities have come to depend 
collapse, causing fear and anxiety. The effectiveness of disaster response and recovery is 
affected by factors such as the type and magnitude of the disaster, the number of 
jurisdictions involved, the capacity to respond to the disaster phases, and the structure of 
the systems in place before the disaster occurred.126 
123 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Contexts,” 45. 
124 Udo Staber, and Jörg Sydow, “Organizational Adaptive Capacity a Structuration Perspective,” 
Journal of Management Inquiry 11, no. 4 (December 2002): 417. doi:10.1177/1056492602238848.  
125 Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki, Modeling Fragility in Rapidly Evolving Disaster, 5. 
126 Ibid., 4.  
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a. Robustness 
One of the primary factors in the research regarding the robust nature of a system 
was in its overall structure. Emergency management has historically used a hierarchical 
structure similar to the military and based on the Incident Command System. This 
structure involves top-down decision making where all partners are within one 
organization.127 Many recent studies have found, however, that this type of structure can 
lead to communications failures and poor information flow.128 When disasters increase in 
complexity, these findings become even more relevant. Instead, many researchers, such 
as Waugh, and Streib, have suggested other structures that promote inclusion and utilize 
established community structures.129 
Two examples of this working include the emergency medical services (EMS) 
organizations’ response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, where they used such a horizontal 
structure to deliver medical supplies to clinics, and the California Department of Social 
Services, where they restored food service systems in South Central Los Angeles after the 
Los Angeles riots in 1992.130 Many even suggest a heterarchical organization for fast 
moving events and disaster situations, where the organization remains more fluid and 
there is no hierarchy at all. Again, with regard to complex systems, this allows for the 
flexibility and adaptability necessary to make rapid decisions and to quickly respond and 
recover.131 In the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, authors Robert 
Agranoff and Michael McGuire state, “With no single authority, everyone is somewhat in 
charge, thus everyone is somewhat responsible; all network participants appear to be 
accountable, but none is absolutely accountable.”132 
127 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 131. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Koehler, Kress, and Miller, What Disaster Response Management Can Learn, 16.  
131 Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, and Fatih Demiroz, “Collaborative Emergency Management and 
National Emergency Management Network,” Disaster Prevention and Management: An International 
Journal 19, no. 4 (August 2010): 456. 
132 Robert Agranoff, and Michael McGuire, “Big Questions in Public Network Management 
Research,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11, no. 3 (July 2001): 310.  
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A heterarchical structure may decrease the fragility of the emergency 
management organization; however, at the same time, it may lead to other difficulties. 
With no clear line of authority, critical information may get lost or critical resources may 
be missed. On the other hand, a decentralized network solves problems of authority and 
responsibility. Therefore, some researchers have suggested a combined approach between 
the hierarchical command and control structure and a collaborative network of partners. 
This would provide a more robust system able to manage information and provide the 
flexibility and adaptability necessary to work through complex events.133 In an article 
focusing on repairing the National Emergency Management System, John Harrald states 
that there is a trade-off between the need for mobilizing and managing a large 
organization, where command and control structures are effective, and the need for 
organizing and coordinating between a broad spectrum of groups and communities. He 
argues, “Diverse organizations must achieve technical and organizational interoperability 
requiring common structure and process while absorbing and interacting with thousands 
of spontaneous volunteers and emergent organizations.”134 
b. Resourcefulness or Capacity 
Increased demand typically leads to a decrease in the capacity to respond. This is 
frequently seen in emergencies and disasters, where a local jurisdiction are unable to 
effectively manage the incident independently and requests assistance from regional, 
state, and/or federal partners. With the interdependencies seen in emergency management 
systems and the networks of partners that connect them all together, a higher degree of 
resourcefulness is needed to ensure small system disruptions do not occur that will affect 
the system as a whole. This is effectively illustrated by the supply chain management 
operations required to provide logistical support to large-scale events. In our current age 
of information technology, supply chain management has acquired a complexity almost 
equivalent to that of an ecosystem.135 There are the transportation systems that are 
133 Kapucu, Arslan, and Demiroz, “Collaborative Emergency Management,” 457. 
134 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 257.  
135 Amit Surana et al., “Supply-Chain Networks: A Complex Adaptive Systems Perspective,” 
International Journal of Production Research 43, no. 20 (October 2005): 4235–65.  
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needed to move materials, supplies needed to support to operation, and people needed at 
both ends of the chain to manage the operation. This takes a high level of coordination 
and adaptability to ensure the support arrives as ordered. The studies in this area suggest 
that a failure in any one area of this network can lead to a collapse of the entire system. 
As seen in the Colorado Floods in 2013, if transportation routes are destroyed, the entire 
supply chain is disrupted.136  
c. Redundancy 
In Gus Koehler’s book, What Disaster Management Can Learn from Chaos 
Theory, he remarks, “Experiments by Hershey and colleagues demonstrate that a flat 
organization tends to produce the least disruption in information flow resulting in higher 
efficiencies than hierarchical organizations (Hershey, Patel, and Hahn, 1990).”137 Many 
other researchers, such as Kapucu, have found similar results and have noted that 
network organizations have a clearly different governance structure that the hierarchies 
they are beginning to replace.138 This suggests that a vertical hierarchical structure 
constrains information flow and innovation, perhaps increasing the fragility of the system 
as a whole. Instead, a decentralized horizontal structure, with varying levels and degrees 
of linkages allows for the adaptive flow of ideas and information, decreasing the 
likelihood and impact of fractures in the network.  
As this paper has already illustrated, a great amount of research exists on the roles 
of the primary and peripheral figures in complex systems, such as ecosystems and social 
systems. Figure 12 illustrates three types of networks and their connections. In 
emergency management, historically, the most common structure has involved the 
emergency manager as the primary hub (keystone) with all support entities connected to 
this person, much like the spokes of a wheel (see Centralized Network in Figure 12). As 
illustrated in the literature, however, this structure leads to greater fragility overall. If the 
136 Jennifer Oldham, “Colorado Visitors Tour Estes Park as Flooded Locals Can’t Flush,” Bloomberg, 
September 24, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-24/flooded-estes-park-greets-tourists-as-
locals-can-t-flush.html   
137 Koehler, Kress, and Miller, What Disaster Response Management Can Learn.  
138 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Contexts.” 
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emergency manager is taken out of the system, the entire network of partners would 
disconnect, leading to disaster disruption and chaos. A decentralized or distributed 
network, however, holds more promise as no one hub will cause failure of the network.  
 
Figure 12.  Centralized, decentralized and distributed networks 
Many argue that a decentralized structure is much less fragile as the system 
consists of a variety of hubs that intersect with the central figure. This is illustrated in the 
changing nature of terrorist organizations since the attacks on September 11, 2001. In the 
past, terrorist networks had one central figure, such as Osama Bin Laden. But many 
terrorist organizations quickly realized the fragility of such a structure when the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started to remove 
the most central figures from the network, leaving the rest in shambles. At present, most 
terrorist organizations work in cells, where groups of people cluster together with weak 
links between each, allowing them to survive if one individual or group is removed.139 
Finally, some researchers suggest a model more similar to a distributed network 
as seen in Figure 12. This model would allow for greater overall communication and 
coordination amongst partners without completely relying on a central figure, such as an 
emergency manager. Some hubs within the network would be more connected than 
139 Choi, “When Practice Matters More Than Government Plans,” 672. 
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others, but they would all have weak links tying them all together.140 This is similar to 
the studies on crowd disasters that illustrated that no one person or group will have all of 
the information needed to prevent system failures. Instead all parts of the system should 
be considered.141  
In interdependent networks, however, researchers have found that not only will 
the one network fail, but it will cause systemic failures throughout all of the networks 
connected within the system.142 From an emergency management perspective, this 
occurrence was clearly illustrated during the 2003 blackout in the northeastern Unites 
States as well as Hurricane Katrina in 2006 where one failure cascaded into another and 
led to systemic failures overall.143  
 
Figure 13.  Example of Compartmentalization within Systems 
It is further argued that it is our highly interconnected systems and networked 
risks that have created these types of failures. For example, studies have shown that 
major disasters do not always have large causes. Instead, researchers have found that 
small events can often lead to larger consequences when they link with other small events 
140 “The Law of Rule: Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed Systems,” Canada Foundation for 
Nepal, accessed December 27, 2014, http://cffn.ca/2009/04/the-law-of-rule-centralized-decentralized-and-
distributed-systems/  
141 Challenger, and Clegg, “Crowd Disasters,” 344. 
142 Alessandro Vespignani, “Complex Networks: The Fragility of Interdependency,” Nature Magazine 
464, no. 15 (April 2010), 985.  
143 Ibid., 984. 
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within the system. As our technology becomes increasingly interconnected, Rudolph and 
Repenning suggest that this will increase the likelihood of chain reactions.144 Therefore, 
they suggest that for highly interdependent systems, that we limit the degree of 
connectedness and the size of each network.145 
Figure 13 clearly illustrates how a large network could be deconstructed into 
several smaller networks, where they remain connected through weaker links (a network 
of networks). This allows the system to function effectively without spreading network 
problems to the whole. Additionally, as was previously mentioned, by adding a degree of 
diversity amongst the various networks, the overall system is better able to manage and 
share information as well as solve complex problems.146 
d. Rapidity 
Because of the intricate network of partners within emergency management, the 
capacity to move information through multiple systems in an effective and efficient 
manner is essential. Emergency management cannot exist as a closed network due to this 
number of partners in governmental, private, and non-governmental organizations. When 
looking at open networks, the research indicates that stability decreases; however, these 
systems are less fragile to shocks and disturbances. Furthermore, research indicates that 
with the broader perspective of a number of partners, we will see faster restoration of 
disturbances and failures. Therefore, from an emergency management perspective, open 
systems will allow for better adaptive capacity, a broader perspective, and a better 
opportunity to not only anticipate and find failures early but to also find solutions.  
Figure 14 outlines the key measurements of fragility in socio-technical systems.  
144 Jenny W. Rudolph, and Nelson P. Repenning, “Disaster Dynamics: Understanding the Role of 
Quantity in Organizational Collapse,” Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 1 (March 2002): 1, 
doi:10.2307/3094889.  
145 Helbing, Systemic Risks in Society and Economics.  
146 Ibid., 16. 
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 Figure 14.  Fragility Measurements in Socio-Technical Systems  
G. COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
The study of complex adaptive systems has been the focus of many research 
projects in an effort to find common characteristics between complex systems, such as 
ecosystems, social systems, and technological systems, in an effort to better understand 
how complexity occurs.147 Complex adaptive systems are systems with a large number of 
components that interact and adapt and learn. This leads to change over time, hopefully 
improving performance and decreasing fragility of the system as a whole.  
1. Relevant Bodies of Literature on Complex Adaptive Systems 
A group of scientists at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences use the concept 
of resilience as their basis for better understanding how social and ecological systems can 
147 Surana et al., “Supply-Chain Networks,” 4235–65.  
Measuring Fragility in Socio-Technical Systems 
• System fragility—Measured by its robustness, resourcefulness, redundancy and 
rapidity 
• Diversity—Variety of partners within the networks will add value and decrease 
fragility 
• Authority—A combination of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal collaborative 
approaches create flexibility and adaptability and provide the most effective 
approach to decrease fragility in rapidly changing events 
• Central actors—Identifying organizations that are most and least prominent in a 
network will allow emergency managers to develop strategies to build on 
strengths while also for increasing the capacity of more peripheral agencies  
• Supply versus demand—The capacity to respond is negatively affected by the 
increase in demand for resources 
• System thresholds—Determining how many people can be added or subtracted 
from a network before a failure occurs will allow for better planning efforts for 
future operations.  
• Open systems—Creation of open systems leads to diverse information flow and 
less likelihood of failure due to shocks or disturbances 
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sustain in our new complex environment.148 They explain that resilience is related to the 
following three characteristics: 1) how much of a shock the system can absorb while 
remaining intact, 2) the degree to which the system is self-organizing, and 3) the degree 
for which the system is able to build capacity for learning and adaptation.149 Resilient 
systems are better able to absorb shocks and are better able to reorganize and learn during 
dramatic events. Each of these factors is illustrated in complex adaptive systems. 
The majority of research regarding complex adaptive systems has been made in 
the social sciences field. For example, Russell Dynes and Enrico Quarantelli identified 
the idea of emergence in community structures following disasters.150 They recognized 
that in events such as catastrophic disasters, communities will self-organize and create 
new structures in order to best manage an event. And much like in social and technical 
systems, they were able to demonstrate that failures routinely occurred in closed system 
models where centralized decision making was made in a command and control network. 
In contrast, they found that problem-solving models in open systems were better able to 
cope with change and the need for increased coordination and cooperation from a large 
number of partners,151 much like the models suggested in the section on socio-technical 
systems. 
All complex adaptive systems that have been studied exhibit the same 
phenomenon regarding one aspect of fragility, previously described as a tipping point. 
Each system has a point where a simple intervention or disturbance causes a lasting 
effect—either positive or negative. For example, vaccines cause lasting change within the 
immune system. However, there is currently no theory that is able to pinpoint how or 
where to look specifically for these tipping points. Additionally, all complex adaptive 
systems have been shown to evolve in an open-ended manner, where a simple system 
begins to exhibit increasing diversity of information exchange and interaction. Finally, 
148 Folke et al., “Resilience and Sustainable Development,” 438. 
149 Ibid.  
150 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 264. 
151 Ibid. 
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the process of this change in systems complexity leads to a greater number of available 
resources and a diversity in the system that did not exist previously.152 
2. Complex Adaptive Systems Literatures Applied to the Concept of 
Fragility in Emergency Management 
Organizations with limited adaptive capacity tend to search for known solutions 
to problems. They use those capabilities and abilities they already possess to determine 
the best possible outcome. During a complex emergency or disaster, this may lead to a 
rigid structure, one unable to bend and adapt as needed to effectively manage the event. 
On the other hand, those organizations with adaptive capacity avoid structures that are 
too rigid, knowing that circumstances rarely, if ever, remain the same in each disaster.153 
In a study by Nelson Repenning and Jenny Rudolph from Cornell University, they state, 
“People must step back from the situation at hand, revisit their core assumptions, reframe 
the situation, recombine existing procedures and routines into alternative responses (e.g., 
improvisation), and engage in some type of higher-order evaluation.”154 Louise Comfort, 
Director for the Center for Disaster Management at the University of Pittsburg, agrees, 
stating that the ability for organizations to build adaptive capacity during emergencies 
and disasters is a “key predictor of success.”155 The ability to grow and adapt has been 
seen in the emergency management field in recent years, specifically since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Emergency management organizations were 
predominantly structured in a quasi-incident command structure, but over the years many 
found that this could not meet the increasing need for collaboration and support. From 
there, the concept of emergency support functions emerged, linking several non-
traditional partners to the incident response and recovery.156  
152 John Holland, “Studying Complex Adaptive Systems,” Journal of Systems Science and Complexity 
19 (2006): 7. 
153 Staber, and Sydow, “Organizational Adaptive Capacity a Structuration Perspective,” 410.  
154 Rudolph, and Repenning, “Disaster Dynamics,” 25. 
155 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 265.  
156 Kapucu, “Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context,” 34    
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Another key characteristic displayed by complex systems is the emergence of 
highly structured collective behavior over time from the interaction of simple groups 
without any centralized control. They exist in a state of perceived equilibrium with a 
combination of regularity and randomness.157 Complexity is driven by the need for 
robustness to uncertainty, leading to a decrease in fragility. This leads to self-
organization, which is essential in a flexible, adaptable environment such as emergency 
management.  
Since its inception after the events of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security 
has focused its efforts in developing a common national approach to incident 
management. This has been done through a series of plans and procedures, such as the 
National Response Framework, the National Incident Management System, and national 
preparedness goals. This focus on standardized processes and step-by-step procedures 
may have actually had an adverse effect on our ability to manage catastrophic events, 
where adaptability and flexibility are essential. Additionally, national policies based upon 
one standard set of actions does not address the diversities of the people, cultures, 
geography, and technology throughout the United States, further increasing the fragility 
of communities that do not fit into the standard model.158 
It is a challenging task to effectively collaborate and integrate multiple partners 
and players in a large-scale emergency response that is both dynamic and chaotic. 
Moreover, this becomes more challenging as the number of partners grows and the scale 
of the incident intensifies.159 Therefore, it is necessary to build systems and networks in a 
way that makes them highly adaptable to change and disorder, and thus, making them 
less fragile.  
In the emergency management field, networks may very well have to change over 
time with the changing conditions of the community or the disaster. With each 
157 Surana et al., “Supply-Chain Networks,” 
158 Harrald, “Agility and Discipline,” 258.  
159 Liaquat Hossain, and Shahadat Uddin, “Design Patterns: Coordination in Complex and Dynamic 
Environments,” Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 21, no. 3 (June 2012): 
337, doi:10.1108/09653561211234516  
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experience, the people and networks involved will learn from the event and from one 
another, leading to changes in the way the interactions work in the future. This is often 
called a “feedback loop” where the information learned returns to the network in the form 
of new knowledge and practices.160 The result is a dynamic network of partners. Studies 
focusing on complex adaptive systems illustrate these changing interactions. Because 
emergency management is a nonlinear dynamic field, our processes and procedures must 
account for adaptation and the ability to respond to changing demands and conditions, 
rather than relying on strict adherence to prior rules and restrictions (see Figure 15).161   
 
 
Figure 15.  Fragility Measurements in Complex Adaptive Systems  
H. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this thesis, the theoretical framework illustrates how the characteristics of 
fragility in multiple complex systems can be utilized as characteristics in the emergency 
management field to assess community fragility. The inference is that the variables in 
complex systems can, and should, be used to determine fragile systems in emergency 
management. The key question this process is meant to answer is whether the 
characteristics of fragility demonstrated in complex systems can be transferred to 
determine community fragility before, during and after disasters.  
160 Choi, “When Practice Matters More Than Government Plans,” 658.  
161 Currao, “A New Role for Emergency Management,” 15. 
Measuring Fragility in Complex Adaptive Systems 
• Magnitude—A system is less fragile when it can absorb higher levels of shocks 
without disruption 
• Adaptive capacity—A system that is able to build capacity for learning and 
adaptation is less fragile 
• Self-organization—The ability to self-organize decreased system fragility 
• Institutions—Flexible and open institutions and multi-level governance systems 
increase adaptive capacity and decrease overall fragility 
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The first step of this process was to create a fragility matrix, illustrating each  
of the key factors outlined in the conceptual development section of this chapter (see 
Table 1). The matrix is broken into sections based upon three factors. The first is the type 
of system studied in the literature review. Second, the matrix outlines the key concepts of 
fragility for that specific system. Finally, the right side of the matrix defines each of the 
key concepts more clearly. The fragility matrix on the following page summarizes the 
work of the literature review. 
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Table 1.   Fragility Matrix from Relevant Literature  
Fragility in Ecological Systems and Food Web Networks 
  Removal of Species  Removal of primary species (keystone) causes instability 
    Removal of weaker species can also cause a trickle-down effect 
  Fragile Ecosystems Combination of weak and strong species creates less fragility 
  Diversity Interactions and diversity strengthen the system as a whole 
Fragility in Social Systems 
  Empowering Citizens Contributes to confidence and feelings of worth, decreasing fragility 
  
Community Ties Connections with friends and family are the primary ways in which people 
get the resources they need to survive 
  
Larger Networks Larger networks are more supportive and better able to find needed 
resources, less fragile to shocks and disturbances 
  
Social Cohesion A lack of social cohesion leads to a decrease in trust and increase in 
community fragility 
  
Social Capital High degree of social capital contributes significantly to social, political and 
economic performance 
    Active participation in community activities  
    Higher cooperation with formal emergency response systems 
  
Trust High social capital contributes to a high level of trust which leads to better 
cooperation and coordination 
  Resilient Systems Better able to absorb shocks and learn during dramatic events 
  
Basic Human Needs Ability to meet basic needs decreases stress and increases the ability to 
cope, decreasing the fragility of communities and systems 
Socio-Technical Systems 
  
Diversity Variety of partners within the networks will add value and decrease fragility 
  
Authority A combination of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal collaborative 
approaches create flexibility and adaptability and provide the most effective 
approach to decrease fragility in rapidly changing events 
  
Central Actors Identifying organizations that are most and least prominent in a network will 
allow individuals to build strategies to maintain strengths and increase the 
capacity of peripheral agencies 
  
Supply vs. Demand Capacity to respond is negatively affected by the increase in demand of 
resources 
  
System Thresholds Determining how many people can be added or removed from a network 
before a failure occurs will allow for better planning efforts 
  
Open Systems Creation of open systems leads to diverse information flow and less 
likelihood of failure due to shocks or disturbances 
Complex Adaptive Systems 
  
Magnitude A system is less fragile when it can absorb higher levels of shocks without 
disruption 
  
Adaptive Capacity A system is less fragile when it is able to build capacity for learning and 
adaptation 
  Self-Organization A system is less fragile when it has the ability to self-organize 
  
Institutions Flexible and open institutions and multi-level governance systems increase 
adaptive capacity and decrease overall fragility 
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The second step in this process was to create a theoretical framework for 
community fragility, found on the following page (see Figure 16). The left side of the 
framework takes the key fragility characteristics found in the literature review on 
complex systems from the fragility matrix (Table 1). On the right side, those same 
characteristics are listed from an emergency management perspective. These 
characteristics are further divided into three specific focus areas: connectedness, stability, 
and sustainability.  
The first area, connectedness, involves the emergency management and 
community structures that connect people together. This includes the development of 
social capital, the difference between strong and weak organizational connections, the 
dangers for isolated communities, and the chosen structure for the emergency 
management system in dealing with disasters.  
Stability involves many of the fragility factors that may create an unstable 
environment. This area is most affected by strong and weak leadership within the 
community, the flexibility of planning models, and the degree of compartmentalization in 
emergency management systems. Weak leadership could lead to a lack of trust, further 
affecting social capital. On the other hand, strong leadership may lead to better planning 
efforts with more flexibility and adaptability. Moreover, the compartmentalization of the 
emergency management system could also lead to greater stabilization and less of a 
chance for small disturbances to cause problems.  
The final factor in the framework includes those items from the fragility matrix 
that are directly related to sustainability of the community. This involves building 
resiliency, resource management, lifelines, and the identification of cascading events. By 
providing for lifeline restoration and supply chain management, communities may have 
the support they need to better recover, also making them more resilient. Figure 16 
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Figure 16.  Theoretical Framework for Community Fragility in Emergency 
Management 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
CONCLUSION 
The area of focus for this research involves community structures, emergency 
management, and the concept of fragility between these two areas. Since there is very 
little research currently on the idea of community fragility in emergency management, 
several other fields were explored in the literature review, including ecosystems, social 
systems, socio-technical systems and complex adaptive systems. These were 
systematically chosen due to their complex nature and their relevance to the emergency 
management field. Once the data was collected in the literature review, the conceptual 
development section identified the connections, or relevancy, between the concepts of 
fragility in these complex systems and their possible use in developing a theory on 
community fragility in emergency management. Common themes and key points were 
extrapolated from the literature and conceptual development to create a fragility matrix, 
illustrating each system and its key characteristics. Finally, assumptions have been made 
to begin the development of a causal prediction model, which is further evaluated and 
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III. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
“Anticipation is about perceiving the world, relating to it, moving around 
in it, making sense of it, thinking about what to expect from it, and what 
possibilities exist that one can gain from.” 
–Mark Nuttall 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This research seeks to answer the question of how the fragility of a community 
can be measured and what the implications would be for the field of emergency 
management. The second research question explores whether this model of community 
fragility can be a useful tool in emergency management. To answer these questions, this 
research uses a multi-method approach. First, the literature review examines data from 
primary and secondary sources, including a variety of articles, reports, books, and 
research studies regarding the concept of fragility to determine if community fragility has 
been previously measured and to what extent. From there, information gleaned from the 
conceptual development section of the literature review is used to create a theoretical 
framework, connecting the measurements of fragility in systems to the areas of proposed 
fragility in emergency management. Non-probability purposive event sampling is 
completed using multiple case study analysis to determine if the theoretical framework is 
sound. Finally, the framework is refined and a causal prediction model is created for 
community fragility in emergency management. This multi-method approach effectively 
addresses both of the research questions and provides a path forward for future research 
on community fragility. Each of these methods is addressed in greater detail within the 
following sections of this chapter. 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A theoretical framework provides the basis for qualitatively analyzing the data 
available on fragility from the literature review and the conceptual development. As 
stated previously, little research has been conducted on fragility in emergency 
management; however, several studies have been conducted on fragility in various 
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systems. By utilizing information found in the literature on ecosystems, social systems, 
socio-technical systems, and complex adaptive systems, assumptions can be made about 
the factors that would influence fragility in the emergency management field.  
The theoretical framework can strengthen this study in multiple ways. First, the 
framework connects the research to existing knowledge, providing a strong basis for 
theoretical assumptions. Second, by extrapolating pertinent studies and analytic models 
that are relevant to the research question, it is easier to critically evaluate such 
assumptions. Finally, a theoretical framework helps to explain the challenges and 
opportunities associated with a phenomenon in order to use that knowledge and 
understanding to create positive future action.162  
C. MULTIPLE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The study design for this thesis continues with a qualitative multiple case study 
approach to examine the theoretical framework as a measurement of community fragility 
in emergency management. According to Robert Yin, “The case study method is best 
applied when research addresses descriptive or explanatory questions and aims to 
produce a first-hand understanding of people and events.”163 For example, the case study 
method has been used extensively in psychology. Some of the best known case studies 
were ones carried out by Sigmund Freud to examine the home lives of individuals to 
better understand possible causes of their mental illness.164 The primary benefit of this 
type of analysis is that it allows the researcher the opportunity to explore a situation in 
context using a variety of sources. In the case of disaster research, case studies are often 
used to determine lessons learned and to strengthen systems before another disaster 
occurs.  
162 Richard A. Swanson, and Thomas J. Chermack, Theory Building in Applied Disciplines, 1st ed. 
(San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2013).  
163 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications Inc., 2011), 3. 
164 Saul McLeod, “Case Study Method,” Simply Psychology, 2008, 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/case-study.html 
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This paper uses a multiple case study approach consisting of three diverse large-
scale disasters. Cases are also examined holistically, allowing for the exploration of 
similarities and differences within and between cases. The three case studies chosen for 
analysis were selected based upon five criteria. Each disaster: 1) qualifies as a mega-
disaster, where the destruction overwhelmed the local community and the state, 2) 
occurred in the last decade to ensure relevancy, 3) transpired due to natural causes, 4) 
occurred in the United States, and 5) is located in a different area of the nation. The goal 
is to examine each of the key variables in the theoretical framework through the lens of 
each disaster and to determine if the fragility model can be replicated across multiple 
cases.   
D. SAMPLING 
This research involves non-probability purposive event sampling, focusing on 
specific disaster events since the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security 
and the establishment of the National Incident Management System to ensure relevancy. 
This provides a means to illustrate the measures of community fragility in an emergency 
management setting and to determine if the theoretical framework is valid. 
A sample is defined as a smaller representative collection of information from an 
event used to determine truths about that event, and there are two types of samples: 
probability and non-probability. The primary difference between the two is that non-
probability sampling does not involve random selection and probability sampling 
does.165 For example, in probability sampling, all disasters would have the same 
opportunity to be included in the sample, and the mathematical probability of the 
selection of any one of them could be calculated. When the probability of selection 
cannot be determined, non-probability event sampling is used. Therefore, for purposes of 
this research, non-probability event sampling is more meaningful.  
This method is further divided into two types of non-probability event sampling: 
accidental or purposive. An example of accidental event sampling would be a newscaster 
165 “Nonprobability Sampling,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, Web Center for Social Research 
Methods, accessed January 15, 2015, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampnon.php 
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out on Time Square asking random people questions to get a quick idea about public 
opinion. In contrast, an example of purposive sampling would be an individual standing 
in front of a veterinary office asking specific market research questions about animals.166 
For the purposes of this research, purposive event sampling is used to study community 
fragility in emergency management.  
Event samples are utilized from three diverse areas of the United States. In order 
to evaluate community fragility, successes and failures will be explored based upon the 
criteria outlined in the theoretical framework. Large-scale disasters that reached a point 
of fragility, or tipping point, are researched as well as those that did not in order to 
compare and contrast the events and to determine if the metric for community fragility is 
sound.  
E. CAUSAL PREDICTION MODELING 
The final phase of the methodology involves causal prediction modeling. A causal 
prediction model is defined as, “a network of variables with causal connections among 
them, drawn from multiple-case analysis.”167 In essence, the process of causal prediction 
modeling involves focusing on knowing what will happen to one variable when you 
change another (if X, then Y).168 For example, what would happen to public opinion 
regarding a disaster if television coverage focused on a political scandal in the same 
jurisdiction? Would the trust in the disaster recovery go down, ultimately affecting the 
community?   
The multi-case analysis provides the information required to analyze the 
theoretical framework and make necessary adjustments. Additionally, this analytic 
process provides the foundation for the development of a meaningful explanatory model.  
166 Ibid. 
167 Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, Qualitative Data Analysis: A 
Methods Sourcebook, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2013).  
168 Gary King, “‘Truth’ Is Stranger than Prediction, More Questionable than Causal Inference,” 
American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 1050.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
Each stage of this research builds upon the one before it to create a complete 
picture. Past research is used to develop a concept regarding fragility in systems, and a 
framework is developed from the literature. By using multi-case analysis, this framework 
is refined to include factors affecting community fragility within the emergency 
management field. The finished product of this analysis is a causal predictive model 
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IV. MULTIPLE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
“A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity. 
An optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.” 
–Winston Churchill 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The case studies presented in this section include the Joplin tornado from 2011, 
the San Diego County firestorms from 2007, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, specifically 
focusing on New Orleans, Louisiana. First, each case study is presented by providing a 
brief history of the event and areas identified as successes and failures. Next, an analysis 
is made between the theoretical framework and the relevant facts from the disaster to 
determine how each characteristic can be used to measure community fragility. Finally, 
each sample provides a summation of the data and analysis, along with a visual 
representation of the results, leading to the development of the causal prediction model.  
B. CASE STUDY 1: JOPLIN MISSOURI TORNADO, 2011 
“As lightning pops and thunder booms, you can see the locals flinch. It’s 
likely too close for comfort after they lost 89 neighbors to a half-mile wide 
twister.” 
–Eric Marrapodi, CNN Producer in Joplin Missouri 
1. Synopsis of the Event 
On May 22, 2011, one of the most powerful tornadoes in American history 
touched down in Joplin, Missouri, located near the Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and 
Oklahoma borders. Joplin Missouri has a population of over 50,000 people and 4,200 
businesses, according to 2010 census records.169 The city is also the commercial, 
medical, transportation, and educational center for the region, increasing the daytime 
population to over 250,000 people.170  




                                                 
At 5:41pm on May 22, 2011, the National Weather Service tracked a supercell 
thunderstorm from extreme southeast Kansas into far southwest Missouri; it produced the 
powerful tornado that devastated the area.171 A tornado of this strength had not touched 
down in Missouri since 1957. According to the National Weather Service,  
The tornado was rated EF-5 on the Enhanced-Fujita Scale, with its 
maximum winds estimated at more than 200 mph. The path of the entire 
tornado was 22.1 miles long and was up to 1 mile in width. The EF-4/EF-5 
damage path was roughly 6 miles long…and generally ½ to ¾ of a mile 
wide along the path.172  
Because the path of the tornado was almost entirely in the city of Joplin, 
catastrophic damage was reported to multiple areas of the city (see Figure 17).173 For 
example, according to a National Center for Disaster Preparedness report, over 30 percent 
of the city and over 8,000 structures were damaged, and another 3,500 structures were 
completely destroyed. These damages displaced one third of the city’s entire population, 
approximately 17,000 people.174  
In addition, the tornado destroyed six of the public school system’s school 
buildings and damaged another four. The tornado destroyed much of the medical 
infrastructure within Joplin as well. This included medical offices, six nursing homes, 
two dialysis centers, eight behavioral health facilities, four home health agencies, a 
hospice agency, and a detox center.175 Most notably, however, was the complete 
destruction of one of the two major hospitals in the city, Mercy St. John’s Regional 
Medical Center, which had a capacity of 367 beds.176  
171 National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, “Springfield, MO, Joplin Event Summary,” 
May 22, 2011, http://www.crh.noaa.gov/sgf/?n=event_2011may22_summary 
172 Ibid. 
173 David M. Abramson, and Derrin Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery: Joplin, 
Missouri Six Months after the May 22, 2011 Tornado (National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Earth 
Institute, Columbia University, 2013), http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:217606  
174 Ibid.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid., 173. 
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Figure 17.  Joplin Tornado Path177 
The principal of Joplin High School remarked to a reporter,  
You see pictures of World War II, the devastation and all that with the 
bombing. That’s really what it looked like…I couldn’t even make out the 
side of the building. It was total devastation in my view. I just couldn’t 
believe what I saw.178  
After the tornado, several days of severe weather followed, making it difficult to 
truly grasp the devastation throughout Joplin. However, as soon as it was safe to do so, 
key officials began damage assessments. The city of Joplin’s Emergency Management 
Team, which includes government officials, fire officials, and police agencies, began 
working on the recovery plan for each day’s work ahead. Their first priorities involved 
search and rescue operations and emergency debris removal to ensure rescuers could get 
into the areas where the need was the greatest. State officials were also available very 
quickly to assist with damage assessments and to determine unmet needs. They began the 
process of a state declaration immediately and by the morning following the tornado, 
177 “Nature in the News: Joplin Tornado Path Map,” May 25, 2011, 
https://blackjackoak.wordpress.com/2011/05/25/joplin-tornado-path-map/ 
178 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery. 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) crews began arriving in Joplin.179 
Ultimately, this disaster caused 161 fatalities, and over 1,000 more people were injured. 
The Joplin tornado is the deadliest single tornado since modern record keeping began in 
1950 and is ranked seventh among the deadliest tornadoes in U.S. history.  
2. Joplin Community—Connectedness 
The analysis of connectedness as a degree of community fragility has four 
components: isolation of the community, lack or surplus of social capital, the effect of a 
loss of a community leader, and the emergency management organizational model 
utilized during and after response.  
Joplin, Missouri is not a very diverse community in terms of ethnicity. The largest 
ethnic group in Joplin is Caucasian at 93 percent of the population. Smaller ethnic 
groups, such as Asian, Native American, and African American individuals, comprise the 
remainder of the population. The median income for a family is $35,566 and the poverty 
rate is 18.3 percent, both of which are below the state average.180 
In the available literature, however, there is nothing to suggest that Joplin is an 
isolated community. To the contrary, Joplin seems to be well connected from a 
transportation, manufacturing, medical, and economic base. In one study of the disaster, 
the authors looked at the nature of the damage, the social and political environment, and 
the community’s pre-tornado experiences and found that all three “created a favorable 
foundation for recovery.”181 Additionally, the researchers found no evidence of conflict 
in the city’s civic or political culture and trust in elected officials was also found to be 
quite high, even in the face of an upcoming election in November that year. They found 
that “while disputed political terrain undoubtedly exists in Joplin as it does everywhere 
else, it appears to be a less significant factor in recovery in Joplin than in other 
communities.”182 
179 Jessi Preussner, Examination of FEMA and the Relationship with a Community after a Disaster 
(Manhattan, KA: Kansas State University, 2012), http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/13694, 31.  
180 Ibid., 21.  
181 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 8. 
182 Ibid., 11. 
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Most notably, however, was the degree of social capital and the connections 
between government and non-government organizations. Joplin is an area where faith-
based and other community groups appear to be integral partners in the day-to-day 
delivery of city services and are often utilized for response and recovery operations. 
Before the disaster, local churches were significant partners of both the school system as 
well as local government. After the disaster, this degree of connectedness within the 
community allowed for a better overall recovery. According to Jay St. Clair, a local 
church outreach minister, “This faith component, this undercurrent that was there before 
[the tornado], that was building. The tornado has stirred that up…it didn’t create it, it just 
stirred up what was already there and magnified it.”183  
From an economic perspective, 20 percent of the population is employed in the 
manufacturing industry, 15 percent in retail and another 10 percent in construction.184 
According to a 2011 report on Joplin’s long-term recovery, “Joplin is an environment in 
which the business community, as embodied in the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce, 
is a full partner with local government in local and regional economic development.”185 
One such economic development partnership is known as the Joplin Regional Partnership 
of Southwest Missouri and Southeast Kansas, which involves six counties. This group 
discusses issues of unemployment, job training, and recruitment to the area.186 After the 
tornado, many people of Joplin who were interviewed believed that the disaster had not 
diminished the economic vitality of the city. Researchers state,  
Without exception, our informants had immense faith in the power and 
durability of Joplin. The tornado had not, in their view, fundamentally 
diminished or impaired the retail economic engine that makes Joplin the 
regional hub for southwest Missouri and the surrounding counties in 
Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas.187  
183 Ibid., 12.  
184 Preussner, Examination of FEMA, 21. 
185 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 12. 
186 Preussner, Examination of FEMA, 21.  
187 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 13.  
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Joplin Missouri did not have a loss of a community or political leader during this 
disaster, therefore it is not possible to evaluate this component. Another area that is 
difficult to analyze involves the emergency management organization. According to the 
Joplin/Jasper County Emergency Operations Center Operations Manual, the City of 
Joplin uses an Incident Command System organization for its emergency management 
response operations.188 This organization involves a hierarchy from an emergency 
operations center (EOC) manager (similar to an incident commander) down to section 
chiefs and units. By examining this manual, it seems that Joplin has a closed system, with 
specific roles and responsibilities for the City of Joplin staff. As the research above 
indicates, it is apparent that many other organizations are involved in emergency 
response and recovery.  
According to Michelle Ducre, the Southwest Missouri Director of Development 
for the Community Foundation of the Ozarks, “If you want a seat at the table you pretty 
much have it. There’s not been anybody that I’ve seen in the seven years I’ve been here 
denied access to the process if they wanted to be a part of it.”189 Therefore, while it 
would seem on paper that Joplin uses a command and control hierarchy for emergency 
management, all other evidence points to more of a collaborative model. The Joplin 
emergency management coordinator stated in the publication, Joplin Pays It Forward,  
In the past we have trained for tornados, but never one that would strike us 
so hard that it would overwhelm our local resources immediately, thus 
requiring us to reach out to a large number of people and organizations for 
help and support, attempt to coordinate their efforts and all the while 
maintain ongoing, viable City operations.190 
Mayor Mike Woolston reiterated the role of community spirit and social capital 
within Joplin after the disaster. In a publication by community leaders, he describes that 
within the first 48 hours, community members were already out clearing debris from 
188 Joplin/Jasper County Emergency Operations Center Operations Manual, last modified April 2009, 
Southwest Missouri Emergency Support Organization, smeso.org/downloads/
EOCOperationsManualUpdated040709.doc 
189 Ibid. 
190 Jane Cage, and Rich Serino, Joplin Pays It Forward: Community Leaders Share Our Recovery 
Lessons (Joplin, MO: Jane Cage, 2013), http://joplincc.com/Joplin%20Pays%20It%20Forward%20-
%20Community%20Leaders%20Share%20Our%20Recovery%20Lessons.pdf, 21. 
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properties and many began rebuilding efforts within the first week. He commented on the 
reasons why the city was able to recover so quickly, attributing it to the initial and 
ongoing response by the local citizens, working together with over 175,000 volunteers, 
who allowed them to move forward. In addition, Woolston states, “I believe it was the 
initial actions and tone set by formal and informal leaders in the community that got us 
started in the right direction but it was the volunteers and our citizen response that keeps 
us moving forward.”191  
3. Joplin Community—Stability 
Stability plays a role in community fragility through community relationships, 
emergency management leadership, emergency management structure, and the ability to 
be flexible and adapt to emerging events. As mentioned in the previous section, by all 
accounts Joplin had strong interjurisdictional relationships before the disaster that 
assisted in both response and recovery operations. This included governmental partners 
as well as non-profits, volunteer organizations, and the private sector.  
Within the first few months of the tornado touching down, four key actions 
occurred to ensure a positive recovery. First, the city government coordinated with the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to remove over three million cubic yards of debris in just 
a few months.192 Second, the school system was able to find replacement facilities for the 
school buildings that were lost in the storm, allowing students to return to school on 
schedule. Third, a hospital sponsor agreed to build a new hospital in Joplin and retain all 
hospital workers in Joplin until the facility opened. This was done in partnership with an 
unaffected hospital in the area to keep up with demand. Finally, a group of civic leaders 
formed an organization called the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team (CART) for long-
term recovery planning. This group consisted of volunteers from multiple sectors of the 
community, working on essential recovery needs throughout Joplin.193 They also served 
as a liaison between the community and the city. Tonya Sperkle, CERT member, stated, 
191 Ibid., 22. 
192 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 2. 
193 Ibid., 2. 
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“CART can also be called the watchdog. We know what was promised by the city and we 
are there to ensure these promises are kept.”194 
Other community groups that assisted Joplin include the Jasper and Newton 
Counties Community Health Collaborative, Ten for Joplin, and the Community 
Foundation of Southwest Missouri. The Community Health Collaborative involves 
representatives from both of the hospital systems, the city and county health departments, 
the United Way, and other organizations interested in promoting health.195 Additionally, 
the Habitat for Humanity out of Tulsa, Oklahoma, created the rebuilding effort in Joplin 
called Ten for Joplin. As a neighboring jurisdiction, it immediately jumped in to assist. 
Members worked for over 10 months and raised over one million dollars to help rebuild 
homes lost in the disaster.196  
Relationships between the citizen-led community groups, local officials, the State 
of Missouri, and FEMA were already well established before this disaster, creating 
relationships based on trust and mutual understanding.197 Due to the number of 
interjurisdictional relationships, and the degree of trust in these groups to do what was 
best for the city of Joplin, more was accomplished in a shorter amount of time. 
Additionally, the number of groups working on different goals as part of a larger system 
illustrates the concept of compartmentalization as outlined in the fragility literature. The 
emergency management agency was able to work through broad goals while the 
community-led groups were able to work on specific recovery actions for their areas of 
expertise. In the case of Joplin, this model was highly successful overall. This also 
illustrates flexibility in planning efforts and the ability to adapt to the disaster 
environment. Instead of maintaining the hierarchical structure as outlined in their 
emergency operations plan, community members were able to effectively branch out 
horizontally to multiple organizations to work through recovery efforts.  
194 Preussner, Examination of FEMA, 26. 
195 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 15.  
196 Ibid., 25. 
197 Preussner, Examination of FEMA, 31. 
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Another key area for the stability of a community is strong leadership and local 
governance. Joplin is governed by a nine-member elected council, including a mayor, and 
has an established city manager to work through the day-to-day government business. 
Joplin has also had an emergency management program in place since the 1950s, led by 
an emergency management director.198 Mark Rohr, City Manager, remarked after the 
disaster,  
I have been in cities in which we dealt with storms and the damage 
incurred, but nothing remotely like this. It was overwhelming—I was 
overwhelmed for a brief moment, but I knew that we had to get to work 
immediately. I took a deep breath, told myself that if the City was going to 
recover, we needed to get to work—and that’s what we did.199  
This statement exemplifies the common attitude amongst the key officials throughout the 
city. This leadership philosophy enabled partner organizations to work without the fear of 
“stepping on toes” or impeding progress, and the leaders provided calm, supportive 
reassurance throughout the disaster.  
This was also true at the state level. Many commented on the visibility and 
leadership of the governor, Jay Nixon. While outlining the state recovery goals, the 
governor stated, “As a state, we are deploying every agency and resource available to 
keep Missouri families safe, search for the missing, provide emergency medical care, and 
begin to recover.”200 The governor secured funds immediately for the wide-scale efforts 
for debris removal and for a pediatric treatment facility. Additionally, Nixon provided 
state income tax credits to encourage voluntary donations toward disaster relief 
operations. Gary Duncan, Chief Executive Officer of Freeman Health System, reiterated 
the positive comments of many others. He stated, “The governor was a huge part of the 
198 “Joplin Jasper County Emergency Management Agency,” Joplin, Missouri, 
http://www.joplinmo.org/index.aspx?nid=154  
199 Cage, and Serino, Joplin Pays It Forward, 12.  
200 Nathan Busch, and Austen Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management: The Role of 
Public-Private Partnerships,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (2013): 1, 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1231&context=jss 
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momentum down here. He was here every other day. He was saying ‘Let’s get ‘er 
done.’”201  
The current literature regarding this disaster agrees that strong leadership existed 
in Joplin at the time of the tornado and that the local officials were present, visible, and 
able to manage the emergency effectively. Mark Rohr stated,  
It comes down to the local leadership. We are the ones setting the pace, 
and these agencies are working for us. And they do, but you have to 
provide the direction in where you want them to go. They will tell you that 
they can enhance local leadership, but they cannot take its place.202 
4. Joplin Community—Sustainability 
Sustainability involves the community’s ability to continue moving forward 
through a disaster, into recovery and beyond. This involves resource management 
practices, restoration of lifelines, and the ability to recognize small system failures that 
could lead to cascading events. There is nothing in the literature to suggest that system 
failures occurred in Joplin that went unnoticed or that cascading events occurred that 
caused full system failures; however, information is available on the other three key 
indicators of community fragility due to sustainability.  
Telephone communications to the city were largely cutoff after the tornado, 
causing difficulty in for officials to obtain situational awareness about the damages and 
community needs.203 Additionally, roads and bridges were blocked by debris, cutting off 
access to the hospital and other critical facilities. The city set a goal of August 17 to get 
all critical infrastructure repaired since school would begin that day. With the help of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the city was able to meet this deadline as well as the 
201 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 14. 
202 Cage, and Serino, Joplin Pays it Forward, 12. 
203 Michael Todd Gardner, Cory Beard, and Deep Medhi, “Avoiding High Impacts of Geospatial 
Events in Mission Critical and Emergency Networks Using Linear and Swarm Optimization,” in 2012 
IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and 




                                                 
deadline of August 6 for the completion of all debris removal operations.204 Additionally, 
because of the loss of one of the two hospitals in the city, a temporary hospital was set up 
within one week of the disaster to assist with surge capacity. After three months, the field 
hospital was transitioned to a modular unit and within a year a new facility was opened 
with 120 beds.205 
The ability to work collectively to repair and restore critical infrastructure is 
directly connected to the city’s ability to obtain the necessary resources for recovery. 
Without the assistance provided by multiple private and public partners in the hours, 
days, and weeks following the disaster, Joplin would not have had the supplies and 
resources necessary to rescue survivors, clear roads, and repair damaged infrastructure. 
According to research done by Busch, and Givens, Home Depot and Wal-Mart each 
pledged to give one million dollars to the recovery effort. Additionally, Home Depot 
partnered with Delta Airlines to fly in over 200 volunteers from businesses in Georgia to 
deliver supplies throughout the city. Moreover, the Empire District Electric Company 
partnered with neighboring power companies to restore power and natural gas to the city 
residents, and Sprint provided cellular phones and satellite phones to emergency officials, 
allowing them to remain connected.206  
Just as importantly, however, the Joplin disaster illustrated the recovery concept 
of neighbors helping neighbors. Daniel Aldrich, Purdue University, states,  
Survivors of tornadoes in the Midwest need to borrow water, chainsaws, 
diesel generators, and other equipment that they do not own and are not 
available due to the closure of stores. Neighbors and friends—not 
government agencies or NGOs—provide the necessary resources for 
recovery after disaster.207  
In the case of Joplin, Missouri, reports indicate that all of these groups assisted in a 
successful recovery.  
204 Doug Scott, “2012 Critical Infrastructure Symposium Focuses on Resilience,” ASCE News, May 
2012, http://cms.asce.org/ascenews/shorttakes.aspx?id=25769808621  
205 White House, “Joplin: One Year Later,” The White House, accessed January 20, 2015, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/joplin  
206 Busch, and Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management,” 1.  
207 Aldrich, “Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,” 6.  
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The data available on resiliency after the storm coincides with all other 
information about this disaster. Joplin has shown the ability to be resilient. According to 
the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce, over 500 businesses sustained damages in the 
Tornado, and six months into recovery, over 400 of those businesses had reopened, and 
another 46 reopened in the months that followed.208 Although 33 companies indicated 
that they would not rebuild, 21 new businesses have since opened in their place.209 As for 
residents of the area, Mayor Mike Woolston reported that 88 percent of the people 
displaced by the disaster had returned to the area and are living within 25 miles of the 
disaster. In addition, schools expected a dramatic decline in enrollment due to the disaster 
but found that 95 percent of students returned at the beginning of the school year. Sue 
Adams, with the Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce, stated that the hospital and the 
schools became “the icon of the rebuilding” because they immediately began the process 
of putting the city back together.210  
The focus did not end with rebuilding. The city formed recovery groups to look at 
ways in which Joplin could rebuild and become stronger in the process. Jane Cage, 
Missouri’s community disaster recovery leader, said, “We owe it to the people who died 
in Joplin, and the people who lost their homes, to rebuild better than we were. If we 
become only what we were before the tornado, it would be a shame.”211  
5. Summary Analysis of Fragility for the Joplin Tornado 
Overall, accounts regarding the 2011 Joplin tornado illustrate a tight-knit 
community, with high social capital, a flexible and adaptable emergency management 
program, and strong local leadership. The city uses an ICS model for emergency 
management, and welcomes various governmental, non-governmental, private sector and 
volunteer agency partners. Several interviews indicated that the community generally has 
208 White House, “Joplin: One Year Later.” 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Joe Lamb, “Joplin Leaders Share Tornado Recovery Lessons with Faulkner County,” The Cabin 
Net, August 14, 2014, http://thecabin.net/news/local/2014-08-14/joplin-leaders-share-tornado-recovery-
lessons-faulkner-county#.VJ86wl4AA  
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a “take care of yourself, don’t wait around for others to take care of you” approach.212 
This attitude is apparent in multiple reports from the tornado, from neighbors helping 
neighbors, to local community groups stepping in to assist the city in recovery efforts.  
An analysis of the conceptual framework for fragility in emergency management 
illustrates that the city of Joplin has high connectedness, stability, and sustainability, all 
factors to decrease overall fragility. Figure 18 further outlines each area of the framework 
specific to the 2011 Joplin tornado event.  
212 Abramson, and Culp, At the Crossroads of Long-Term Recovery, 11. 
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There was no loss of a community lead 
in available literature, therefore unable 
to assess this factor
Joplin is well connected from a 
transportation, manufacturing, medical 
and economic base. Joplin has a 
structured emergency management plan
No evidence found of conflict in the 
city’s civic or political culture and trust in 
elected officials was found to be high. All 
levels of government showed strong 
leadership during this event. 
Faith-based and community groups are 
an integral partner in day-to-day delivery 
of city services and often used for 
response and recovery. There is a high 
degree of trust in government 
organizations and strong community 
engagement. High social cohesion.
EOC Manual suggests Joplin uses a 
vertical ICS model, and yet collaboration 
horizontally is evident with multiple non-
governmental organizations. 
By all accounts, Joplin had strong 
interjurisdictional relationships before 
the disaster.
The number of groups working on 
different goals as part of a larger system 
illustrates the concept of 
compartmentalization.
Joplin adapted the emergency plan to 
ensure needs were met. They showed 
flexibility in their approach. 
Multiple private and public partners 
came to Joplin and assisted the city in re-
establishing supply chain management 
routes. 
There is nothing in the literature to 
suggest that small system failures went 
unnoticed or that cascading events 
occurred that caused full system failures. 
Lifelines were cut off, but alternate 
sources were made available and 
redundancies existed.
In six months 400 businesses had re-
opened and 88% of displaced people 
were back in their homes. Strong 






Figure 18.  Fragility Framework—Analysis of the 2011 Joplin Tornado 
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Keith Stammer, Emergency Management Coordinator for Joplin, summed it up 
when he said,  
We are but ordinary people who found ourselves in extraordinary 
circumstances. We stepped up to meet the challenge presented us. We 
have done what was needed in order to recover and restore. ‘Adjust, adapt, 
overcome’ is the mantra we continue to live by.213 
C. CASE STUDY 2: 2007 SAN DIEGO COUNTY WILDFIRES 
“There was a desert wind blowing that night. It was one of those hot dry 
Santa Ana’s that come down through the mountain passes and curl your 
hair and make your nerves jump and your skin itch.” 
–Raymond Chandler 
1. Synopsis of the Event 
Southern California is known for its wildfires, and there, they are as common as 
hurricanes in Florida or tornadoes in Kansas. Since 1956, there have been seven federally 
declared wildfire disasters, along with annual wildfires meeting the thresholds for the 
Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) through FEMA.214 The nature of wildfire in 
southern California is also quite different that the rest of the United States, both by nature 
and degree. California has the highest losses in property and life from wildfires annually, 
but it also has the highest number of people moving into the wildland-urban interface 
where wildfires are most destructive.215 
Because of this history, all 58 counties and nearly all city governments in 
California signed a master mutual aid agreement for wildfire management in 1950.216 
After the devastating wildfire season in 1970 and criticism regarding a lack of 
213 Cage, and Serino, Joplin Pays It Forward, 22. 
214 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] and California Office of Emergency Services 
[OES], Southern California Best Practices: Southern California Wildfires of 2007 (Mather, CA: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency and California Office of Emergency Services, 2008), http://nhma.info/
uploads/bestpractices/2007%20Wildfires%20-%20DR%201731%20CA%20-%20Best%20Practices.pdf  
215 Jon E. Keeley, Hugh Safford, C.J. Fotheringham, Janet Franklin and Max Moritz, The 2007 
Southern California Wildfires: Lessons in Complexity (Bethesda, MD: United States Geological Survey, 
2009), http://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/70036938, 287.   
216 California Fire Siege 2007: An Overview (Los Angeles: California Department of Forestry and 
Fire Protection, 2008), http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/downloads/siege/2007/
Overview_CompleteFinal.pdf, 8.   
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cooperation and accountability in response, state and federal funding was made available 
for a five-year research project called Firefighting Resources of Southern California 
Organized for Potential Emergencies, better known as FIRESCOPE. The research team 
identified a new fire management system composed of the following key elements: 
Incident Command System, Multi-Agency Coordination System, Information 
Management System, Technological Support, and Common Communication. This would 
later become the basis for the National Incident Management System.217  
Although California had long faced major wildfires and had helped to create the 
incident management systems that have been used nationally for decades, the 2007 
wildfire season exceeded state capabilities and severely taxed current plans and 
procedures. The San Diego Firestorms were the largest in county history, far surpassing 
the devastating 2003 wildfire season, which had previously been the worst on record.218  
Rainfall totals that year were far below average, leaving California drier than 
normal at the beginning of the fire season. Summer weather continued to be dry with very 
little precipitation, increasing the potential for severe fires in the fall. Beginning in mid-
October 2007, Predictive Services at the Southern California Geographic Area 
Coordination Center (OSCC) began forecasting an “extreme fire weather event of strong, 
hot, dry, winds.”219 Fire managers monitored the weather and as the winds increased, 
they pre-positioned federal firefighting resources, including Incident Management 
Teams, air resources, and 24-hour staffing of fire personnel.  
California fire managers understand that coordinating firefighting efforts during a 
“fire siege” is drastically different than a typical wildfire. Due to the force and nature of 
the Santa Ana winds, these wildfires are highly unpredictable. The winds, coupled with 
the dry, heavy fuels, increase the number of wildfires in the area and cause the fires to 
217 Sheron Morgan, Marian Mosser, and Phillip Paker, Wildfires in California: Analysis of the 
Incident Command System and FIRESCOPE (presented at Cambridge Business and Economics 
Conference, 2011), http://www.gcbe.us/2011_CBEC/data/
Sheron%20Morgan,%20Marian%20Mosser,%20Phillip%20Paker.doc, 6. 
218 Walter Ekard, Harold Tuck, and Ron Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report 




                                                 
grow out of control quickly. The wildfires move like a storm front, called a firestorm, and 
can shift direction randomly in any direction.220 In 2007, the Santa Ana winds blew up to 
70 mph. This, combined with the high temperatures, low relative humidity, and dry 
conditions created the perfect environment for a major fire event.221  
The 2007 wildfires began at approximately 9:30am on October 21, 2007. The 
Harris Fire was reported along Highway 94 near the U.S.-Mexico border town of Potrero 
in San Diego County. Strong winds decreased suppression efforts, and the fire grew 
rapidly in dry brush and grass. Emergency management personnel quickly mobilized and 
activated their emergency operations center (EOC) just a few hours into the incident. As 
the incident progressed, more personnel were called in to assist. Personnel from over 60 
disciplines were present, representing local, state, and federal governments, as well as 
non-governmental and non-profit partners. By mid-afternoon, a local disaster declaration 
had been sent to the governor’s office.222 There were reports of multiple structures 
burning and numerous injuries. Air firefighting efforts were also affected because of the 
low visibility and 70 mph winds in the area. In a little over 12 hours, the Harris Fire had 
already burned more than 16,000 acres (see Figure 19).223 
220 California Fire Siege 2007, 60. 
221 Emergency Response and Crisis Management Technical Assistance Center, “Communication and 
Collaboration During Natural Disasters: The Lessons Learned from Past Experience,” Lessons Learned 
from School Crises and Emergencies 3, no. 2 (2008), http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED504384  
222 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 8. 
223 Ibid.  
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Figure 19.  Fire Maps of the 2007 Southern California Fire Storms224 
A mere 40 miles away, the Witch Creek Wildfire was reported at 2:35pm on the 
same day in a rural area east of Ramona in San Diego County. Due to the high winds and 
the inability of air resources to assist in combatting the blaze, the fire spread rapidly 
toward heavily populated communities. Rates of fire spread exceeded 5 mph in some 
areas and flame lengths were often 80–100 feet high. Locals in the area of the Witch Fire 
reported winds in excess of 100 mph.225  
Each incorporated city within San Diego County has the ultimate authority for 
wildfire management within their boundaries. State, tribal, and private lands in 
unincorporated areas of the county are managed by the California Emergency 
224 California Fire Siege 2007, 66. 
225 Ibid. 
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Management Authority (Cal EMA), previously known as CAL FIRE, and federal lands 
are managed by the federal land agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service or the Bureau 
of Land Management. All agencies utilize their own resources before calling on 
neighboring jurisdictions as part of the San Diego County Fire Mutual Aid Agreement 
and the State Master Mutual Aid Agreement. Furthermore, San Diego officials formed a 
fire authority in June 2008 to improve fire protection and emergency medical services 
throughout the county. They also contract with local fire protection districts and 
volunteer fire departments to provide fire suppression and medical services.226 
With multiple fires already burning throughout Southern California, resources 
were already stretched thin. By evening, the fire jumped Interstate-15 and burned over 
10,000 acres.227 Multiple structures were reported destroyed in Rancho Bernardo and 
Poway. The Witch Creek Wildfire became the most destructive of the 2007 season, and 
as it grew in size, it joined the Poomacha Fire in the north and together the two fires 
burned 247,400 acres and destroyed over 1,200 homes.228  
The Guejito Wildfire began the next day, October 22, 2007, at 1:30am near the 
Wild Animal Park in San Diego County. It took only a few hours before the fire began 
consuming homes in northeastern Rancho Bernardo. It continued to spread west and 
jumped I-15, ultimately destroying hundreds of homes in West Rancho Bernardo. While 
365 homes were lost, it is estimated that over 6,000 were saved by aggressive firefighting 
actions taken by the fire managers on scene.229  
The Witch Creek and the Guejito fires ultimately merged in the early morning 
hours of October 22, 2007, as the temperatures increased. This lead to the largest 
evacuation in the county’s history, where more than a half a million people were ordered 
to leave the area. The San Diego Mayor, Jerry Sanders, and the Chief Operating Officer, 
226 Operational Area Emergency Plan: Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Annex (San Diego: Unified San 
Diego County Emergency Services Organization and County of San Diego, 2011), 
http://www.wildfiremethods.com/linked/final_wildland-urban_interface_fire_annex.pdf, 7. 
227 Ibid. 
228 FEMA and OES, Southern California Best Practices, 5. 
229 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response (San 
Diego: City of San Diego, 2007), http://www.sandiego.gov/fire/pdf/witch_aar.pdf, 6. 
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Jay Gladstone, were kept updated regarding the advance of the fires into heavily 
populated areas of the city of San Diego. Mass notifications and evacuation plans were 
put into effect with an estimate of the fires reaching the city limits by 5am on October 22. 
Geographical trigger points were utilized for neighborhood evacuations to ensure a 
timely and controlled evacuations. Furthermore, police officers staged at various points 
throughout the city to assist in compliance with evacuation orders.230  
Short-term recovery operations began in the Operational Area Emergency 
Operations Center (OAEOC) with the establishment of a recovery coordinator to assist in 
the development of the recovery organizational structure. This group focused primarily 
on damage assessments in unincorporated areas of the county and the formation of four 
local area assistance centers (LACs). Each LAC provided a single point of contact for 
displaced and affected community members to get assistance and support from local, 
state, federal, and non-governmental agencies.231  
In four days, the Santa Ana winds contributed to 23 separate southern California 
wildfires before finally dying down and allowing firefighters to battle the blazes. At the 
height of the firestorms, there were seven separate wildfires burning in San Diego County 
alone. These fires resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians and injuries to 89 firefighters. 
More than 6,200 personnel assisted in controlling these fires, which all together 
consumed over 13 percent of the county’s land mass.232  
2. San Diego County—Connectedness 
The four components of connectedness include: isolation of the community, lack 
or surplus of social capital, the effect of a loss of a community leader, and the emergency 
management organizational model utilized during and after response. Out of these four 
components of fragility, the two areas that stand out for the 2007 San Diego firestorms 
are elements of social capital specific to vulnerable populations, and command and 
control mechanisms specific to wildfire. Similar to the incident in Joplin, San Diego 
230 Ibid., 5.  
231 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 67. 
232 Ibid., iv. 
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County did not experience the loss of a key community leader, making it impossible to 
evaluate the consequences of such a loss. San Diego is also not an isolated community. 
The area is surrounded by populated communities, various access routes, and a robust 
wildfire management system throughout the county and the state of California.  
San Diego County had a population of approximately 3.2 million people at the 
time of the 2013 U.S. Census.233 Unlike Joplin, San Diego County is incredibly diverse 
in terms of ethnicity and other demographics. The majority of the population is Caucasian 
at 62 percent, but the county also has large populations of Asian, African American, 
Filipino, and Hispanic ethnicities.234 One-third of San Diego County has a Hispanic and 
Latino population, and approximately 70 percent of the wildfire burn area was populated 
with this group of people, including groups of immigrants and migrant farm workers 
from Mexico.235 Due to this diversity, it was easier to evaluate various degrees of social 
capital and isolation of a specific group of people.  
In 2002, the United States Department of Agriculture published a report titled, 
Homeowners, Communities, and Wildfire: Science Findings from the National Fire Plan. 
In that report, it recognized the value of social capital in improving community 
preparedness specific to wildfires.236 After the 2003 Cedar Wildfire in San Diego 
County, the county made several strides to ensure diverse populations were considered in 
evacuation actions. Particularly, planning and preparedness efforts went toward 
strengthening communications with the disability community and others with access and 
functional needs.  
In the 2007 fire siege, multiple organizations began working to ensure these 
populations were considered and that their needs were met. Many skilled nursing 
233 Ibid.  
234 United States Census Bureau, “American Fact Finder,” accessed January 20, 2015, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
235 Nadia Siddiqui, Dennis Andrulis, and Guadalupe Pacheco, “Southern California Wildfires of 2007: 
Preparing and Responding to Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities,” in Case Studies in 
Public Health Preparedness and Response to Disasters, ed. Linda Young Landesman, Isaac B. Weisfuse 
(Burlington MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning, 2013), 22.  
236 Aldrich, “Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,” 10. 
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facilities had to be evacuated to shelters and evacuation points. Due to the pre-planning 
by the Office of Emergency Services and Health and Human Services personnel, these 
actions went smoothly. Additionally, patients from three hospitals and 12 nursing homes 
were evacuated. Medical resources were also deployed to provide medical care at each 
shelter.237 However, one problem that was noted was that there was not a coordination 
point for these agencies to collaborate. Therefore, while people with disabilities or 
medical conditions were considered and helped, many agencies were unaware of the 
actions or decisions of other agencies, which caused confusion. 
Overall, many applauded San Diego County for its quick response to the wildfire 
and its effective evacuation of citizens. However, many community organizations 
reported that there were serious gaps with sections of the community, specifically with 
regard to culturally and linguistically diverse populations.238 More than one-third of the 
county’s residents reported receiving no warning or communications regarding the 
wildfire or evacuations. This included homes on Native American reservations and those 
located in remote areas of the county.239 Other barriers to communication occurred in 
evacuation and sheltering operations. This was mainly due to one of the three key areas 
of social capital: trust. These barriers led to delays in key services, the loss of jobs and 
homes, health concerns, and other damages.  
An after action report for the City of San Diego stated,  
The safety and security of the people who seek the City’s protection is our 
Number One priority. This is for all people seeking protection from the 
firestorm, irrespective of unknown or questionable residential, 
immigration or other status. Everyone had the opportunity to be safe.240  
But one of the primary areas where trust was a factor was in the sheltering of migrant 
workers and illegal immigrants. One example, leading to many not evacuating or seeking 
shelter, was the relationship San Diego County had with the U.S. Customs and Border 
237 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 56. 
238 Ibid.  
239 Siddiqui, Andrulis, and Pacheco, “Southern California Wildfires of 2007,” 22.  
240 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response, 27.  
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Patrol. The county invited the Border Patrol to assist in the wildfire by providing 
mapping services on the burn area. And although Border Patrol agents were not at the 
shelter site in an immigration capacity, the presence of their vehicles and the presence of 
personnel with Border Patrol uniforms created fear and anxiety among the migrants, who 
feared the agents would arrest them, which led to a breakdown in successful evacuation. 
Additionally, many in the community reported that San Diego police officers walked 
through the shelters at night asking people for their identity documents.241  
Military personnel and their families are also a large part of the San Diego 
community. During the fires, the Navy opened several evacuation centers at three naval 
bases in San Diego to provide support to these families. It also provided logistical support 
to local shelters in the form of cots and tents at Qualcomm Stadium and the fairgrounds. 
Although the military is an integral part of the San Diego community, there were 
communications breakdowns, however, between the civilian shelters and the military 
centers. For example, military personnel deployed to the area were unable to contact 
family members who were not located in military shelters but who had been evacuated to 
civilian shelters.242  
On the positive side of social capital, there were many community groups that 
came to assist. When they found out about the difficulties with sheltering diverse 
populations and the communications concerns, advocacy and community groups 
mobilized resources to fill any unmet needs within the community.243 For example, 
church organizations opened their doors and provided shelter to those who did not trust 
official shelter locations. Having these organizations available and ready to assist during 
this disaster allowed for the successful evacuation of thousands of people. Additionally, 
the county recognized that there was a gap in the communications during this incident 
and has made significant strides in this area for future operations. Seventeen of the 21 
recommendations outlined in the after action report for the county tied to better 
241 San Diego Immigrant’s Rights Consortium and American Civil Liberties Union, San Diego and 
Imperial Counties Chapter, Firestorm: Treatment of Vulnerable Populations During the San Diego Fires 
(San Diego: San Diego County, 2007), http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/38026325?selectedversion=NBD46043713, 5.  
242 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 48. 
243 Siddiqui, Andrulis, and Pacheco, “Southern California Wildfires of 2007,” 35. 
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communications. This ranged from ensuring people have the right information regarding 
evacuations to a multi-phased citizen preparedness campaign.244 The county also plans to 
increase the number of “partner relay” agencies from 150 to 300. This program was 
specifically designed to get evacuation notices to the many diverse communities 
throughout the area by utilizing religious organizations, community groups, and schools. 
Holly Crawford, Director of Emergency Services for San Diego County, said, “It’s 
important for us to reach everyone. Particularly paying attention to more vulnerable 
populations, we have an interest in reaching those individuals.”245  
Another primary consideration when looking at the fragility of emergency 
management systems is an examination of the emergency management structure. As 
stated previously, California is responsible for creating the Incident Command System 
(ICS) that led to the National Incident Management System, which is now a standard 
across the nation. ICS includes five functional areas: command, operations, planning, 
logistics, and finance. Many law enforcement agencies have added another layer for field 
intelligence in law enforcement operations.  
Under the ICS, the incident commander has the ultimate authority for the incident. 
This typically involves one agency as command with others falling into the various 
positions within the hierarchy. Agency administrators from other jurisdictions may be 
incorporated into the ICS as needed to ensure cooperation throughout the incident. This 
allows for a seamless transition in the event a wildfire spreads into other jurisdictions.246  
ICS was also built to be expandable and flexible, to be used on any wildfire 
incident, large or small.247 In our new complex environment, where large populations are 
living in forested areas, the numbers of partners have grown exponentially. This has led 
to an expanding structure of incident command, including multi-agency coordination 
centers (MACCs), emergency operations centers (EOCs), joint information centers 
244 Ari Bloomekatz, “How the County Wants to Fix Wildfire Response,” Voice of San Diego, June 17, 
2014, http://voiceofsandiego.org/2014/06/17/how-the-county-wants-to-fix-wildfire-response/  
245 Ibid. 
246 Operational Area Emergency Plan, 5. 
247 Morgan, Mosser, and Paker, Wildfires in California, 10. 
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(JICs), and other coordinating elements. In the case of the 2007 San Diego firestorms, the 
incident commander communicated with the local EOCs for each jurisdiction. They also 
used multiple fire communications centers (FCCs) for resource ordering, situation status 
cells for intelligence operations and spatial analysis, department operations centers 
(DOCs) for law enforcement coordination, and JICs for communicating with the 
public.248 These groups are not necessarily under the command of the incident 
commander, but instead coordinating groups acting together on the incident. Therefore, 
while San Diego County utilizes the ICS model of command and control for incident 
operations, it also uses it with the flexibility to bring in partners that are most needed for 
the successful execution of the mission.  
3. San Diego County—Stability 
Stability is assessed by looking at relationships, leadership, plans, and the 
structure of the emergency management system. As illustrated in the previous section, 
San Diego has a robust emergency management system that utilizes a hybrid approach, 
combining the command and control model of ICS with the horizontal model of 
collaboration. Additionally, there are many “hubs” or groups that work throughout the 
area in various functions, such as information management, shelter operations, law 
enforcement actions, etc. For law enforcement alone, the county reported that the San 
Diego Police Department Operations Center (DOC) worked with Eastern Command, 
Traffic Command, Southern Command, Northeastern Command, and Headquarters 
Staging to provide scene security, traffic control, evacuation operations, and overall law 
enforcement coordination.249 However, difficulty with this model is that the connection 
points between these groups are not always strong, leading to breakdowns in 
communications. It is also challenging having so many groups called “command” as it 
causes confusion with the public and support entities as to who is really in charge. From a 
stability perspective, having a compartmentalized structure can lead to better overall 
248 Operational Area Emergency Plan, 5. 
249 Michael Dombeck, Jack Williams, and Christopher Wood, “Wildfire Policy and Public Lands: 
Integrating Scientific Understanding with Social Concerns across Landscapes,” Conservation Biology 18, 
no. 4 (August 2004): 888.  
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management of the incident as different partners will focus on diverse areas of need. 
However, as was expressed in multiple after action reports, it is equally important to 
build the bridges between these organizations to ensure communications remain strong.  
San Diego County has shown its ability to adapt and to create flexible planning 
models for the future. Literature regarding the Cedar Fire in 2003 outlined various 
lessons learned that have since been implemented within the community to make them 
stronger for the next disaster. This greatly enhanced the emergency management system 
for the 2007 firestorms. For example, newly developed city, county, and community 
evacuation plans were utilized for the first time in the 2007 wildfires, assisting the San 
Diego County Sheriff’s Office execute the largest single fire evacuation in the nation’s 
history. Again, when these fires ended, the wildfire and emergency management 
communities captured new lessons learned and have shown their willingness to adapt 
plans and procedures to decrease their fragility in the future.  
Additionally, traditional approaches to incident management and the ICS involved 
military models that were much less flexible than what is seen today. These military 
officers modified military command and control models for the wildfire arena to meet the 
needs of the communities affected. However, over time, adaptation and flexibility were 
needed to make the model work in large-scale disasters involving multiple jurisdictional 
authorities. According to Morgan, Mosser, and Paker, “This adaption process was not 
seamless, nor did it occur rapidly. In fact, both emergency services incident command 
theory and military sciences continue to evolve.”250  
The two areas with the most literature regarding fragility measures include 
interjurisdictional relationships and leadership. Much like Joplin Missouri, San Diego 
County has a wealth of partnerships with public and private partners. One of the San 
Diego after action reports states, “The 2007 firestorms demonstrated that the working 
relationships and coordination in this region have never been better between the city and 
the county.”251 Some of these partnerships are formal, specific to wildfire management 
250 Morgan, Mosser, and Paker, Wildfires in California, 4. 
251 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response, 1. 
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with various state and federal wildfire managers, while others are less formal 
relationships with community groups and the private sector.  
The American Red Cross plays a primary role in sheltering operations for 
emergency incidents throughout California. The local Red Cross chapter was severely 
taxed during the initial days after the first few fires broke out in San Diego County. It did 
not have the staff or the resources to manage such a large event. With the assistance of 
other volunteer organizations, however, 45 shelters were opened and operated throughout 
the county, including two mega-shelters: one at Qualcomm Stadium and the other at Del 
Mar Fairgrounds. Additionally, over 3,000 animals were rescued, housed, and fed for 
over a week while people remained evacuated.252  
San Diego County has strong relationships with all 42 school districts within the 
county, which became an important partnership during this incident. The Valley Center-
Pauma Unified School District closed schools on Monday, October 22, 2007, due to 
dangers posed by the wildfires. That same day, the school district was asked to open an 
evacuation center at the Valley Center High School. By noon, the center already had 300 
evacuees, and by the next day that number swelled to over 1,000 due to the start of the 
Poomacha wildfire.253 This influx of people to the high school was overwhelming, and 
since Red Cross resources were already stretched thin, school officials ran the center for 
several days. At one point, all roads leading to the school were closed due to wildfires 
surrounding the area. Members of the community brought in food and supplies and the 
school continued to handle the increasing number of evacuees for over one week.254 This 
ability to coordinate with multiple volunteer organizations and community partners 
greatly reduced the fragility of San Diego County during the wildfires. 
Strong leadership was also shown throughout these fire events by all levels of 
government. Because of the anticipated number of evacuees throughout the county, the 
mayor made a decision early in the disaster to establish a mass evacuation center operated 
252 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, v.  
253 Ibid.  
254 Emergency Response and Crisis Management Technical Assistance Center, “Communication and 
Collaboration During Natural Disasters,” 6.  
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by city staff and volunteers until the Red Cross was able to bring in national resources to 
take over. Because other shelters were being forced to close due to additional 
evacuations, the city prepared to receive up to 100,000 people at Qualcomm Stadium.255 
Other significant policy decisions that assisted residents include the early declaration of 
disaster by the mayor requesting state and presidential declarations, the dissemination of 
information to the public with instructions for people affected by the event, the delivery 
of resources to field personnel allowing them to continue response efforts, and the 
establishment of a city-run Local Assistance Center as a one-stop location for community 
members to get information about recovery resources.256  
In addition, San Diego had state- and federal-level support. Governor 
Schwarzenegger made himself available to fire managers and other policy makers 
throughout the course of this event. He flew out to each fire base to meet with local 
officials and to determine the greatest needs so that he could pass along the information 
to the federal government partners. The state quickly assessed the situation and was able 
to provide the necessary information to FEMA for a presidential declaration, which was 
requested on October 22, 2007. President Bush signed Disaster Declaration 1731-DR-CA 
on October 24, and federal resources were immediately made available to assist local 
responders and agencies.257  
4. San Diego County—Sustainability 
Fragility factors related to sustainability include a lack of resource management 
procedures, inaccessibility of lifelines, lack of resiliency, and the inability to recognize 
system failures when they occur. Sustainability measures are a key topic of discussion 
amongst wildfire managers and emergency managers due to the number of people living 
in the wildland urban interface (WUI), the parched forests, and the overgrowth of tree 
stands due to decades of fire management practices that avoided the natural wildfire 
cycle. The 2007 San Diego firestorms provide prime examples of how resource 
255 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response, 7. 
256 Ibid., 8. 
257 California Fire Siege 2007, 63. 
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management procedures and resiliency projects can decrease the overall fragility of a 
community over time.  
The Incident Command System is an example of a tried and tested model for 
resource management practices. One of the primary reasons the ICS was created was to 
reduce duplication of efforts and decrease over wildfire costs through proper resource 
management. The addition of emergency operations centers and multi-agency 
coordination centers have increased the capacity of fire managers to acquire necessary 
supplies and equipment to provide successful response and recovery support. In 
California, several additional measures have been taken to ensure this vital task is 
accomplished effectively. One example is the Emergency Managers Mutual Aid 
(EMMA) agreement, which provides emergency management personnel assistance to 
affected jurisdictions. Activation of the EMMA during the San Diego firestorms resulted 
in seven additional personnel deployed to the operational area EOC to provide overhead 
support in operations, planning, and intelligence functions.258  
Another strength of the response actions during the firestorms involved the pre-
positioning of resources throughout California in anticipation of a challenging fire 
season. With predictions of severe fire weather, including high heat, low humidity, and 
severe winds, fire chiefs throughout the region built up firefighting resource depth. 
Firefighters were moved into southern California prior to the start of the first wildfire and 
resources were increased after the fires began. As the wildfires progressed, other state 
and federal resources were deployed, as well as firefighting resources from Mexico.259  
Even with these measures, resources were severely strained during the first few 
days of the fire siege. One report noted,  
The experiences of the 2003 Cedar Fire and this 2007 Firestorm have 
confirmed that during periods of high fire activity in southern California, 
the State fire mutual aid system’s ability to fulfill all resource requests 
during the critical first 48–72 hours will be severely challenged.260 
258 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 28. 
259 California Fire Siege 2007, 62.  
260 Ibid.  
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This was mainly due to the number of fires burning throughout southern California 
causing resource exhaustion and competing needs in the region. The recommendation for 
future operations is a “surge capacity” plan, involving additional ground and aerial 
resources.261  
This series of wildfires also saw the first activation for the state of California of 
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which is a state-to-state 
mutual aid agreement allowing governors to request resources from other states. Since 
California utilizes both the ICS as well as Emergency Support Functions as outlined in 
the National Response Framework, these outside resources were easily able to integrate 
into existing incident management operations.262  
The Operational Area EOC activated a robust logistics section that was 
responsible for managing incoming resource requests and providing situational awareness 
regarding resource needs and status. The team consisted of members of the Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) staff, facility personnel, purchasing agents, buyers, and off-
site personnel at the primary warehouse for distribution. Emergency agreements were 
utilized to work with vendors on unmet resource needs. Approximately, 978 resource 
requests were made and filled during the EOC activation.263  
Lessons learned from the 2007 firestorms outline several areas where logistical 
support could be enhanced. It was reported that several fire engines were unable to switch 
out hose and leave hoselays in place since there was no replacement hose available.264 
Additionally, it was determined that a lack of a pre-determined number of fire apparatus 
required for large-scale wildfires led to a deficiency in fire apparatus for other events 
outside of the scope of this disaster. It is important to ensure that each jurisdiction has the 
resources required to handle day-to-day events while also supporting incident operations 
for wildfires in other areas.265  
261 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response, 23.  
262 California Fire Siege 2007, 63. 
263 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 27. 
264 City of San Diego, After Action Report: October 2007 Wildfires City of San Diego Response, 11. 
265 Ibid., 21. 
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It was also found that the Incident Management Teams were not utilized to their 
full capacity and the EOC should add positions to provide better support. This would 
have eased the burden on incident managers, and it would have allowed the teams and 
EOC to stay ahead of the incident instead of falling behind. Positions noted in the San 
Diego County after action report include: a medical unit leader for firefighter medical 
care, a recovery liaison to begin planning recovery operations, a volunteer manager to 
oversee critical functions of volunteer coordination, and a donations manager to manage 
the influx of donations into the city.266  
Coordination with informal partners for resource management also had its 
strengths and weaknesses. To handle the significant donations from individuals as well as 
corporations, a logistics distribution center was established at Qualcomm Stadium. This 
provided countywide support to shelters, command posts, and base camps in the form of 
food, water, and necessary supplies. However, heavy evacuee traffic throughout the area 
caused major traffic difficulties and hampered the ability of workers to process deliveries, 
causing the county to re-examine supply chain management operations in the future.267  
San Diego County recalled Community Emergency Response Team volunteers as 
well as academy recruit personnel to support emergency operations. The county also 
assigned special events staff to the evacuation shelter at Qualcomm Stadium because of 
their knowledge of the stadium and their ability to provide logistical support in a wide 
variety of areas. These groups proved to be extremely valuable in providing ongoing 
logistical assistance. Additionally, corporate sponsors, such as Wal-Mart, provided staff 
to manage inventory needs on a 24-hour basis in coordination with the EOC.268  
One of the primary components of community fragility as outlined in the 
conceptual framework under sustainability is the inability to recognize small system 
failures leading to a cascade. From the information available on supply chain 
management and resource management, it appears that San Diego County was able to 
266 Ibid., 22. 
267 Ibid., 8. 
268 Ibid., 29. 
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recognize small failures or gaps when they occurred, and it was able to correct them 
before any major challenges occurred. If logistical support had ceased at one of the mega-
shelters, the incident had the potential to fail quickly. Instead, available reports suggest 
that when problems were identified, the county took appropriate measures to correct 
them. A primary example of this involves the restoration of lifelines. During the 2007 
firestorms, power outages at the San Onofre Nuclear power plant and damages to 
SDG&E power lines threatened to cause a rolling black out throughout San Diego 
County. The state assisted the county by notifying the Navy, which returned all ships to 
port and worked off their own power supplies to decrease the demand. The ability of the 
Navy to provide this support allowed the county to maintain enough power to avoid the 
black out.269 Additionally, as mentioned previously, lessons learned after the disaster 
were given priority, and many solutions have already been implemented to ensure those 
problems do not occur again during the next disaster.  
The final sustainability measure involves resiliency. This disaster provides several 
examples of how preparation efforts, wildfire mitigation, and education programs can 
decrease the fragility of the community for future disasters (see Figure 20). Since the 
2003 Cedar Wildfire, San Diego County has invested over $285 million in fire 
preparedness. County Supervisor Dianne Jacobs attributes this effort to saving homes and 
providing for the safety of residents in the 2007 firestorms. Ian MacDonald, Deputy Fire 
Marshall for the City of Orange Fire Department, agreed and added, “Jurisdictions need 
to understand their community and have fuel modification plans ready, so they can work 
closely with developers to avoid future problems.”270  
269 Ekard, Tuck, and Lane, San Diego County 2007 Firestorms after Action Report, 48. 
270 FEMA and OES, Southern California Best Practices, 23. 
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Figure 20.  Pre-fire Mitigation Efforts Using Defensible Space Actions271  
New construction continues throughout southern California. Homeowners are 
attracted to the climate, the forested mountains, and the ocean views, leading more to 
purchase property in the wildland urban interface. This increases the vulnerability of the 
area to potentially catastrophic wildfires affecting residents of the area. To combat this 
problem, in January 2005, California passed a new state law that extended defensible 
space clearance requirements around homes and other structures from 30 feet to 100 feet. 
Where applied, these strategies for wildfire mitigation were successful. Homeowners, fire 
department personnel, and real estate agents all agreed that the “results spoke for 
themselves” after the 2007 wildfires.272  
More than 2,460 multi-million dollar homes survived when the Witch Fire blew 
through the area. These homes were built to the highest construction standards, including 
extensive defensible space work around and within developed areas.273 Cliff Hunter, fire 
marshal for the Rancho Santa Fe Fire Department, said that developments within his fire 
area are governed by the strictest residential fire codes in the country.  
271 California Fire Siege 2007, 60. 
272 FEMA and OES, Southern California Best Practices, 4. 
273 Ibid., 17. 
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Other areas that require defensible space measures and that survived the 2007 
firestorms include the Crosby, Cielo, 4SRanch, Bridges, and Bel Etage developments; 
this area is also known as the Santa Fe Valley. Wildfires in these areas burned up to the 
point where defensible space measures had been taken and then the fires stopped. 
Additionally, flying embers were unable to cause harm to the tile roofs and stucco walls, 
further strengthening the homes against wildfire. Furthermore, firefighters in these areas 
assist homeowners with wildfire education and by identifying trouble areas on private 
property that could cause fires to grow.274 Schools also pass out preparedness materials 
to students regarding defensible space and ways to mitigate against wildfire. This 
combination of strict codes, building standards, education, and preparedness efforts have 
saved many homes and other buildings during the 2007 firestorms and continue to be a 
best practice for public officials.  
5. Summary Analysis of the San Diego Firestorms 
Overall, the 2007 San Diego firestorms provide a strong example for the factors 
of community fragility outlined in the fragility framework. In this event sample, both 
strengths and weaknesses are available to illustrate how one factor can either contribute 
to or overcome community fragility. For example, there is high social capital and 
connectedness in San Diego County amongst most communities, but the low social 
capital of a few other communities, such as migrant workers and people with disabilities, 
led to a few system failures that now need to be addressed. Additionally, while San Diego 
County uses a command and control model for wildfire response, which has the potential 
to increase fragility, it also provides flexibility and adaptability within that model to 
account for other partners and organizations. This combination provides the county with 
the necessary authority structure while also honoring the collaboration of multiple non-
governmental groups.  
Probably the best example of decreasing fragility for a community available from 
this sample involves the degree of education, preparedness, and mitigation efforts to 
decrease overall risk. The partnership between government, real estate agents, building 
274 Ibid., 18. 
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officials, fire management officers, and community members is extraordinary and was 
directly responsible for saving lives and homes in the areas of the wildfires.  
Figure 21 on the following page provides a visual analysis of the 2007 San Diego 
firestorms, outlining each measure of fragility as described in the theoretical framework, 
along with specific comments for each measure. While the San Diego case study had a 
few more weaknesses in social capital than the Joplin example, most of the fragility 
factors were easy to examine and found to be strong in favor of a system with decreased 
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There was no loss of a community lead 
in available literature, therefore unable 
to assess this factor
San Diego is a geographically diverse 
area surrounded by populated 
communities, various access routes, and 
a robust wildfire management system.
All levels of government showed strong 
leadership during this event and local 
governance was also strong. 
After the 2003 Cedar Wildfire, San Diego 
made strides to ensure diverse 
populations were considered in 
evacuation actions, but many 
commented on a lack of trust or social 
cohesion with culturally and linguistically 
diverse populations. Presence of Border 
Control agents caused decrease in trust. 
California created the ICS system and 
utilizes it well, but also uses it with 
flexibility to allow for various horizontal 
relationships and partners. 
Multiple interjurisdictional relationships 
and agreements in place for wildfires.
San Diego utilized several command 
structures and coordination entities with 
various overall responsibilities, which 
tied together into the larger system. 
Communications between groups is 
sometimes problematic. 
San Diego adapted the emergency plan 
to ensure needs were met. They showed 
flexibility in their approach. 
The utilization of ICS and multiple 
agreements for resource sharing provide 
for a robust resource management 
system. Problems arose with system 
strain due to number of wildfires. 
There is nothing in the literature to 
suggest that small system failures went 
unnoticed or that cascading events 
occurred that caused full system failures. 
Lifelines were cut off, but alternate 
sources were made available and 
redundancies existed.
Preparation efforts, wildfire mitigation 
and education programs are all utilized 







Figure 21.  Fragility Framework: Analysis of the 2007 San Diego Firestorms 
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D. CASE STUDY 3: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, 
LOUISIANA, 2005 
“Hundreds of heroes and leaders among the residents and responders 
helped save lives in flooded and wind-damaged communities, but those 
charged with responsibility to lead showed little leadership.” 
–William Waugh 
1. Synopsis of the Event 
Due to the number of overwhelmingly negative reports and the number of lessons 
learned from the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans, Louisiana, it is assumed that 
the area would have a high degree of community fragility. Therefore, any research 
regarding fragility in emergency management would be incomplete without an analysis 
of this disaster to determine if the measures of fragility in the framework match such an 
assumption.  
The tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina first formed over the 
Bahamas on August 23, 2005. Meteorologists followed the storm and began warning 
people in the Gulf Coast States that a major storm was coming. By August 28, 2005, 
evacuations had begun across multiple states. The City of New Orleans was particularly 
at risk due to its topography. The average elevation of the city is approximately six feet 
below sea level and is surrounded on all sides by water. A system of levees and seawalls 
have been constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers over the years to protect the 
area. The levees along the Mississippi River were robust, but even before the storm, 
officials worried about the levees that hold water back from Lake Pontchartrain, Lake 
Borgne, and the swamps to the east and west. Neighborhoods that sat below sea level, 
many of which housed the city’s poorest and most vulnerable populations, were at the 
greatest risk.275  
The government, however, was slow to respond. Although Louisiana Governor 
Kathleen Blanco declared a major emergency prior to landfall, both the governor and 
Mayor Nagin had to be contacted by the National Hurricane Center on August 26 urging 
275 “Hurricane Katrina: Facts & Summary,” History, accessed December 28, 2014, 
http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-katrina  
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them to issue mandatory evacuation orders. At the time, they merely said they would 
“take it under consideration.”276 Mayor Nagin decided to issue a voluntary evacuation 
order on August 27, and the Superdome was opened as the “shelter of last resort” for 
those who could not leave the city. Finally, the National Hurricane Center Director, Max 
Mayfield, and President George Bush called Mayor Nagin to urge him to declare a 
mandatory evacuation. At the time, Mayor Nagin was consulting with legal counsel over 
whether he could issue a mandatory evacuation order due to liability over closing hotels 
and other businesses.  
On Sunday, August 28, Max Mayfield briefed FEMA Director Michael Brown 
and DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, as well as local and state officials, stating that the 
storm would cause major damage and flooding before landfall, including levee breaches 
in New Orleans. Mayor Nagin continued to urge people to leave the area but did not issue 
a mandatory evacuation order until 10am on August 28, less than 24 hours from 
landfall.277 Contraflow operations begin on roadways throughout the city, allowing all 
lanes of traffic to be used to lead people out of the area. By 3pm, over 10,000 people had 
arrived at the Superdome, and by 8pm, that number had swelled to 26,000 people.278  
When Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, 
it had a Category 4 rating on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale and covered over 400 
miles.279 The coast was pummeled with 150 mile-per-hour winds with gusts reaching 180 
miles-per-hour, destroying most buildings in its path. After five long hours, the storm 
subsided, leaving over 150 miles of destruction along the gulf coast. The hurricane 
greatly affected three states: Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Mississippi received 
276 Ibid.  
277 “Anatomy of a National Disaster: The Consequential Timeline of Hurricane Katrina,” The Patriot 
Post, accessed December 28, 2014, https://patriotpost.us/pages/104  
278 Ibid.  
279 “Hurricane Katrina: Facts & Summary.”  
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the brunt of the storm, but New Orleans suffered catastrophic damage due to the 
cascading events that followed the storm (see Figure 22).280  
 
Figure 22.  Hurricane Katrina: Storm Track and Counties Designated Eligible  
for Disaster Assistance281 
At approximately 4:30am on the morning Katrina made landfall, minor breaches 
in the levees surrounding New Orleans began to flood the city. After the initial breaches 
to the levees, other breaches soon followed, and St. Bernard Parish, the Ninth Ward, and 
the Plaquemines Parish began to flood. Many areas were under so much water that people 
had to move to attics and rooftops for safety. By 8:30am, further levee breaches caused 
catastrophic flooding of New Orleans (see Figure 23). By August 30, 24-hours into the 
280 Thomas Gabe et al., Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted Areas 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), http://www.tidec.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
crsrept.pdf  
281 Ibid.  
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storm, 80 percent of New Orleans was under water, and 200,000 homes were 
destroyed.282  
 
Figure 23.  Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment—New Orleans and Vicinity283 
The flood waters continued to inundate the area for several days. New Orleans 
was left without power, drinking water, and wastewater systems. In addition, broken gas 
lines caused structure fires in multiple areas. The situation worsened as food supplies 
became scarce throughout the city as well as in the Superdome and widespread looting 
began. At a Wal-Mart on Tchoupitoulas Street, an initial effort to provide supplies to 
stranded people ended up leading to mass looting throughout the store. The Superdome, 
282 Margaret Crocco, ed., Teaching the Levees: A Curriculum for Democratic Dialogue and Civic 
Engagement (New York: Teachers College Press, 2008).  
283 Gabe et al., Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted Areas.  
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which had been designated as one of the primary evacuation centers, was surrounded by 
water, making it impossible to re-supply or to complete further evacuations. 
While many of the stories of this disaster are negative, there were also many 
organizations and individuals that provided assistance. For example, the Coast Guard 
rescued over 34,000 people in New Orleans alone, and many ordinary citizens saved 
neighbors and delivered food and supplies to those who needed it. In addition, FEMA 
deployed 23 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams throughout the four states most affected 
by the hurricane, and 10 urban search and rescue teams were deployed to assist with the 
rescue of stranded citizens and to look for the missing. Furthermore, U.S Department of 
Transportation deployed 390 trucks to deliver necessary food, water and emergency 
supplies. Additionally, 10,000 National Guard troops, along with 7,500 active duty troops 
assisted civilian law enforcement agencies to keep order.284  
In the weeks that followed, the cascade continued with widespread looting and 
crime throughout the New Orleans area. Fifteen percent of the New Orleans Police force 
never returned to duty after the storm, leaving the city without the necessary resources to 
handle the increase in crime.285 Additionally, some police officers were charged with 
looting after stealing new automobiles from local dealerships and looting boarded up 
stores. In addition, officers were also charged with brutal beatings in the French Quarter 
and the shooting of a man in an evacuation zone.  
Americans watched the events unfold and were shocked upon viewing the media 
coverage of the destruction and violence that followed the flooding of New Orleans. 
Instead of pulling together and supporting each other, as is seen in most disasters, 
America witnessed looting in the streets, heard stories of rapes and murders at the 
Superdome, and read about acts of violence against the responders trying to help.286 The 
284 Ibid.   
285 Crocco, ed., Teaching the Levees.  
286 Douglas Brinkley, The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf 
Coast, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007), 9. 
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combination of the hurricane, storm surge, broken levees, and the actions of the people in 
the area created the largest human crisis since the Civil War.287 
In the end, 1.1 million families were displaced and an estimated $100 billion was 
allocated for recovery operations.288 In addition, 97 percent of the population affected by 
flooding lived in Louisiana. St. Bernard Parish, to the south-east of New Orleans, was 
especially hard hit by the flooding, affecting over 95 percent of the parish population. 
Over three-quarters of the Orleans Parish was also affected (approximately 372,000 
people).289 Ultimately, Hurricane Katrina claimed the lives of more than 1,300 people 
and led to the largest urban dislocation in U.S. history.  
2. City of New Orleans—Connectedness 
Connectedness involves the way in which the community works together before, 
during, and after a disaster. The fragility framework suggests four key factors that can 
make a community more fragile: loss of a community lead, isolation of the community, 
low social capital, and a vertical hierarchical model for response operations. Researchers 
have asked whether Hurricane Katrina was a disaster because of the force of the storm or 
because of catastrophic human failure. Or perhaps it was both. In the study of fragility in 
emergency management systems and community fragility, Hurricane Katrina provides a 
stark example of how much a community can affect the success or failure of response and 
recovery from a large-scale event.  
Louisiana is a very diverse state with a mix of multiple cultures, ethnicities, and 
histories. Within New Orleans, the complexities that emerged from governance by the 
French, Spanish, and American governments created a cultural mix distinctive to the 
area.290 Louisiana has a total population of 4.6 million people, and approximately 
287 Ibid., xv. 
288 Ashley J. Craw, “Call to Arms: Civil Disorder Following Hurricane Katrina Warrants Attack on 
the Posse Comitatus Act, A,” George Mason Law Review 14 (2007): 829.  
289 Gabe et al., Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted Areas. 
290 Maida Owens, “Louisiana’s Traditional Cultures: An Overview,” Folklife in Louisiana: 
Louisiana’s Living Traditions, accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.louisianafolklife.org/LT/
Maidas_Essay/main_introduction_onepage.html  
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378,700 people living in the city of New Orleans. Louisiana has two primary ethnic 
groups that make up 95 percent of the population: 63 percent Caucasian and 32 percent 
African American; however, in the city of New Orleans, these numbers are reversed.291 
African Americans are the ethnic majority at 60 percent of the population and Caucasians 
at 30 percent.292  
These demographics partially illustrate why a disproportionate number of people 
seeking shelter in New Orleans, and three quarters of the 2,300 people reported missing 
were African American.293 What is more troubling, however, is why so many chose not 
to evacuate. Studies found, “a combination of poverty and perceptions of racism and 
inequities influenced African Americans to not evacuate, even after reaching the stage of 
high threat perception.”294 Additional factors include neighborhood crime and violence 
causing the perceived need to stay behind to protect property, and a deeply rooted culture 
in the area that has faced multiple hurricanes in the past. Many of these factors can be 
attributed to the key characteristics outlined in the fragility matrix and conceptual 
framework.  
Community ties and a lack of social capital created barriers in evacuation as well 
as preparedness and planning. Due to a lack of trust, many communities did not 
participate in pre-disaster activities, they did not get information about the storm, nor did 
they heed warnings about the storm once the information was available. Additionally, 
while there are strong community ties within many parishes, one parish often does not 
communicate or collaborate with the others, leading to a form of isolation for each 
community. This isolation can lead to greater fragility when events such as Hurricane 
Katrina occur; it impedes a community’s ability obtain necessary supplies and assistance 
and limiting a community’s ability to recover.295 The Handbook of Disaster Research 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid.  
293 Keith Elder et al., “African Americans’ Decisions Not to Evacuate New Orleans before Hurricane 
Katrina: A Qualitative Study,” American Journal of Public Health 97, no. Suppl 1 (April 2007): 124.  
294 Ibid. 
295 Scott Horsley Twitter, “The Ties That Bind St. Bernard Parish,” NPR, October 26, 2005, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4975511  
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states, “In societies with extreme cross-cultural ethnic or racial differences, volunteering 
to help others outside of one’s own group at times of disasters or crisis is almost 
unknown.”296  
In one study by Aldrich, three recent disasters are cited as examples of the 
importance of social networks in recovery. In the first, the Kobe Earthquake, killed 6,500 
people and displaced another 300,000. At the one-year anniversary of this event, 
however, the city had restored all critical lifelines and key business operations, such as 
manufacturing and trade, were at 80 percent of pre-disaster levels. The 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami, the second, caused 8,000 deaths and displaced 310,000 people. One year 
later the majority of schools had been rebuilt, 75 percent of the homes had been rebuilt 
and the majority of fisherman were back to work. In New Orleans, however, one year 
after Hurricane Katrina, which killed 1,600 and displaced 250,000, some neighborhoods 
remained untouched since the disaster. Less than half of the schools and businesses were 
re-opened.297  
Upon closer examination into why New Orleans did not recover as well as Kobe 
Earthquake or the Indian Ocean Tsunami, researchers found that the Kobe disaster and 
Indian Ocean Tsunami both had more trust relationships, civic engagement, and stronger 
networks overall. Some neighborhoods in New Orleans, such as Village de L’Est, 
displayed strong ties, working together to provide recovery information, clean up the 
neighborhoods, and provide support to one another; however, other neighborhoods have 
showed very little cooperative effort. Daniel Aldrich, at Purdue University, states, 
“Citizens bound by fewer ties to their neighbors are more likely to engage in illegal and 
disruptive acts which impede recovery efforts, neutralizing positive efforts at 
rehabilitation efforts.”298 
Further evidence suggests that disaster perception differs based on ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and educational levels. For example, studies have shown that 
296 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, From Research to Praxis,” 31.  
297 Aldrich, “Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience,” 3. 
298 Ibid., 8.  
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people with higher education and income are more likely to participate in disaster 
preparedness efforts, while those are isolated by language or ethnic barriers are less likely 
to participate and often do not know where to go for assistance if needed.299 According to 
the Handbook of Disaster Research,  
While Hurricane Katrina momentarily and unavoidably called attention to 
issues of race and class vulnerabilities, hazards and disaster research has 
clearly shown that social inequalities are core conditions that shape both 
disasters and environmental inequalities on a global scale.”300  
In New Orleans, the poverty rate is over 30 percent, and one in three people do not own 
personal transportation. This left many communities affected by Hurricane Katrina 
without the necessary support to prepare for the storm or to evacuate when necessary.  
Another key factor in the analysis of fragility for Hurricane Katrina involves the 
emergency management structure and the determination of how the city of New Orleans 
handles disaster response. As illustrated in both the Joplin tornado and the San Diego 
firestorms, often the most robust systems involve a level of command and control along 
with a collaborative network of partners. The State of Louisiana and the City of New 
Orleans had a much different structure at the time of Hurricane Katrina. The ICS model 
was unknown to the area in 2005, and in fact, Louisiana did not use any standardized 
incident management model at that time. Instead, the State of Louisiana had an inflexible 
plan that did not allow it to effectively make decisions regarding evacuations, order 
necessary resources, or to even collaborate with the multitude of non-governmental 
partners available in the area.  
Since Hurricane Katrina, a national debate has begun regarding the centralization 
of emergency management efforts. The failures in response after Hurricane Katrina have 
led to more pressure to return to a command and control approach in emergency 
management and more federal authority over disasters. Carole Jurkiewicz and Sean 
O’Keefe with the Public Administration Institute at Louisiana State University wrote an 
article in Public Integrity Magazine asserting that the “political culture of Louisiana is so 
299 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, From Research to Praxis,” 98.  
300 Ibid., 113. 
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problematic that strong federal intervention is called for if a repeat of the Katrina disaster 
is to be avoided.”301 As has been shown in multiple studies and disaster samples, 
however, this idea is inconsistent with the shared responsibility and authority that exists 
in the United States between levels of government, nongovernmental partners, and the 
private sector.302 
Studies of the effectiveness of the Coast Guard and Florida during Hurricane 
Katrina continue to point to collaborative accountability in disasters, leading to a “mixed 
form” governance network that combines a command and control system with a 
collaborative network.303 According to the Handbook of Disaster Research, “The 
overarching goal should be to reduce fragmentation and integrate activities both 
vertically among levels of government and horizontally across departments. This is 
especially crucial as disasters span geographic space and distinct authority domains.”304  
3. City of New Orleans—Stability 
The stability of the community involves interjurisdictional relationships, 
emergency management system structure, leadership, and planning models. Two primary 
failure points for the Hurricane Katrina disaster with regard to stability involved poor 
leadership at all levels of government and a lack of collaboration with outside partners, 
both of which are indicators identified in the conceptual framework for an increase in 
community fragility. From the very beginning of this incident, people perceived that 
leadership was lacking. The Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, blamed the state 
government, the state government blamed federal agencies, and the people were caught in 
the middle. According to Scott Shane, New York Times correspondent, “Some federal 
officials said uncertainty over who was in charge had contributed to delays in providing 
aid and imposing order, and officials in Louisiana complained that federal disaster 
301 Christopher J. Koliba, Russell M. Mills, and Asim Zia, “Accountability in Governance Networks: 
An Assessment of Public, Private, and Nonprofit Emergency Management Practices Following Hurricane 
Katrina,” Public Administration Review 71, no. 2 (2011): 218.  
302 Waugh, and Streib, “Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management,” 131.  
303 Koliba, Mills, and Zia, “Accountability in Governance Networks,” 217.  
304 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, From Research to Praxis,” 178.  
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officials blocked some aid efforts.305 Meanwhile, Mayor Nagin remained at the Hyatt 
Hotel, overlooking the Superdome, while the city unraveled around him. Douglas 
Brinkley stated, in his book The Great Deluge, “He refused to give a pep talk, blaming 
the city’s communications breakdown for his decision. His primary post-storm initiative 
was to get a generator hooked up to the elevator so he wouldn’t have to walk all those 
stairs.”306 Would things have turned out differently if he walked over to the Superdome 
to offer strength and to show support for the people of his parish? Many other instances, 
such as riots during the civil rights movement, have shown that taking action may have 
made a difference. For example, Robert Kennedy walked into an angry mob after Martin 
Luther King’s assassination, and he offered the people encouragement and uplifting 
words, ultimately calming the crowd. Instead, according to Brinkley, “The Mayor was 
being extremely shortsighted, exhibiting childlike leadership in an adult hour.”307  
A major turning point in the disaster occurred when the Louisiana State Governor, 
Kathleen Blanco, appeared on television close to tears. Instead of offering words of 
comfort or strength, she stated, “The devastation is greater than our worst fears. It is 
totally overwhelming.”308 There is no argument that this catastrophe was devastating and 
completely overwhelming. There is also no question that for the governor of Louisiana, 
or any other state, this would be the ultimate test of leadership; however, the power of 
public opinion is immense. It only takes one small sign to indicate loss of control or 
expertise to create a downward spiral in public opinion. Barbara Kellerman states, “When 
leaders lose self-control and their followers find out about it, it’s a distraction, sometimes 
even a major distraction.”309  
305 Brinkley, The Great Deluge, 36. 
306 Ibid., 217. 
307 Ibid., 34. 
308 “New Orleans: The Lost City. Teary Gov Orders Full-Scale Evacuation: Floods Threaten to KO 
Water Supply. Looting Chaos Spurs Martial Law.,” NY Daily News, August 31, 2005, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/new-orleans-lost-city-teary-gov-orders-full-scale-evacuation-
floods-threaten-ko-water-supply-looting-chaos-spurs-martial-law-article-1.571309  
309 Barbara Kellerman, Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters (Boston: Harvard 
Business Review Press, 2004), 96.  
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Governor Blanco’s and Mayor Ray Nagin’s actions during the course of this 
disaster greatly influenced the people involved. At a time when the people of their 
jurisdictions needed them the most, they were unable to effectively manage the job. A 
repeated theme from the New Orleans disaster was a lack of credibility in elected 
officials due to conflicting reports from local and state officials regarding the storm 
intensity and the importance of evacuation.310 This caused a loss of hope and faith that 
the government would assist when the hurricane made landfall, ultimately leading to 
chaos in the weeks following the flood. 
The federal government, specifically FEMA, also illustrated several major 
failures with regard to emergency response during the Hurricane Katrina disaster. It is 
quite possible that the change in FEMA from an independent agency that answered 
directly to the president to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where FEMA 
was merely a subset of a larger organization, may have been a major factor in the failures 
indicated. Many believed that due to the over-centralization within DHS, there were long 
delays in mobilizing and deploying critical resources during Hurricane Katrina.  
Disaster relief organizations that used to deploy immediately ended up waiting for 
a decision to be made regarding their deployment to the disaster.311 For example, the 
American Red Cross was ready to respond to the Superdome to provide shelter and mass 
care assistance but was prevented from doing so by the Louisiana state government 
because its presence “would keep people from evacuation and encourage others to come 
into the city.”312 
The Hurricane Katrina disaster and flooding that followed in New Orleans reveals 
that most governance networks within the city suffered from failures in accountability, 
planning, and leadership. The general lack of coordination amongst partners and agencies 
and the failure of initiative of the key officials caused a large-scale natural disaster to 
become a humanitarian crisis as well. Russell Mills, at Kent State University, states, 
310 Elder et al., “African Americans’ Decisions Not to Evacuate New Orleans,” 125.  
311 Brinkley, The Great Deluge.  
312 “Anatomy of a National Disaster: The Consequential Timeline of Hurricane Katrina.”  
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“That a disaster of this magnitude had been anticipated, yet local, state, and national 
elected officials failed to collectively address the visibly crumbling levee system, points 
to failures in the very checks and balances to be found in a democratic accountability 
frame.”313 
The response to Katrina was not all bad. There are few examples where 
collaborative networks of partners created positive results in New Orleans. One primary 
example involves the collaborative group that created and implemented the contraflow 
plan, allowing unidirectional flow out of the city once evacuation orders were given. 
Over one million people successfully evacuated out of the affected area. Additionally, in 
the months prior to the disaster, a citizen awareness and evacuation guide was distributed 
through several partners, including the Red Cross, Wal-Mart, Home Depot, Lowes, and 
the major media outlets. At the state level, Louisiana used the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact, mobilizing more than 220 different governmental, nonprofit, and 
private sector partners from around the United States. At least 535 organizations were 
ultimately involved in some aspect of response and recovery from this event, not 
including the thousands of rescuers and volunteers that also came to the area to provide 
assistance.314 
4. City of New Orleans—Sustainability 
Unlike the Joplin tornado or San Diego firestorms, Hurricane Katrina can provide 
examples of all four of the key components of a lack of sustainability causing an increase 
in community fragility: lack of resource management and supply chain management, 
inaccessibility of lifelines, lack of resiliency, and the inability to recognize small system 
failures leading to a cascading event. The distribution of resources to people in need is 
not only a problem of supply and demand but also a problem of coordination. Many 
organizations may have had surplus supplies and resources, as was seen in Hurricane 
Katrina, but they may not have the means of distribution necessary to get the resources to 
313 Koliba, Mills, and Zia, “Accountability in Governance Networks,” 215. 
314 Ibid., 215. 
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people who need assistance.315 Additionally, more vulnerable populations may not know 
how to get the assistance they need.  
In the case of Hurricane Katrina, supply chain routes were completely cut off to 
organizations that had supplies but could not deliver them. The size of this disaster alone 
provided problems for logistics, shared resources, and demand exceeding supply 
capacity.316 Many people who did not evacuate in time went to the Superdome, which 
was not staffed or equipped to support such a large populations, creating another 
logistical challenge. Further delays in resource distribution occurred due to the authority 
structures within the state. Very few people had the authority to authorize expenditures 
and resource acquisition, causing a backlog at the state EOC of requests for assistance. 
Additionally, as stated previously, collaborative networks and partnerships were not in 
place to allow for the quick and easy acquisition of supplies. Not surprisingly, Wal-Mart 
and Home Depot were highly successful in providing logistical support in areas affected 
by Hurricane Katrina because supply chain management is part of their daily business. 
Their plans and procedures allowed for the flexibility necessary to adapt to the incident 
and provide necessary support.317 
Most major lifelines were also severely impaired or completely destroyed in the 
city of New Orleans and in other areas throughout the state of Louisiana. But more 
importantly, the area was unable to quickly restore these lifelines for the affected 
population. Lifelines and resource management are highly interdependent systems—
without one the other cannot succeed. The inability to move resources into the area kept 
workers from being able to restore key services, and the lack of lifelines impeded the 
ability to move into the area.  
In most disasters, when considering lifelines, the normal response is to look at 
power, water, gas, and transportation infrastructure. In the case of New Orleans, however, 
315 Louise K. Comfort, Kilkon Ko, and Adam Zagorecki, “Coordination in Rapidly Evolving Disaster 
Response Systems: The Role of Information,” American Behavioral Scientist 48 (2004): 302. 
316 Ibid.  
317 Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki, “Coordination in Rapidly Evolving Disaster Response Systems,” 
455. 
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an argument could be made that the vital lifelines for restoration and recovery were also 
the community members themselves. Comfort, Ko and Zagorecki state that a disaster 
“threatens not only the destruction of technical infrastructure such as power lines, roads, 
and communication lines but also the social, organizational, and economic structures that 
support the daily operations of the community.”318 Without such lifelines, the chance of 
restoration diminishes considerably. 
This interconnection between technology and social systems creates a system that 
can be very fragile to shocks and disturbances. If these small disturbances are not 
recognized as they occur, cascading events may follow causing a complete system 
failure. The Handbook of Disaster Research calls the factors leading to collapse of a 
system as pathogens. It notes they are present long before the disaster, and in the process 
of leading up to the disaster, they combine and create disruption, threatening the overall 
system.319 Hurricane Katrina, unfortunately, provides an example of these cascading 
failures and how the state and the nation were ultimately affected.  
The most obvious example is the breach of the levees surrounding the city of New 
Orleans. Many have noted that weaknesses in these levees were known prior to Hurricane 
Katrina and that many of the levees were not built to withstand a storm surge created 
from a Category 4 or 5 hurricane.320 Second were the warnings from the National 
Hurricane Center stating that this storm would cause disruptions to the levee systems, 
causing a potential collapse, and flooding into populated areas. With this information, 
evacuation orders were still delayed, leaving people too little time to get out of the area 
before flooding occurred. Once the levee system started to show signs of stress, it was too 
late to try to avoid the smaller system failures, and the disaster reached a tipping point 
leading to a catastrophic failure with multiple cascading events to follow. Being able to 
recognize any of these failures would have allowed community leaders and elected 
318 Ibid., 297.  
319 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, “From Research to Praxis,” 46.  
320 Michael Grunwald, and Susan B. Glasser, “Experts Say Faulty Levees Caused Much of Flooding,” 
The Washington Post, September 21, 2005, sec. Nation, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/09/20/AR2005092001894.html  
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officials to assess the future demand for resources and services and proactively prepare 
for the worst case scenario.  
However, the most striking out of all the factors studied is the lack of resiliency in 
the New Orleans area following Hurricane Katrina. Some have commented that they 
could not have possibly predicted a disaster of this magnitude, but this was not the first 
time that the city had been destroyed by hurricanes. In the last century alone, New 
Orleans has been flooded six times: in 1915, 1940, 1947, 1965, 1969, and 2005.321 In an 
area so prone to disasters, specifically hurricanes and flooding, it is surprising that city 
officials did not have more measures in place to protect people and property, and that 
they did not foresee a disaster of this magnitude as a possibility. A common theme after 
disasters is to return to normal or to rebuild; however, in an area that has repeatedly been 
destroyed by flooding, does it make sense to rebuild and put people back into harm’s 
way?  
The definition of resiliency is to “bounce back” from a disaster. Although this has 
happened in the Kobe Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami examples, New Orleans has 
struggled in this endeavor more than other areas affected by catastrophic disasters. A total 
of 236,970 people left Louisiana between July 2005 and June 2006, largely due to 
Hurricane Katrina, an only 100,000 of those people have returned.322 The lack of 
employment is cited as the single greatest reason for this downturn.323 Furthermore, 
businesses have not returned, and some neighborhoods continue to work through the 
daily complexities of rebuilding efforts 10 years later. By all accounts, New Orleans has 
illustrated a lack of resiliency after Hurricane Katrina.  
5. Summary Analysis of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
The scope and nature of Hurricane Katrina was unique in the United States. 
Though hurricanes have made landfall in the past, and catastrophic damages have 
321 “Hurricane Katrina- Facts & Summary.”  
322 Ibid.  
323 “New Orleans’ Katrina Recovery Slows as Most of Louisiana Loses Population to Rest of 
Country,” The Lens, February 4, 2014, http://thelensnola.org/2014/02/04/new-orleans-katrina-recovery-
slows-as-most-of-louisiana-loses-population-to-rest-of-country/  
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occurred, the human side of disaster has never been shown in such stark light as with this 
disaster. Katrina provides an example of how the loss of either a technological or a social 
system can have meaningful impacts, and how both are interconnected to the point where 
they cannot be treated separately. As illustrated in the framework analysis of this disaster 
(see Figure 24), New Orleans lacked many of the key factors required to decrease 
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Figure 24.  Fragility Framework—Analysis of New Orleans, LA, 2005 Hurricane 
Katrina 
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Each component of the theoretical framework on community fragility is easily 
illustrated through this disaster, from the lack of leadership causing social chaos to 
cascading system failures leading to catastrophic failures in New Orleans. This year 
marks the 10-year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, and it is hoped that the wealth of 
information collected about this disaster can be used as lessons learned for other 
jurisdictions to avoid the pitfalls and challenges presented.  
E. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS CONCLUSION 
Through a review of literature on systems fragility, a number of key factors were 
constructed and placed into a fragility matrix to illustrate overarching and repeating 
themes. This matrix led to the development of a theoretical framework on fragility in 
community and emergency management systems, showing a cross-reference between 
general systems fragility and those factors that could be used to most specifically 
measure fragility before, during, and after disaster. From there, the framework was 
assessed using three specific case studies: 2011 Joplin tornado, 2007 San Diego 
firestorms, and 2005 Hurricane Katrina.  
Interestingly, the three event samples turned out to illustrate three distinct patterns 
of assessment for community fragility. Each was catastrophic in nature, affecting not only 
the local communities but the state as a whole, and each occurred in the last decade 
where national standards have been present for emergency management. The Joplin 
tornado illustrated how each of the components in the framework could be used to 
decrease fragility overall. By all accounts, this disaster was considered successful and 
many of the assessment measures were used by the city of Joplin prior to the tornado, 
possibly decreasing their fragility. The San Diego firestorms also provided several areas 
where preparedness practices and mitigation could improve the community’s resiliency to 
disasters, but it also provided clear examples of how weaknesses in social capital and 
resource management could have devastating effects. Finally, the Hurricane Katrina case 
study provided the other side of the spectrum, illustrating several weaknesses and failures 
that led to catastrophic collapse of systems within the city of New Orleans. This case 
study provides more information about the importance of social capital than the others, 
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and it provides lessons in how isolation of communities, lack of leadership, and fractured 
supply chain management mechanisms can drastically affect a community after disaster. 
It also suggests that flexibility in planning, adaptability to disturbances, and 
interjurisdictional relationships can decrease fragility before a disaster occurs, making 





V. CAUSAL PREDICTION MODELING 
“The ultimate authority must always rest with the individual’s own reason 
and critical analysis.”  
–Dalai Lama 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The multi-method approach to this research has led to several areas of analysis 
and findings that ultimately answer the key questions this thesis seeks to answer. This 
chapter will expand upon the analysis provided by the literature review, conceptual 
development, and each of the three individual case studies to provide a combined analysis 
of fragility in emergency management (see Figure 25). An examination of the initial 
conceptual framework follows, leading to the development of a causal prediction model 
for the future.  
Although fragility has not been extensively studied in the emergency management 
field, the study of systems has proven to be helpful in determining how to best measure 
fragility in this context. Many of the key themes of fragility that emerged from the 
literature on complex systems intuitively seem to also belong in the emergency 
management arena. For example, without connections between systems, how could 
emergency managers obtain the information and resources necessary to effectively 
respond to an event? How would they even know what was needed? Thinking something 
is intuitively connected and actually being able to illustrate it are two different things. 
Therefore, the case study analysis provided the necessary avenue to determine if the 
constructed framework is actually a valid tool for determining if the literature on systems 
fit into another field all together.  
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Each of the case studies were catastrophic events for the communities affected, 
and all three placed a large strain on the emergency management system from local to 
state and federal resources. On a spectrum, however, the Joplin case study would be at 
one end, described in the literature as a successful response and fast recovery, and New 
Orleans would be at the other end, with the majority of the literature describing the 
number of lessons to be learned from a failed response and slow recovery. San Diego 
falls in the middle of the spectrum with many favorable reports and systems in place and 
other areas of reported weakness. Each of these was analyzed separately in Chapter IV. 
The following sections provide a closer look at the fragility factors under connectedness, 
stability, and sustainability to determine how valid each measure is to determine fragility 
in emergency management.  
1. Connectedness 
The four areas of connectedness evaluated for each case study include: the loss of 
a community lead, the isolation of a community, social capital, and the structure of the 
emergency management system (see Figure 26).  
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Figure 26.  Fragility Factors for Community Connectedness  
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None of the case studies provided the ability to measure whether the loss of a 
community lead or emergency management partner would have created greater overall 
fragility. Due to the strength of this claim in the literature, however, it was not removed 
from the theoretical framework and is retained in the predictive model despite the need 
for additional research to more fully support its inclusion.  
Both San Diego and Joplin are well-connected communities with multiple 
networks connecting their systems to others. Each is also along major transportation 
routes leading to the ability to seek assistance from a variety of sources. The New 
Orleans Parish was the only case study that illustrated the effects of an isolated 
community. As mentioned previously, many of the parishes within southern Louisiana 
are highly individualized and unlikely to interact across borders. This type of isolation, 
combined with little disaster planning, ultimately played a role in the breakdown of 
assistance available. This measure was easy to identify in each community and, therefore, 
remains as part of the framework. Because transportation hubs were so important in all of 
these case studies, transportation was added to this factor specifically.  
Unsurprisingly from the amount of research available, social capital became a 
prime indicator of fragility within each of these case studies. Areas with high social 
capital had a greater ability to adapt to changing circumstances. In areas where there were 
perceived inequalities, such as the migrant workers in San Diego or the racial disparity in 
New Orleans, there were barriers to response. Trust also came out as one of the key 
components of measuring social capital in each of these cases, specifically the trust in 
elected and key government officials.  
The final factor in the framework for connectedness is the structure of the 
emergency management system. Initially, the research indicated that a command and 
control model would lead to difficulties due to the fact that non-governmental partners do 
not report to government entities. A horizontal collaborative model is suggested in 
several papers as an alternate to ensure inclusion of multiple partners; however, the case 
studies showed that from a fragility perspective, a hybrid approach is actually best. There 
has to be some form of vertical hierarchy when establishing authority structures and 
when working with state and federal officials for support; however, a collaborative 
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approach leads to more partners with the ability to work together. Much like the model 
adopted in San Diego, an incident management system that allows for the flexibility and 
adaptability to bring in non-governmental partners is required. Therefore, this factor was 
slightly changed to allow for the hybrid approach to decrease fragility. 
2. Stability 
The second area of focus in determining fragility of a community involves areas 
that either increase or decrease stability. The four factors outlined in the framework were: 
interjurisdictional relationships, compartmentalization of the emergency management 
system, leadership, and the flexibility in emergency plans (see Figure 27).  
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Figure 27.  Fragility Factors for Community Stability 
Each of these four factors is apparent in all three of the case studies. The strength 
of interjurisdictional relationships is closely tied to the degree of connectedness as 
described above. Connectedness deals with the structure of the emergency management 
system; however, where this factor is more about the strength of the relationships 
themselves. Do they exist? If there is a need, are there organizations that can fill the need 
for the jurisdiction? Joplin, Missouri provided the best example of the utilization of 
multiple non-governmental partners, specifically the faith-based community, to assist in 
both day-to-day operations as well as emergency response and recovery. On the other 
hand, the relationship San Diego had with the Border Patrol actually worked against it in 
the sheltering of community members since a trust relationship had not been established. 
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Therefore, where strong relationships are necessary, those relationships should also be 
weighed against the need to ensure it is the right fit. In New Orleans, many of the non-
governmental partners were not allowed to respond, which caused great tension between 
governmental jurisdictions and support entities.  
Compartmentalization of the emergency management system is more difficult to 
assess. The San Diego example provides the best opportunity to see how this measure 
would work since it had multiple command organizations and coordination centers 
focused on specific areas of response, such as evacuation, sheltering, emergency 
notifications, firefighting, public information, etc. In this case, however, they also had 
communications difficulties between each group. Therefore, in order for this factor to 
work effectively, strong communications networks must be established between each 
group to ensure appropriate situational awareness and improved response.  
One of the strongest factors to promote stability of a community is leadership. 
Where leadership falls short, such as it did in the New Orleans example, trust diminished 
and chaos ensued. In the areas where leaders were visible and communicated strength in 
the face of adversity, community members and groups rallied around them to help 
support the response and recovery operations.  
The final factor to determine stability of a community is the presence of 
emergency plans and procedures that are flexible and adaptable. The Joplin case study 
illustrated that the community had a very structured plan but were able to move beyond 
that structure when necessary to ensure successful disaster response. In New Orleans, 
there was very little knowledge about the plan, which was illustrated when Mayor Nagin 
delayed the mandatory evacuation of the city to consult with legal counsel over the 
legality of such measures. Additionally, neither Mayor Nagin nor Governor Blanco 
showed understanding of emergency planning and the responsibility of local government 
in disaster response. In contrast, both San Diego and Joplin showed a unified effort 
between local and state officials, providing a clear line of authority and responsibility in 
utilizing state and federal systems. This factor was very influential in determining a 
community’s ability to recover.  
 126 
3. Sustainability 
The final area of focus involves factors that increase or decrease the sustainability 
of a community after a disaster. As stated previously, resilience is the current favorite 
term for many organizations to describe the strength of a community post-disaster; 
however, resilience is only one of four factors that determine sustainability. The other 
three consist of: resource management and supply chain management procedures, the 
ability to restore lost lifelines, and the recognition of small system failures that may lead 
to a cascade of failures (see Figure 28).  
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Figure 28.  Fragility Factors for Community Sustainability 
The ability to access critical resources in times of need is essential for a 
community’s recovery. The question that needs to be answered, however, was whether 
the lack of resource and supply chain management could lead to increased fragility of a 
community. In the Joplin case study, very few articles mentioned anything about a need 
for resources. Due to Joplin’s central location between four states, its ability to receive 
resources was not hampered and its plans seemed to be strong. San Diego also had strong 
plans for resource management through the Incident Management System. Due to the 
size of this disaster, and the fire jumping the major freeway, it did report the inability to 
get the right resources at the right time. This lack did not affect the community’s ability 
to recover as the delays in getting resources were small. In New Orleans, however, 
resource management was a critical factor in the community’s ability to recover. The 
Superdome is the most visible example of thousands of people without the necessary 
food and water to support them as the water surrounded them and cut them off from the 
 127 
rest of the community. The lack of a plan in this respect led to many of the difficulties 
and also decreased the trust in local officials. Additionally, due to the scope of this 
disaster, across multiple states, resources often had difficulty getting into the area. Supply 
chain management did not seem to be a consideration in planning efforts. Other 
communities in similar circumstances have flown in supplies as necessary until roads and 
bridges were repaired to ensure the community was able to manage during short-term 
recovery; however, this did not happen effectively in New Orleans. This example 
illustrates how the inability to receive and distribute supplies and resources can lead to an 
increase in fragility of a community.  
Along these same lines, the ability to restore lifelines is evaluated as a measure of 
fragility. Much like resource management, if lifelines cannot be restored quickly, the 
community will suffer longer and the possibility of secondary consequences increases. 
The Joplin case study demonstrated this understanding. The city developed priorities and 
timelines to re-establish lifelines, such as the opening of roads and medical facilities, and 
it met each one. This further established trust with the community members and allowed 
support organizations to continue working in the disaster area. On the other hand, the 
New Orleans example is an extreme case of the loss of lifelines. Also, due to Hurricane 
Rita following on the heels of Katrina, some lifelines were further delayed. That being 
said, redundant systems and lifeline support were not mentioned in planning documents 
or as priorities for the city. This disaster is more difficult to evaluate, however, due to the 
magnitude and the area affected.  
Resiliency was originally evaluated based upon the community’s ability to 
“bounce back” or recover after disaster. Joplin, Missouri provided the best example of a 
community that was able to bounce back after the tornado. Within a week businesses 
were re-opening and the community organizations helped to ensure schools could open 
and community services continued. On the contrary, the New Orleans case showed that 
resilience was lacking. One year after the hurricane, many people had not still returned to 
New Orleans, and hundreds of businesses never re-opened their doors. Entire 
communities changed overnight as well as new groups moved in and changed the 
structure of the community for the future.  
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The San Diego case study illustrated a lack in the fragility framework for 
emergency management. San Diego uses strong mitigation measures, specifically for the 
wildfire hazard. Years of efforts between building officials, land use planning officials, 
and wildfire officials led to a decrease in overall risk to property for many community 
members. Defensible space measures illustrated how a community could decrease risk 
from specific hazards in its area. This same concept could be used in tornado areas, such 
as Joplin, and in hurricane zones, such as New Orleans. Both have repeated danger from 
these types of storms and both could utilize building and land use codes to decrease the 
risk and improve the ability of the community to recover after the next disaster. 
Therefore, mitigation measures have been added to the model for future consideration.  
Finally, community sustainability was evaluated based upon the ability to 
recognize small system failures before they became larger or systemic failures. Both the 
Joplin and San Diego cases provided information about small weaknesses or failures that 
were addressed quickly. For example, when resource shortfalls were noticed, both 
communities quickly adjusted and were able to get resources from other sources quickly. 
In contrast, the New Orleans case illustrated the absolute necessity to recognize small 
failures before they lead to system collapse. Multiple small system failures occurred 
during the days leading up to the storm without recognition or action. For example, the 
city of New Orleans had over three days’ notice of the oncoming storm; the weather 
prediction center urged people to evacuate and predicted several levee failures. When one 
levee failed, it was inevitable that more would follow. Therefore, instead of merely facing 
a hurricane, the city had to face wide-scale flooding throughout most of its area. The lack 
of trust in key officials, such as law enforcement and elected officials, and also led to 
many refusing to evacuate, which in turn led to the human crisis that followed. Each of 
these single points of failure could have been avoided or remedied before full system 
failure occurred.  
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C. CAUSAL PREDICTION MODEL 
From the information provided in all three case studies, the theoretical framework 
developed through the literature review was adjusted, allowing for the development of a 
causal prediction model. This model indicates those factors identified in this research that 
help explain and predict the fragility of communities and systems in the emergency 
management field. The model, Figure 29, flows from left to right answering the question: 












The overall fragility 
of the community is 
decreased, leading 
to the increased 
ability to recover 
and the ability to 
adapt and gain 
strength before the 
next disaster
Community has no loss of leadership or a community 
lead during or after the emergency
Communities are not isolated, have multiple routes in 
and out, and work with neighboring communities, 
and…
Communities have high social capital in the forms of 
trust in formal systems, a high degree of community 
engagement, and strong social cohesion, and…
Communities use a hybrid approach to incident 
management through the use of 1) a formal incident 
management system to work with governmental 
entities, and 2) a collaborative approach using 
horizontal authority structures to ensure inclusion of 
non-governmental partners...
Communities have strong relationships with non-
profit, non-governmental, private sector and 
volunteer organizations, and…
The emergency management structure involves key 
support hubs, or compartmentalization to ensure 
each priority can be met, and…
Communities have strong leadership from both the 
informal community as well as the formal government 
structure, and…
Communities have flexible and adaptable plans and 
procedures that are able to change as needed to meet 
the circumstances of the disaster...
Communities have strong resources management 
plans, mutual aid agreements, and supply chain 
management procedures…
Communities have redundancies and/or the 
abil ity to quickly recover the lost lifelines to 
continue efforts toward recovery…
Communities are resilient through mitigation 
efforts, system redundancies, and strong 
community ties…
Communities have systems in place to recognize 
small system disruptions or disturbances, 
reducing the chance of cascading or full systemic 
failures...
 
Figure 29.  Causal Prediction Model of Community Fragility in Emergency 
Management 
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In this case, the model outlines each of the factors relevant from the case studies 
on the left. In the middle are the three primary categories for each factor: connectedness, 
stability, and sustainability. If the factors on the left are true, then it is expected that each 
of these categories will also be strengthened. If all three areas are strengthened, then it is 
also expected that the overall fragility of a community would be decreased and the 
community would not only be able to recover quickly but would also be stronger for the 
next disaster.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the three primary characteristics of fragility, using a multiple case 
study method, provides the necessary information to determine how each may play a role 
in this new model of community fragility in emergency management. More than anything 
else, this research shows that this is a complex endeavor, involving several moving parts, 
all working as one to ensure successful recovery. Each disaster is unique, and each will 
have its own set of challenges. Through a multi-method approach, however, fragility may 





VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 




This thesis introduces the idea of community fragility to the study and practice of 
emergency management. The assertions made at the beginning of this paper were that 1) 
there is a gap in the current emergency management literature and policies with regard to 
community fragility and what causes systems to fail, and 2) there should be a way to 
qualitatively measure fragility as an emergency management concept. These assertions 
were tested through the creation of various research products. The existing literature on 
fragility in complex systems provided the basis for a conceptual framework on fragility in 
emergency management. The multiple case study analysis allowed this framework to be 
evaluated and ultimately led to a community fragility causal prediction model, which 
reveals the factors and characteristics that drive community fragility and underlie a 
community’s ability to recover from and thrive following a catastrophic disaster. This 
naturally leads to additional questions and research possibilities in the field of emergency 
management.  
A. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research is only the first step in determining if fragility is a valid concept for 
emergency management. The research provides several indicators of fragility from 
various complex systems and provides examples of how those indicators could be used in 
the analysis of past disasters. The analysis also suggests a few different directions for 
future research on community fragility in emergency management.  
First, further research is needed to determine how each area of fragility can be 
measured. This thesis illustrates how each could be applied to a disaster in the United 
States, but further analysis is needed into each indicator of fragility to determine how it is 
measured. For example, how does one measure the isolation of a community? Is it 
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through ingress and egress routes, critical infrastructure access, or through the 
community members themselves? If measurement of these factors is possible, then 
further research could determine whether the factor increases or decreases fragility and to 
what degree. 
Second, further research has the potential to determine if the utilization of these 
indicators before a disaster could have positive effects after a disaster. For example, 
would actions within the community to increase social capital decrease civil unrest in 
incidents similar to the Los Angeles riots of 1992 or the community protests following 
officer involved shootings, such as the Ferguson Missouri shooting of Michael Brown in 
2014? The case studies suggest a connection through the actions of leaders, community 
structure, and the trust in formal systems. Further research is required, however, to 
determine whether a direct connection exists between each factor to increased or 
decreased fragility in these incidents.  
Finally, a discussion is required about the ways in which to utilize each indicator 
in the emergency management field for the greatest overall benefit to the community 
served. Once measurement has been established and the indicators of fragility have been 
shown to have a positive effect on outcomes, further research is needed to show how that 
information could lead to stronger emergency management systems and a change in 
policy direction to allow for a broader scope in mitigating disaster.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Emergency management involves various parts and pieces all working together 
toward a common goal, whether that goal is to better prepare a community, mitigate 
against future harm, respond to an event, or provide for the effective recovery of a 
community after disaster. Each piece is important to the success of the networked system, 
and a failure in one area could very well lead to a cascade of events that cause a collapse 
of the system as was shown in the Hurricane Katrina case. On the other hand, by 
fostering these networks and looking at them from a broader point of view, we may be 
able to identify small failures early and correct them before they lead to a cascade, much 
like the San Diego firestorm case where the community learned lessons as they moved 
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through the disaster and responded swiftly to the changing environment. The Joplin 
tornado case illustrated the enormous benefit of social systems working together with 
technical systems to provide the best support to a community. 
Each one of the case studies chosen for this research illustrated key concepts that 
are critical to emergency management when looking into the future. The first is the 
understanding that our disaster landscape is not the same as it was when the discipline of 
crisis management emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, crisis managers looked 
at a specific problem or a potential disturbance within a system. The aim was the same—
to stop a cascading event from occurring. However, it was assumed that the triggering 
event would be stable and recognizable. With the increase in complexity in the twenty-
first century, along with our highly interdependent global network, we have entered into a 
new era where we face greater instability and less recognizable problems.324 This 
research illustrates this new environment by outlining various factors of fragility from a 
systems perspective in a diverse manner. The research does not end at risk and 
vulnerability assessments; instead, it recognizes the importance of these factors along 
with the social structure of a community, the leaders who shape policy, the 
interdependencies in our critical infrastructure, the structure of emergency management 
systems, and the people who put it all together. 
Three themes have emerged from an examination of the research: connectedness, 
stability, and sustainability. Recent trends have shown an increase in focus upon resilient 
communities, but as shown in this research, resiliency is merely one factor of the whole. 
Along with resiliency, there are factors that affect the sustainability of a community. 
Additionally, the connections between community members, public officials, and 
emergency management practitioners play a role as well as the overall stability of the 
community before the disaster strikes. This could explain why plans and procedures so 
often fail despite the best efforts of everyone involved—they were looking through a lens 
that was too small.  
324 Anderson, Kennedy, and Ressler, “From Research to Praxis,” 490. 
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The concept of fragility alone is significant to the field of homeland security and 
emergency management. While studied in several other disciplines and fields, the term is 
just beginning to gain momentum in the area of disaster management. This causes a 
change in focus; instead of looking merely at how to reduce a threat, the study of fragility 
allows emergency managers to turn around and see the connections between multiple 
parts and pieces of the whole. Everything may be planned out well and executed as 
expected, only to see the event unravel and fail; however, a focus on fragility brings to 
light areas previously hidden that explain these failures and provide a roadmap to success 
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